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Entries Tagged as 'Robert Adams'

Thinking Matters Talk: Does Morality Need God? Part One

August 24th, 2022 Comments Off on Thinking Matters Talk: Does Morality Need God? Part One

This year the New Zealand apologetics organization Thinking Matters, ran a “Confident Christianity Conference” in Auckland. I was asked to speak at this conference on the topic. Does Morality Need God? Below is a slightly streamlined version of the talk I gave. “If God does not exist, then everything is permissible.” These words from Ivan […]

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Can a Divine Command Theory Vindicate the Objectivity of Morality: Huemer on Observer Independence, part two

September 12th, 2021 Comments Off on Can a Divine Command Theory Vindicate the Objectivity of Morality: Huemer on Observer Independence, part two

In my last post, I discussed Michael Huemer’s argument that a divine command theory cannot vindicate the objectivity of moral requirements. As I interpret him, the  argument is: [1] Our commitment to morality presupposes that moral requirements are objective. [2] Moral requirements are objective just in case there obtain facts about what is right and […]

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The Psychopath Objection to Divine Command Theory: Another Response to Erik Wielenberg (Part three)

October 8th, 2019 Comments Off on The Psychopath Objection to Divine Command Theory: Another Response to Erik Wielenberg (Part three)

In Part One, I expounded the Psychopath objection to divine command meta-ethics (DCM) that has recently been defended by Erik Wielenberg. Wielenberg argues as follows: R1) If God commands a person S to do act A, this command imposes an obligation on S to do A, only if S is capable of recognising the requirement […]

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The Psychopath Objection to Divine Command Theory: Another Response to Erik Wielenberg (part one)

September 3rd, 2019 Comments Off on The Psychopath Objection to Divine Command Theory: Another Response to Erik Wielenberg (part one)

www.youtube.com/watch?v=6iVyVJAMiOY.

Recently, Erik Wielenberg has developed a novel objection to divine command meta-ethics (DCM). DCM “has the implausible implication that psychopaths have no moral obligations and hence their evil acts, no matter how evil, are morally permissible” (Wielenberg (2008), 1). Wielenberg develops this argument in response to some criticisms of his earlier work. One of the […]

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Erik Wielenberg and the Autonomy thesis: part four Intrinsic goodness

March 31st, 2017 23 Comments

In my last two posts, I argued that  Erik Wielenberg fails to show that Godless Normative Robust Realism (GRNR) avoids some of the standard objections to the autonomy thesis. This brings me to Wielenberg’s third claim III, Wielenberg suggests that GRNR is prima facie preferable to various theistic accounts of axiological properties. Several authors have […]

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Erik Wielenberg and the Autonomy Thesis: Part Two Standard Objections to the Autonomy Thesis, Reasons to be Moral Without God

March 20th, 2017 3 Comments

The autonomy thesis contends that there can be moral requirements to φ regardless of whether God commands, desires, or wills that people φ. In his monograph, Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism,[1] Erik Wielenberg offers arguably one of the most sophisticated defences of the autonomy thesis to date. Wielenberg argues three […]

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Is Ethical Naturalism More Plausible than Supernaturalism? A Reply to Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Part II

April 26th, 2012 7 Comments

This is the second part of the paper I presented to the Naturalisms in Ethics Conference at Auckland University last year. In my previous post, I noted that Robert Adams has argued that if God exists, then divine commands “best fill the role assigned to wrongness by the concept”.[1] He argues that if moral obligations are […]

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