This is  first half of the paper I presented to the Naturalisms in Ethics Conference at Auckland University last year.

In many of his addresses and debates William Lane Craig has defended a Divine Command Theory of moral obligation (“DCT”). In a recent article Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has criticized this contention.[1] Armstrong contends that even if theism is true then a particular form of ethical naturalism is a more plausible account of the nature of moral obligations than a DCT is. This paper critiques Armstrong’s argument.

Craig’s contention
Craig’s contention is that if theism is true then we can plausibly explain the nature of moral obligation by identifying obligations with God’s commands analogous to the way “we explain the nature of water by identifying it with H2O, or explain the nature of heat by identifying it with molecular motion.”[2] By “God” Craig means a necessarily existent, all-powerful, all-knowing, loving and just, immaterial person who created the universe.

This emphasis, both on God as a loving and just being and identifying moral obligations with God’s commands suggests that Craig defends a version of the modified DCT defended by Robert Adams,[3] William Alston[4] and C Stephen Evans[5]. Both Adams and Evans have argued, like Craig, that if God exists then his commands “best fill the role assigned to wrongness by the concept”.[6] Much of Craig’s arguments can be seen as an appropriation and popularisation of Adams.[7]

Armstrong’s Argument from Harm
Armstrong contends that such a position is “incredible”[8], he states:

There is a much more plausible foundation for morality. It seems obvious to me, and to everyone who does not start with peculiarly religious assumptions, that what makes rape morally wrong is the extreme harm that rape causes to rape victims.[9]

We do not need a “new supernatural level” for morality because a natural property, the property of harming others without an adequate reason, fulfils the role assigned to wrongness by the concept better than divine commands do. Armstrong provides two arguments for this conclusion.

(a) The harm account makes moral obligations more objective than a DCT does;

(b) The harm account is more economical than a DCT.

Armstrong contends that his argument refutes, not just Craig, but any theistic account of ethics, “Other theists might try to give better arguments for a religious view of morality. I don’t see how they could avoid all the problems in Craig’s account without leaving traditional Christianity far behind.”[10]

I will address arguments (a) and (b) below. However, it is worth noting that, as stated, Armstrong’s conclusion here misses the point. He contends that everyone who does not start with peculiarly religious assumptions will see that the harm-based account is more plausible than a DCT. But Craig’s contention is that if God exists then a DCT is a plausible account of the nature of moral obligations. Neither Craig nor Adams contend that a DCT is the most plausible theory in the absence of religious assumptions. They contend that a DCT is the more “attractive theory, given those [theistic] beliefs, than any other meta-ethical theory is, given non-theistic beliefs”.[11] Note that this is not the conditional Armstrong addresses in his paper.[12]

Armstrong’s Arguments for the Superiority of the Harm-Account
Turning to Armstrong’s two main arguments in favour of the harm-account:

Objectivity
Armstrong’s first argument is that his harm account of moral obligations makes moral obligations more objective than a DCT does. He distinguishes between two “levels of objectivity”; a strong sense, where the wrongness of an action does not depend on whether anyone thinks or wants it to be wrong, and a weaker sense where the wrongness of an action does not depend on whether we think or want it to be wrong. Armstrong contends that divine commands are objective only in the first sense. God, after all, is “someone”. However, the natural property of causing harm is objective in both senses. Hence, his harm account provides a better explanation of the objectivity of moral obligations.

I will make three comments in response to this.

First, Armstrong’s harm account is not, in fact, more objective than a DCT.  If God exists then natural properties are not objective in the first sense. God is omniscient and is the creator and sustainer of the universe; hence, no natural property exists independently of his beliefs and desires. Natural properties can only be objective in the strong sense if theism is false but Craig is not arguing that a DCT is plausible if theism is false. His claim is that if God exists then there is a sound ontological basis for moral duties.

Second, the property of harming others is not objective in the weak sense either. In a later elaboration of his account Armstrong states that the badness of harm consists in it being “irrational to seek it (or not to avoid it) without an adequate reason”[13] and “to call such acts irrational is then, at least partly, to say that you and other normal people would never advise your friends (or anyone you care about) to do them”.[14] This entails that the badness of harming others, and the reason-giving force of the obligation, depends on what we (normal people) believe and desire and so it is not objective even in Armstrong’s weak sense.

Third, even if Armstrong’s harm account does make moral obligations objective in the strong sense. It does not follow that it is a better explanation of the objectivity of moral obligations. That follows only if strong objectivity is part of the “the role assigned to wrongness by the concept”, and hence, is the type of objectivity an account of moral obligations must explain. However, Armstrong provides no argument for this.[15] Moreover, Adams’ reason for claiming that objectivity is part of this role assigned to moral obligations is that “‘wrong’ has the syntax of an ordinary predicate, and we worry we may be mistaken in our moral judgments”.[16] We worry that, neither we nor society can “eliminate all moral requirements just by not making any demands”[17] and that “what the Nazi’s did to the Jews was horribly wrong whether or not the Nazi’s thought so and it would have been more horribly wrong if they had managed to persuade the Jews that it was not wrong”; these features of the concept only require weak objectivity.

Ockhams Razor
Armstrong’s second argument appealed to Ockham’s Razor; he stated “We should prefer simpler views when we have no reason to complicate matters.” However, “the divine command view adds a new supernatural level to its theory of morality. That added complication brings no benefits for the objectivity of morality”.[18]

In response to this argument I will make three points.

First, it is unclear that in the relevant dialectical context a DCT does violate Ockham’s Razor. Consider a related point by Alvin Plantinga:

Suppose we land a space ship on a planet we know is inhabited by intelligent creatures.  We find something that looks exactly like a stone arrowhead, complete with grooves and indentations made in the process of shaping and sharpening it.  Two possibilities suggest themselves: one, that it acquired these characteristics by way of erosion, let’s say, and the other, that it was intentionally designed and fashioned by the inhabitants.  Someone with a couple of courses in philosophy might suggest that the former hypothesis is to be preferred because it posits fewer entities than the latter.  He’d be wrong, of course; since we already know that the planet contains intelligent creatures, there is no Ockhamistic cost involved in thinking those structures designed.[19] 

Plantinga’s comments are aimed at debate over divine design. But something analogous occurs here. Craig and Adams are assuming for the sake of argument that God and his commands exist and asking what theory best explains the nature of moral obligation given these assumptions. One does not postulate a new supernatural level by explaining obligations in terms of divine commands. Armstrong’s appeal to Ockham’s Razor might[20] have “teeth”[21] if the naturalist and divine command theorist were starting from an agnostic position, and if the divine command theorist postulated the existence of God’s commands to explain the nature of moral obligation.  But Craig and Adams are not doing this.  They are assuming, for the sake of argument, that God and his commands exist and they are then asking which theory best explains the nature of moral obligation given these assumptions.[22]

Second, even if Armstrong’s naturalism is simpler than a DCT, it doesn’t follow it is a better account, all-things-considered. Simplicity is one relevant consideration. Another is which property best fits the role assigned to wrongness by the concept. Armstrong does not provide a reason for thinking his account does this. He argued it is a simpler account of the objectivity of moral obligations. However, objectivity is only one feature of moral obligations that a viable account must explain.

This is important because defenders of DCT contend it provides a better explanation of all the relevant features. Adams argued that if God exists then divine commands “best fill the role assigned to wrongness by the concept”.[23] He argued that if moral obligations are divine commands then this explains the fact that “wrongness is an objective property of actions”;[24] it also accounts for “the wrongness of a major portion of the types of action that we have believed to be wrong”;[25] It can explain how this property “plays a causal role … in their coming to be regarded as wrong.”[26]  And how moral obligations constitute a “supremely weighty reason” for doing or refraining from an action. Similarly, he contends that a DCT accounts for the intuition that our moral duties comprise “a standard that has a sanctity greater than that of any merely human will or institution”.[27] To conclude, his arguments call into question any theistic account of ethics that Armstrong needs to argue that his account provides a simpler account of all these features.

Part II coming soon…

Tags:   Divine Command Theory · God and Morality · Robert Adams · Walter Sinnott-Armstrong · William Lane Craig9 Comments