In Part I of my review of the debate between Sam Harris and William Lane Craig on the moot “Is the Foundation of Morality Natural or Supernatural? I discussed Craig’s defence of the contention that:
1. If God exists then we have a plausible account of (a) the nature of moral goodness and (b) the nature of moral obligation.
I noted that Harris’s attempt to refute this conditional failed miserably. However, he did not just offer a negative case; Harris contended that:
2. If atheism is true then we have a plausible account of (a) the nature of moral goodness and (b) the nature of moral obligation.
Harris defended 2(a) by contending that moral goodness could be identified with human well-being, which he “in turn” identified with physical states of the brain. Harris defended 2(b) by identifying our moral obligations with the property of promoting human well-being. Harris suggested that this means that moral questions are scientific questions that can be answered by science.
Harris’s Argument for Ethical Naturalism
Harris’s argument for 2(a) consisted of three claims. First, he proposed a thought experiment of a world without conscious beings. Intuitively, we judge that nothing is good or bad in this world because nothing matters to anyone in such a world, since there is no one for anything to matter to. Harris concluded that the existence of goodness is dependent on conscious beings.
Second, Harris asked us to imagine a world full of conscious creatures who live forever in excruciating pain. We intuitively judge this state of affairs to be bad and we intuitively assume a duty to avoid it.
Third, since states of consciousness are brain states, science can develop ways of promoting these states.
However, this argument fails to establish Harris’s conclusion. The first claim shows only that goodness depends on the existence of conscious beings. It does not show that goodness is a state of consciousness. Moreover, the second and third premises affirm that we have a duty to avoid maximising pain and that science can tell us how to fulfil this duty. It does not show that moral obligation is the property of promoting or enhancing human flourishing. Nor does the argument show that science can answer moral questions.
The argument, in fact, relies on people determining, by moral intuition, what things are good and what obligations we have prior to scientific investigation. After this is determined science is used to ascertain how to fulfil these duties. Nothing in Harris’s argument implies that science can discover what our duties are or what is good in the first place.
Moreover, as I noted in my previous post, this method involves accepting moral beliefs as properly basic. However, if it is the case that we can accept moral beliefs as properly basic then what is the problem with Alvin Plantinga’s contention that belief in God is properly basic? What exactly is it about religious beliefs that disqualifies them from being basic in the same way Harris contends moral beliefs are?
Craig’s response to Harris’s account of Goodness
Craig offered at least six different arguments in his critique of Harris’s naturalism.
Human Flourishing and ‘Speciesism’
First, Craig contended that,
“But if there is no God, what reason is there to regard human flourishing as in any way significant? … After all, on the atheistic view, there’s nothing special about human beings. They’re just accidental by-products of nature that have evolved relatively recently on an infinitesimal speck of dust called the planet Earth, lost somewhere in a hostile and mindless universe, and doomed to perish individually and collectively in a relatively short time.
This is mere rhetoric. As Wes Morriston argues the conclusion that “there is nothing significant about human flourishing” simply does not follow from the premises that: (i) humans are tiny compared to the universe, (ii) they have not been around very long, (iii) they owe their existence to mindless natural processes, (iv) they die after a short time, (v) eventually all of them will become permanently dead.[1] In fact, it is hard to see how any of the premises (i)-(v) imply this at all.
Craig’s premises allude to John Hare’s[2] and Stephen Layman’s[3] arguments that atheism does not allow for the existence of a moral order where, ultimately, virtue and happiness are conjoined. They argue that such an order is important for the rational authority of moral obligation.
However, at the point Craig offered this argument in the debate he was not attacking Harris’s account of moral obligation, nor was he addressing the question of morality’s rational authority. His conclusion was that “human flourishing”, sans God, could not be “significant”. Craig’s argument seems confused here, given the imprecision of the word ‘significant’ and his failure to spell out the links to the premises mentioned. Despite this, however, Harris never responded to the argument.
Craig’s second argument was more on point. He argued that if naturalism is true, there is nothing significant about human flourishing given that, on naturalism, humans do not differ in any significant way from other animals. Past critics of Craig, such as Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, have tended to dismiss this argument. I think this is a mistake. Craig’s comments and his references to “speciesism” – a term associated with Peter Singer – allude to a serious point made by both Singer and Nicholas Wolterstorff. In Justice: Rights and Wrongs Wolterstorff challenges the secularist who believes in human rights to identify a non-theological or non-religious property that:
(a) is possessed by all members of the human family;
(b) is not possessed by a terrestrial non-human animal;
(c) can be plausibly said to give humans worth sufficient to account for the standard rights we grant to humans; and,
(d) is not a property that is possessed by different humans to different degrees.[4]
Criteria (a) and (b) are necessary if rights are going to be granted to all human beings and not to animals like cows or dogs; (c) is necessary for the property to ground the kinds of human rights we recognise; (d) is necessary if all people have “equal rights”. If the property that grounds rights comes in degrees, and some people have it more than others, then people will not have equal rights. The problem according to Wolterstorff is that no non-theological property we know of appears adequate to do this. Interestingly, Singer has made the same point, arguing that our moral codes must be radically revised so that the welfare of human infants is not given more importance than that of pigs.
Harris’s response to this was inadequate. He stated that if it is a sin to be concerned about sentient life on this planet then he’ll take being sinful. He then remarked, “One wonders what Dr Craig is focused on”. However, Craig never said that being concerned about sentient life is sinful. The real wonder was what Harris was focused on – it was clearly not the arguments of his opponent.
Evolutionary Scepticism
Craig’s second objection alluded to an argument made by Mark Linville, Sharon Street[5], and others. In his opening argument, Harris relied on moral intuitions concerning, good, evil and duties. Linville has argued that if God does not exist then the theory of evolution leads to moral scepticism about our basic evaluative judgements and our other evaluative judgements by implication – given that our non-basic judgements derive from these.
Craig argued that contemporary evolutionary psychology teaches that our basic evaluative judgements have evolved from precursors in lower primates. Evolution, however, is unconcerned with truth per se; it merely selects adaptive behaviour. As Craig pointed out, if God does not exist then the process evolution took is the result of numerous chance contingencies. There are a huge number of different ways evolution could have occurred. Each different way offers the possibility that radically different evaluative judgements of humans or any other moral agents could have emerged. Consequently, it is highly unlikely that the evaluative judgements we actually ended up making, given how the evolution did occur, just happened to be objectively true; this entails that all possible judgements that could have been made just happened to be false. [6]
Once again, Harris gave no response to this argument.
Identity and Incoherence
In his rebuttal, Craig made a further argument Harris’s position. Harris claimed that well-being is identical to goodness; however, identity relations such as this are, in philosophical language, ‘necessarily’ true. If A is identical to B then there is no possible world or situation where A and B are not identical. Craig noted that, in his book, Harris appeared to admit it was possible that doing evil might enhance human well-being. He also appeared to say that if this occurred then the “landscape would not be a moral landscape”. But this admits that there is a possible world where human well-being is not identical with what is morally good, and hence, logically is not identical in the actual world. Harris’s only response was to state “that was interesting” and then change the subject to questions of hell and religious exclusivism – issues which were not the subject of the debate.
Craig’s response to Harris’s account of Obligation
Craig also offered several arguments against Harris’s account of obligation.
Moral Lawgiver
The first was his argument that “moral laws require a lawgiver”. This argument is unpersuasive. As many have noted, it is not obvious that laws always require a lawgiver; the laws of mathematics and logic for example do not. For Harris, obligation could perhaps function a bit like laws of nature. Just as with gravity, if one drops something then that thing falls to the ground, so to with obligation – if one does X then it is a scientific fact that well-being will be enhanced.
Yet, again, Harris again said nothing in response.
A related argument Craig gave was that obligations arise in response to imperatives from a competent authority. I addressed this argument in my previous post, I suggested that it is not entirely cogent but that Craig was probably alluding to Robert Adams’s point that obligations can be plausibly construed as “social requirements”. Being obligated to do X differs from having a reason to do X or it being good to do X. If one is obligated to do X then one has to do X. Failure to comply brings censure, guilt, shame and alienation from other people. Adams observes, “having an obligation to do something consists in being required (in a certain way, under certain circumstances or conditions), by another person or group of persons, to do it”[7] This feature of obligation, moral or otherwise, makes obligations very different from laws of logic or natural laws. Once again, Harris offered no response to this argument.
Is-Ought Fallacy
Craig’s second argument against Harris’s account of obligation was that his position violates the “is-ought fallacy”. Harris’s position is that our moral obligations can be determined by scientific research. But while science can tell us descriptive facts, it simply cannot tell us whether these facts were good or were identical to goodness. Nor can it tell us which facts are identical with the property of being morally obligated.
Harris did respond to this argument but in a confused way. He argued that scientists often assume certain epistemological values and virtues in their research, and that there is no way to actually argue for these values. But even though this is true, the fact that scientists rely on certain virtues to conduct research does not show that one can validly infer a substantive evaluative answer from that research. The is-ought fallacy does not claim that you cannot rely on values when you discover facts, it claims that you cannot deduce values from facts. Harris’s own comments suggest that science often operates by making moral assumptions which it cannot itself validate or prove, and are therefore known from some source other than science itself.
Ought Implies Can
The last objection Craig offered was that moral obligations presuppose the ability to make morally responsible choices. Implicit in our moral discourse is the notion that “ought implies can”. A person can be morally required or obligated to do something and be culpable for not doing it only if they can choose to not do it. This is why, for example, we do not have laws requiring people in wheelchairs to walk and why we don’t hold small children or the insane responsible for crimes, and so forth. Craig noted that Harris himself rejects the notion of moral responsibility. Harris rejects libertarian free will, the idea that human beings have a will that is not determined by prior physical events. He also rejects compatibilism, the idea that human responsibility is compatible with physical determination. Consequently, Harris’s own view commits him to denying that human beings can have moral obligations.
Yet once again, Harris did not respond to the argument presented.
Conclusion
Concerning the issue of ethical naturalism, it seems clear that Craig made the better case. Harris opened with an argument that did not, in fact, establish what he thought it did – something Craig made obvious. Craig then responded with three arguments against Harris’s account of goodness and another three against his account of obligation. Granted, some of these arguments were rhetorical flourishes that on examination required more exposition but others alluded to or presented significant challenges to Harris’s ethical naturalism.
What was telling was that Harris did not respond adequately to any of them, and in most cases he did not respond at all. One challenge he responded to with a thinly-veiled insult; another he responded to by simply confusing the derivation of an ought from an is by presupposing an ought in order to act in a way that enables one to determine an is while nevertheless maintaining the reverse i.e. that the ought (moral) has been derived from the is (scientific).
With every other argument, Harris offered no rebuttal or reply whatsoever. He changed the subject, and often aggressively attacked the truth of various Christian beliefs that were irrelevant to the moot of the debate. But even aside from this, Harris never offered any rationale for accepting his own meta-ethical stance of ethical naturalism and did not even attempt to mount any remotely rational defence of it against Craig’s criticisms.
[1] Wes Moriston “God and the Ontological Foundation of Morality,”Religious Studies, doi:10.1017/S0034412510000740, Published online by Cambridge University Press, 15 February 2011.
[2] John Hare The Moral Gap (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996; Paperback 1997); Why Bother Being Good? (Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, April 2002); “Moral Faith and Providence” a paper presented at the 1996 Annual Wheaton Philosophy Conference, accessed 27 December 2010; “Is Moral Goodness without Belief in God Morally Stable” in Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics eds Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008).
[3] C. Stephen Layman “God and the Moral Order” Faith and Philosophy 19 (2002) 304-16; “God and the Moral Order: Replies to Objections” Faith and Philosophy 23 (2006) 209-12; “A Moral Argument for The Existence of God” Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics eds Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008) 49-66.
[4] Nicholas Wolterstorff Justice: Rights and Wrongs (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008) see chapter 16.
[5] Sharon Street “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value” Philosophical Studies 127 (2006) 119.
[6] Mark Linville “The Moral Argument” in The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology William Lane Craig and JP Moreland (Eds) (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2009) 393-417.
[7] Robert Adams Finite and Infinite Goods (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999) 242.
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Debate Review: Sam Harris and William Lane Craig on Divine Command Theory Part I
Tags: Debates · Ethical Naturalism · God and Morality · Is the Foundation of Morality Natural or Supernatural? · Notre Dame · Robert Adams · Sam Harris · Wes Morriston · William Lane Craig41 Comments
A common objection to belief in the God of the Bible is that a good, kind, and loving deity would never command the wholesale slaughter of nations. In the tradition of his popular Is God a Moral Monster?, Paul Copan teams up with Matthew Flannagan to tackle some of the most confusing and uncomfortable passages of Scripture. Together they help the Christian and nonbeliever alike understand the biblical, theological, philosophical, and ethical implications of Old Testament warfare passages.
Hi Matthew. I just have one question/disagreement. With regard to Craig’s argument that there doesn’t seem to be anything special about humans by which to ground that our flourishing ought to happen you said Craig was just appealing to rhetoric. I disagree. It seems that he is trying to highlight that humans haven’t come into being in any special way and that we’re just like every other thing that has come into being in the universe. If that’s the case, then it doesn’t seem that the atheist has any reason to regard humans as special or superior in any way to lava rocks on a distant moon. I think that’s important to point out, but perhaps I’m missing something.
It seems very important to most that the opposing side answer every claim laid down by their opponent. Craig did indeed lay down allot of arguments but this is a well known technique and for harris to spend his time merely answering Craig’s questions would not have won him any favors. I also note Craig’s tendency to sum up things for Harris, which if you’re just listening to Craig’s side, makes it appear like he is also winning as he puts words in his opponents mouth. These are all just debate tactics but unfortunately, neither side gets to set the addenda nor is obligated to answer the others questions. The lack of response or counter to the opponents argument is not telling of the lack of a valid argument but is just how debates go. I find that most debators in these situations are not actually talking to their opposition but rather to the audience. If they win more support by going down a different track then that’s what they’ll do. This all aside, from my side of the fence, what I don’t understand with all of these moral arguments is why craig and others get so caught up on the fact that morality must tied to obligations and that morality is objective. Morality is continually evolving around us and can be seen to be evolving throughout the bible… why are we hung up on objectivity?
John, if morality changes then things which are now identified as morally “wrong” may become morally “right.”
Morality did not “evolve” in the Bible. From the beginning human life had such value that the only penalty acceptable for murder was the death of the offender. Specific expressions of morality, ie ethics, did change based on the social climate that morality was expressed in.
Harris actually answering Craig’s arguments would have been a good start. That’s why it’s called a “rebuttal.” The purpose of a debate is to defend your position, and rebut your opponents position. Harris didn’t defend his position, and he did nothing to rebut Craig’s position.
John you write “This all aside, from my side of the fence, what I don’t understand with all of these moral arguments is why craig and others get so caught up on the fact that morality must tied to obligations and that morality is objective. Morality is continually evolving around us and can be seen to be evolving throughout the bible… why are we hung up on objectivity?”
Objectivity is actually an important part of our concept of moral obligations ( and wrongness). For example, (a) we discuss and debate moral questions, this assumes that other people can be mistaken about morality. Proponents of abortion rights for example think that those who do not support abortion rights are mistaken, that’s why they debate the same is true of most issues in applied ethics. (b) Similarly, we use moral principles to criticise policies and practises in our and other societies. The campaign against slavery, or sweat shops, or in favour of womens sufferage, or civil rights, and so on involved doing this. (c) We consider some changes in a socities moral codes to be an improvement, the examples I mention above would be a case in point.
But all these features (a) (b) and (c) entail that the concept of moral obligation is of something “objective” . (a) assumes that other people can be mistaken about what is just and that when two people come to contradictory views at least one is mistaken. (b) assumes that moral principles transcend societies and societies mores can fail to live up to these principles (c) entails the same thing, it suggests that one can asses whether the norms accepted by a society are closer to or further from where they should be and so on. All this presupposes objectivity.
As to your claim “Morality is continually evolving around us and can be seen to be evolving throughout the bible…” I think is conflates the sociological sense of morality ( understood as the norms accepted by a society) with the normative sense (understood as what we are obligated to do) , its true that the former evolves, but this only tells us that different peoples and societies understanding of what they are obligated to do changes over time, it does not mean that moral obligations they actually have change. The same kind of argument could be used to suggest that scientific claims are not objectively true, one could not that “science” is evolving and has evolved over time, therefore scientific statements are not true. No one would accept this argument, so why is it a good argument in ethics?
I think it is workable theory to say that as the sociological sense of morality changes, so do the moral obligations change.
We all agree that when looking back through history it is obvious that the sociological sense of morality has changed.
It appears that we are moving in the right direction. As jason says, things which are now identified as wrong or right may change. To put another to death for murder is, in many places, considered morally wrong these days.
Does this mean we are moving closer toward an objective moral gold standard? Not necessarily. It may seem that way given hind sight but couldn’t you just as easily say that we are learning as we go along and generally getting better and better at surviving in a world that is more closely packed and socially driven than ever?
Evolution can give the appearance of design but there is not necessarily a goal aside from the better survival of each generation.
The examples you mention, such as the campaign against slavery, sweat shops, civil rights etc, could all be examples of society looking for a better way to develop and flourish.
Comparisons and judgements between two people with opposing views does not have to assume that there is an objective moral obligation that transcends society but just that one has evolved a better way of doing things than the other given the particular circumstances at the time.
The danger in assuming an objective morality is that one may be left behind and cling on to barbarities for longer.
Scientific knowledge is evolving in a different way as there is an objective universe out there to catalog – it is amoral, and a different kind of knowledge – I don’t see how the two arguments come together.
But moralities aim does not have to be objective as our needs and the demands put on us and what is best may change. There may be a ‘best’ way to be moral, and for our current situation on this planet there probably is. What I don’t see is that this has to be externally and objectively set out in stone somewhere any more than scientific truth. It just seems that way.
@Matt writes:
“Objectivity is actually an important part of our concept of moral obligations ( and wrongness). For example, (a) we discuss and debate moral questions, this assumes that other people can be mistaken about morality. Proponents of abortion rights for example think that those who do not support abortion rights are mistaken, that’s why they debate the same is true of most issues in applied ethics. (b) Similarly, we use moral principles to criticise policies and practises in our and other societies. The campaign against slavery, or sweat shops, or in favour of womens sufferage, or civil rights, and so on involved doing this. (c) We consider some changes in a socities moral codes to be an improvement, the examples I mention above would be a case in point.”
Your examples of slavery, child labor and women’s rights are good ones but your conclusions have the benefit of hindsight. At one point in our history it was not considered immoral to keep slaves, deprive women of the right to vote and work or make children work long hours in factories. Yet now most everyone agrees that those things are immoral.
Where’s the objectivity?
Nick, your argument does not follow. Your premise is
[1]some past societies held moral beliefs that we now believe are false”
infer from this that
[2] moral claims are not true independently of whether a society believes in them
This does not follow, consider the following analogous line of argument.
[1]’ some past societies held cosmological beliefs that we now believe are false
infer from this that
[2]’ cosmological beliefs are not true independently of whether a society believes in them
The fact that a person or society believes something, does not mean its true, on many issues people and whole societies can be mistaken. We recognise this point in every other sphere of study. Its bizarre that in ethics and religion people suddenly think otherwise.
But all these features (a) (b) and (c) entail that the concept of moral obligation is of something “objective” . (a) assumes that other people can be mistaken about what is just and that when two people come to contradictory views at least one is mistaken. (b) assumes that moral principles transcend societies and societies mores can fail to live up to these principles (c) entails the same thing, it suggests that one can asses whether the norms accepted by a society are closer to or further from where they should be and so on. All this presupposes objectivity.
I’m not sure. I think that morality has no objective basis (in the sense “moral good” doesn’t exist as anything other than a concept in human brains). Amazingly, I think evolutionary skepticsm you talk about (which is a pretty silly argument when it comes to our cognitive faculties, IMHO) is pretty much a knock-out blow to moral realism for an atheist – if there were moral facts there’s no reason to imagine evolution would find them.
BUT, moral intuition is a human universal. Societies will always build ethical standards, and actions will always be judged in light of them (and our own minds will always develop within in them). Since ethical systems will always exist – I think we should use our ethics to foster (well, I’ll just say it) human flourishing.
So, if I wanted to argue against abortion rights I’d try and argue a fetus was truly human, or that the suffering caused by abortion is unreasonable. If I argue against the treatment of women in Islamic societies, I’ll simply argue that those systems are unfair to women and cause suffering.
Now, I’ll admit that make s moral debates hard work – if I want to convince someone my ethical standard is better than someone else’s I also have to convince them that something like “preventing undue suffering” should be the basis and many people won’t accept that.
(I realise these aren’t particularly well put together ideas, just trying to say that discarding objective morality won’t, in practice, open the door to any old ethical system. )
Matt would it be more that Moral claims may be true independent of weather a society values them because they are best for that society or species. It does not follow that they will always be true due to the fact that society changes. So in a way I suppose it is objective but as a consequence of society not because they are independently applied.
I think the reason it is not similar to your cosmological argument is because cosmology claims are easily testable and repeatable but thats not to say it cant be done i suppose. I don’t work in your field however I’d be keen to read up on any reasearch or trials that have been conducted.
Personally I think that both theories are workable – morals originated from a higher authority or as a product of society, it really just depends on the world view we bring to the table. As for me I’m not really sure where I stand but it isn’t firmly in either camp.
The first was his argument that “moral laws require a lawgiver”. This argument is unpersuasive. As many have noted, it is not obvious that laws always require a lawgiver; the laws of mathematics and logic for example do not.
You’ve equivocating here Matt. The laws of maths/ logic (truths derived by deductive arguments) the laws of science (suppositions derived by inductive reasoning) and moral laws (external oughts) are not the same. The first 2 were named after the first based on vague analogy but they all belong to fundamentally different categories.
John,
I was going to say this in response to your last post, but what you sketch actually presupposes objectivity.
Your suggestion is that there are things that are best for, or better for a society or societies. You suggested that when people disagree over a social practise, or when we abolished slavery and so on, this was due to the fact that some cultural practises are better at achieving this goal. This would seem to be a fact about those things that holds independently of whether the societies believe or accept them or not. Hence, its objective, of course what counts as good for a society will depend on the nature of the society, but that does not change the fact that it’s still objective.
Now I myself don’t object to the claim that we have at least a prima facie duty to support or advocate practises that enable society to survive. The issue in this context is not about that, in the context of meta-ethics the question is wether its plausible to claim the nature of moral obligation itself is identified with the property of promoting societal survival. One can grant we have an obligation to do this, but that’s different from claiming that the property of being obligatory just is (is identical to) the property of causing society to survive. I’d be sceptical of this latter thesis simply because I think that moral obligations are different ontological entities to causal laws, obligations have certain features which causal laws do not have. And I think a DCT is a more plausible account of the nature of moral obligation.
I think the reason it is not similar to your cosmological argument is because cosmology claims are easily testable and repeatable but that’s not to say it cant be done i suppose.
This difference does not matter because I was commenting on the logical structure of the argument not the epistemic status of the premises. The structure of this argument is invalid, it infers from the premises that
[1] people once believed P
[2]people now believe not P
Therefore
[3] P is not objectively true.
This argument is invalid regardless of wether the premises are “testable” or not.
As to testability, I don’t think moral claims can be tested empirically, for example the claim “Rape is wrong” or the claim “its wrong to torture little children” are not claims that can be empirically tested.
Bossmanham, that’s an interesting suggestion, I guess Craig could be read as arguing that humans lack any theological property that makes them special relative to any other animal in the universe, and hence rhetorically challenging the atheist to come up with a natural (or secular) property that can do the work. If this is the case then Craig is making a point similar to Wolterstorff.
David Winter,
It seems to me that, if moral facts exist, then God exists, and it’s quite likely that, since God exists, he would make sure we come to know them.
Interesting debate,
Why assume moral facts means ‘human flourishing’ in a liberal pluralistic sense? It can also mean exclusionary fascist/nationalistic expressions of population control. I’m talking about Ancient Sparta’s eugenics through infanticide, Nazi Germany’s Lebenschraum’s policy and South Africa’s Apartheid system, Human intuition for morality is notoriously fluid in concepts of what consitutes the best for society irregardless of its under divine rule or not. It doesn’t really follow that because one lives at a secular democratic open society, this society is at the apex of morality, when other societies which have degraded views of human rights have also been operative in the past.
@ Alvin:
I agree with your entire post
“It doesn’t really follow that because one lives at a secular democratic open society, this society is at the apex of morality, when other societies which have degraded views of human rights have also been operative in the past.”
Yes, yes and yes again.
However, if we lived in a Theocratic society, with God given morality – would it be any different ? If so, why ?
I can agree with the holes in Harris’ argument that you’re pointing out, I just don’t see how it then validates a Christian Theistic moral worldview as an alternative.
Sorry it came across the way you put it matt. I’m trying to argue that while there may be an ideal/objective way of ‘flourishing’ (which would be hard to prove) it is plausible that this may not be true forever. What are objective moral values today may not apply to the conditions of tomorrow. So I suppose I agree with you on one point, I think morality is more of a curve. Do I believe there is there a point to it? A direction? I have to concede that despite my desire for things to have a purpose and some unwavering objectivity, maybe not.
I think that moral obligation is more nuanced than just concern with survival. Other things come into play such as individual and collective happiness, love etc. I would postulate that out of the complexity of human society these days come some very developed moral obligations that could plausibly be purely a product of the society that upholds them.
I agree with you that DCT could also be a plausible account of the nature of moral obligation but for me this leaves me with more questions than it answers. Maybe a distant deity who set things in motion could fit with this?
But it’s not just moral obligations but the non-obligatory actions that people selflessly undertake that interest me. Humans, who may be the only ones who can put themselves in someone else’s shoes, have ended up with the golden rule. I think allot of what we do morally does not come solely out of obligation but because of our ability to feel the suffering of others and remedy it. But I go off on a tangent….
Is there any way to study what is causal morality? someone must have tried. If natural philosophy can’t answer the questions then can experimental philosophy shed any light? Don’t worry matt I’m not advocating murder and rape in the cause of research but surely peoples sense of obligation can be studied etc.
@Paul
For the purposes of the above debate Craig wasnt trying to justify a Christian theistic worldview. As he repeated numerous times “If God exists….then”
If God exists we would be foolish in the extreme to ignore Him if He chose to communicate with us. If God doesnt exist then survival is the only criteria of anything and our species is no more special than any other and nowhere near as successful as many.
“I would postulate that out of the complexity of human society these days come some very developed moral obligations that could plausibly be purely a product of the society that upholds them.”
I think you are confusing “moral obligation” with “peer pressure”. Just because society pressures you into particular actions or directions , no matter how complex their causes, doesnt make those actions/directions right or moral.
Take as an extreme example Nazi Germany. It was obligatory, enforced by law, the physical power of the state and by created social norms to turn in Jews and anyone who spoke against the actions of the govt, in to the authorities. Still this was wrong. Only adherence to a set of external objective moral standards not swayed by the norms and conventions of that society allowed some people to see this. Most succumbed to the pressure.
Well, I’m really not criticizing Harris I’m just perhaps entertaining the idea of nihilism, or the nothingness that characterizes moot points between arguments proposed by the Atheists and the Theists on the grounds of morality, God and the law. One of the problems in the theistic side is source ambiguity, which god to follow and translating that to the atheistic side is which ideology to follow best?
Perspective-wise aspects of the Christian critique looks a lot like a mutated form of De Sade’s Amoralism and Nietzsche Transvaluation criticism of enlightenment values and on the other side Skeptics point to the Euthypro’s dilemna and William of Occam’s fatalism that he simply acquiesce to declaring rapine to be legal if God so wills it.
So Paul, its not that I’m saying the christian moral view is superior to the atheist ones, that’s why in my post I mentioned “irregardless of divine rule” its that they both are incomplete and suffer ambiguity problems. now I know Harris attempts to shore up a scientific view of morality in this book just as M Adams and Wolterstorff have done so in modifying DCT to counter the latest attacks by atheist philosophers, but by no means is the debate on morality sources over.
On a curious note, is morality legitimate because it has strong enforcement backing? “right is right because of martial might”
I was disturbed to hear a documentary made that Hitler could have conquered Western Europe IF it hadn’t been for his clumsily made decisions not to invade Britain, but instead make a leeway for Russia. Nazi Germany at this time had a higher quality guns, armor and armaments and England’s RAF was just beginning to catch up to them, in addition to poor armaments and logistical problems that the British Army was suffering from, Odds were in favour of the Nazis taking over England and if that happened, Ingsoc would be a reality and every british baby would be indoctrinated to a German aryan moral view.
Paul, who said anything about a theocracy? The divine command theory is simply the view that moral wrongness is (is identical with) Gods prohibitions. Nothing in this thesis tells us what these prohibitions are.
I find it puzzling that when this view is discussed sceptics suddenly start talking about the Taliban. Are the stereotypes and prejudices of the sceptical community really that skewed that they must always jump to this conclusion. Anyone who thinks God and morality are linked must be a theocractic Taliban supporter?
Matt, they’re just following their source material.
Wasn’t it Harris who claimed that the old woman putting flowers in her church exactly like the terrorists who flew planes into buildings?
The “Taliban” are the example they reach for when deriding the evils of religious leadership.
Ironically, in the name of multiculturalism, the secular democracies are importing the roots of religious dictatorship. I find that to be most amusing.
I think it was Churchill who said, ‘the Hun is always either at your throat or at your feet’ and the same is true of Islam.
Moderator, could you please edit that last remark quoting Churchill. We have many good Muslim friends and I would be ashamed for them to see that written in a Christian blog. (And then please remove this comment too).
Moderator, could you please edit that last remark to say “I would be delighted for them to see that written in a Christian blog” (And then please remove this comment too).
Matt,
Images like the Taliban’s Shari’ah come to mind in light of the Prohibitions of cultural expressions found in the Mosaic Law like worshipping other gods for example. or advocating death to close relatives and friends for even suggesting apostasy to Yahweh. How can you explain this snippet?
Not all gods in the ANE were that debased and debauched, some were benign just so happens the prohibition would assume idolatry is equated to lifestyles that were pernicious to the moral purity of Yahweh such as cultic prostitution and human sacrifice that were associated with the worship of sumerian fertility and war deities. But you really can’t count on the OT to give you a foretaste of expression and freedom of religion that democratic countries have now. Social justice yes as wolterstorff explains, but not expression or the right to convert or de-convert.
Alvin your question and comments assume there is no truth. What if Yhwh is the one true God? what then of His objections to people choosing wooden or stone idols in preference to Him?
@ Matt:
“Paul, who said anything about a theocracy? The divine command theory is simply the view that moral wrongness is (is identical with) Gods prohibitions. Nothing in this thesis tells us what these prohibitions are.”
Ok, so where do those prohibitions come from and how can a citizen of a country living under a legal system founded on DCT determine whether their actions are moral or immoral ?
DCT seems to be more than just a theory but is applied as a system of law in a number of jurisdictions, which is surely the point that Harris was making ?
Aside from that I cannot reconcile the idealized God that Craig was describing with the Christian God – doesn’t the fourth commandment include a justification by jealousy ?
“I find it puzzling that when this view is discussed sceptics suddenly start talking about the Taliban. Are the stereotypes and prejudices of the sceptical community really that skewed that they must always jump to this conclusion. Anyone who thinks God and morality are linked must be a theocractic Taliban supporter?”
No, we could discuss the Fundamentalist Mormons or the Branch Davidians instead. The Taliban make a better soundbite, but they are not the only available example of DCT being misused.
@Paul
No comment on the Mormons or Branch Dravidians but a note on jealousy.
One lesser known meaning…
“solicitous or vigilant in maintaining or guarding something: eg The American people are jealous of their freedom.”
When God speaks of being a “jealous God” He is doing so in this sense, ie what is His by virtue of who and what He is, He is not prepared to share with created things. This has no resemblance to the “green eyed monster” of sexual rivalry or who has the best car or biggest house etc.
I dont know whether you have children but try and imagine your response if someone tried to ursurp you position as your daughters father, take her love and exercise authority in her life, in front of you while you were there ready willing and able to be everything a father ought.
OT
London ‘Taliban’ attempting to impose Sharia law.
No Peter D, you may know good Muslims, I may know good Muslims, but Islam itself, going back to Mohammed himself, is not good.
Read the Koran and the Hadiths, contrast those with the New Testament, and see how Mohammed fares against Jesus.
Sorry to dump that on you, Moderator. On calmer reflection, let me put it this way. Jason, the Muslims we know best are gentle intelligent people who know their Qur’an but who show no more desire to take over the world than do followers of any other mission-minded religion.
Of course they have learned the benefits of living and studying in a free society, and so have we – fortunately for us all..
Paul,
I guess Matt’s predictions comes true then, instead of presenting more or better sound bites can you at least be honest in stating that DCT is a founding bed rock in not just western law, but the principle of governance. I’m talking about certain elements of the Mosaic law like safeguarding the rights of the marginalized elements of society, property and asylum rights (cities of refuge) the virtue of non-discrimination and not to perjure in court
Almost all legal and moral codes enacted by humanity has been associated with deities, polytheism/pantheism (Vedas, The Laws of Manu, Buddha’s Dharma, the Mandate of Heaven, the Twelve Tablets) monotheism (Mosaic Law, Justinian Code, Shariah) Its a tad bit immature and ungrateful to just appropriate all these laws, remove all the divine associations with them to secularism and pretend that people who were prophets, oracles who were inspired by the gods to be mad and bad.
You’ve also mentioned a mis-use implying that there is a right and correct usage in interpreting DCT with the right exegesis, hence the obsession of Christianity to form a canon and get the official story right based on witness testimonials, OT references and facts, not contrived propaganda. This is not a power play, its a consensus-building process akin to creating a statement of values based on reasonable facts. Otherwise some idiot would like a fundy atheist create his/her own version of Christ ex nihilo and start spouting out teachings that are bizzare or contrary to scripture.
Paul,
Jeremy has a point, think about it.
@ Jeremy:
“I dont know whether you have children but try and imagine your response if someone tried to ursurp you position as your daughters father, take her love and exercise authority in her life, in front of you while you were there ready willing and able to be everything a father ought.”
I don’t think that that’s actually addressing my point, nonetheless, the scenario you positing has already happened – the day she went to nursery school, infants, primary and then secondary school to name but four, then of course she’s at the age where boys that are friends become something more and hopefully one day she’ll marry.
Am I “jealous” ? No, I’m a parent who accepts that his children grow and develop. Equally, I don’t portray myself to them as “perfect” either.
@ Alvin:
“Otherwise some idiot would like a fundy atheist create his/her own version of Christ ex nihilo and start spouting out teachings that are bizzare or contrary to scripture.”
I think what you meant to write was
“Otherwise some idiot would like a fundy theist create his/her own version of Christ and start spouting out teachings that are bizzare or contrary to scripture.”
Like the Branch Davidians, the Mormons, the JWs etc, etc.
In which case I can see your point, but who is to say that the DCT basis advocated by one of these groups is wrong and the DCT basis used by other Christians is right ? They all claim a foundation based on a “God” of one description or another.
From the outside it all looks very confusing, but very well argued.
Paul you write ”Ok, so where do those prohibitions come from and how can a citizen of a country living under a legal system founded on DCT determine whether their actions are moral or immoral ?DCT seems to be more than just a theory but is applied as a system of law in a number of jurisdictions, which is surely the point that Harris was making ?”
This is doubly problematic, your first paragraph assumes that a DCT is a theory of moral epistemology, that it contends one discovers what is right and wrong through some revelation like the koran. But that’s false, it’s a theory about the nature of moral obligations. Moreover, this is made abundantly clear in the literature. In fact the leading defenders of DCT in the literature (such as Quinn and Adams) hold that one can know right and wrong through ones conscience. Adams in fact has a chapter where he argues that one should not accept the story of Abraham and Isaac because its clear a loving and just God would not command that. The point is a DCT does not entail anything about moral epistemology, so appealing to cases where people appeal to Shariah law to discover right and wrong are simply straw man, fairly blatant ones at that. A simple reading of the literature would ascertain this. So again I ask, why do sceptics keep doing this?
Second, this claim assumes that the Taliban or the other examples you use of branchdavidians, or fundamentalist mormons held to a divine command meta-ethic. Whats the evidence for this? The fact someone believes in divine commands and applies to life does not entail that they hold to a divine command meta-ethic. I doubt many of those people really have done serious meta ethical theorising.
Third, if you want actual examples from history they are there. Take middle ages when the Inquisition occurred, we know that the Dominican order which was involved in carrying this out, were not divine command theorist’s. They understood goodness in terms of human well being which was a natural fact. We were obligated to do what promoted human flourishing by using reason. It was believed that God’s law coincided with this ( sound familiar?). That’s an actual example of naturalism. Why not use this example when talking about naturalism, if your so worried about theories being misused?
Divine command theories on the other hand became popular after this time. Prominent historical examples are John Locke, who promoted a divine command theory in his Essay on Human Understanding We know how Locke applied his theories politically, his two treatise on civil government which was a founding text of liberal democracy and defended limited government, inalienable rights, government by consent is well known. As is his defence of religious tolerance. That’s an actual historical example. Another is Samuel Pufendorf, who defended a divine command theory, he latter applied this politically in his works on the On The Duty of Man and Citizen According to the Natural Law. . Another very prominent divine command theorist was William Paley, he wrote a whole book arguing for various social reforms on the basis of a DCT , such as the abolition of slavery in the 19th century, Paley argued that a loving God would want humans to be happy and so suggested various reforms on this basis.
So we do actually have clear historical cases of people who held to a DCT and advocated social reforms on its basis. This is all documented history. So again why use the examples of the Taliban ? I think the honest answer is that atheists who do are trying to appeal to a sterotype and whip up fear and hatred, that’s called bigotry.
“Aside from that I cannot reconcile the idealized God that Craig was describing with the Christian God – doesn’t the fourth commandment include a justification by jealousy ?”
Actually Craig’s definition of God as an immaterial person who is all knowing, all powerful, essentially just and loving, is the standard definition in Christian theology. The question of whether the God presented in the bible can be identified with this being is an interesting question, but it is irrelevant to the truth or falsity of a DCT. Because a DCT states the property of being morally prohibited is identical with the property of being contrary to the commands of God defined in the way Craig stated. To refute a DCT you need to show that it’s implausible to identify the property of being morally obligated with the property of being commanded by God, so defined.
Like the Branch Davidians, the Mormons, the JWs etc, etc.
In which case I can see your point, but who is to say that the DCT basis advocated by one of these groups is wrong and the DCT basis used by other Christians is right ? They all claim a foundation based on a “God” of one description or another.
This suggests that any one who claims God as a foundation is advocating a DCT meta ethic, that’s false.
Not also these people argue that humans flourish if they follow the path they advocate, so by parity of reasoning we could say these people are follows of Harris.
From the outside it all looks very confusing, but very well argued.
Really, so when David Koresh states that a perfectly just, loving being has commanded people to engage in child molestation, its not easy to tell if what he says is true or false.
I find this a little hard to take seriously. As has been pointed out in previous posts. We have a reasonable grasp of what is right and wrong, we also know that its part of our concept of goodness that a good person does not command wrong doing. So in many cases we actually have a pretty good idea what a just and loving omniscient person would command. Unless you embrace a fairly radical moral scepticism this argument does not fly.
Paul either you are being deliberately obtuse or you failed to understand the different meanings of “jealous”
WRT your daughter if you put her in nursery school etc then they are not ursurping your rightful position in her life but rather have authority delegated by you. You example therefore is completely irrelevant to the point i was trying to make.
I would be pretty sure any prospective boyfriends or husbands are specifically not interested in ursurping your position as your daughter’s father.
@ Matt:
I’m just trying to see where the DCT line of argument leads to
“Really, so when David Koresh states that a perfectly just, loving being has commanded people to engage in child molestation, its not easy to tell if what he says is true or false.”
I think if you read the accounts of what happened in the compound that’s not far off what was said and how it was justified.
“I find this a little hard to take seriously. As has been pointed out in previous posts. We have a reasonable grasp of what is right and wrong, we also know that its part of our concept of goodness that a good person does not command wrong doing. So in many cases we actually have a pretty good idea what a just and loving omniscient person would command. Unless you embrace a fairly radical moral scepticism this argument does not fly.”
I’m beginning to think that I do, and that I’m not the only person taking this view.
I think that in the right surroundings it is very possible to remove the conceptualised notion of a “properly basic idea of right and wrong” ie it’s not hard coded into us.
Maybe I view human behaviour far more cynically that yourselves.
Anyway, I’m still learning this DCT stuff, so I could well be wrong 🙂
@ Jeremy:
It’s not my fault that ‘jealousy’ seems to have a range of meanings.
🙂
Paul
I am well aware that this is what David Koresh claimed that’s why I used it as an example.
My point is this: a DCT claims that an action is wrong if and only if God understood as a just and loving being, commands it.
Now take David Koresh he claims, God commands those in his compound to allow him to molest their children.
You suggested that “from the outside” claims like this appear very well argued and confusing”
Now, and this is my point. I find it hard to believe you really think this. I think we have really good reasons for thinking that Koresh is mistaken, why, because we know that just and loving people do not command things like this. We know that laws permitting child molestation are unjust, we also would not consider any parent who handed there children over to another to be raped to be acting in a loving or just manner. Hence, given we know this we have really good reasons for thinking Koresh was a quack. I also do not think you are confused about this at all. I suspect you know full well that a perfectly just and loving person did not command this. Which raises the question, why use it as an example?
That was Craig’s point in the debate, Harris cited the Taliban, and as Craig pointed out Harris himself is being disengenious. Harris for example is not confused about whether the Taliban really represent the will of a loving and just omniscient person, he cites these examples because he takes it as patently obvious that no loving or just person could support these examples. So his suggestion that it’s a counter example to a DCT was disengenious.
I wrote some stuff on this a while back if you remember http://www.mandm.org.nz/2010/10/god-morality-and-abhorrent-commands-part-i-kant.html
http://www.mandm.org.nz/2010/10/god-morality-and-abhorrent-commands-part-ii-robert-adams.html
http://www.mandm.org.nz/2010/11/god-morality-and-abhorrent-commands-part-iii-philip-quinn.html
The point is this, if we can know with a degree of reliability what counts as right and wrong conduct, then we know with the same degree of reliability what a perfectly good fully informed person would command us to do. Because, I take it as conceptually true that a perfectly good fully informed person does not command wrongdoing.
@ Matt
“Now, and this is my point. I find it hard to believe you really think this. I think we have really good reasons for thinking that Koresh is mistaken, why, because we know that just and loving people do not command things like this. We know that laws permitting child molestation are unjust, we also would not consider any parent who handed there children over to another to be raped to be acting in a loving or just manner. Hence, given we know this we have really good reasons for thinking Koresh was a quack. I also do not think you are confused about this at all. I suspect you know full well that a perfectly just and loving person did not command this. Which raises the question, why use it as an example?”
I’m using it to refute your last paragraph.
“The point is this, if we can know with a degree of reliability what counts as right and wrong conduct, then we know with the same degree of reliability what a perfectly good fully informed person would command us to do. Because, I take it as conceptually true that a perfectly good fully informed person does not command wrongdoing.”
I don’t think that human beings naturally reach moral value judgements as though there is a recognised moral value giver or as though those moral values are hard-wired into them.
The point about Koresh, and others like him, is that he was able to use, wittingly or unwittingly, psychological techniques such that outsiders might view his actions as immoral from their viewpoint but insiders would not and he could justify himself by appealing to his own warped version of DCT.
To use yet another example (note I’m not using the Taliban or any other non-Christian group but I could well do) during the Rev Jim Jones of Jonestown got 900 of his followers to commit mass suicide (including children). So, if you’re correct then some of these people should have know that their actions were immoral and should have attempted to prevent the loss of life. No such attempt was made.
So is that a failure of the morality you’re advocating or a failure to perservere under strong psychological pressure ?
As I said earlier, maybe I’m a lot more cynical about human nature than you guys.
Paul, not sure what your argument is here. It seems to consist of two premises. First, that David Koresh, Jim Jones and so on used a divine command metaethic to convince there followers to do crazy things. Second, that if a meta ethical theory is used by some people to convince others of crazy things the theory is false.
I don’t think either premise is plausible.
First, I see no evidence either Jones or Koresh held to a divine command meta-ethic. The mere fact people (i) believe in God and believe in (ii) divine commands and (iii)people think one should obey Gods commands does not make them a divine command theorist. Natural law theorists for example hold all (i) (ii) and (iii), yet a natural law theorist does not believe that wrongness and rightness consist in disagreement and agreement respectively with Gods commands. Natural law theorists believe that believes that what is good is human flourishing and act act is right if it enhances this flourishing. God commands acts because they are right prior to his commanding. A divine command theory is a particular theory on how God’s commands relate to moral obligation. I doubt Koresh or Jones really gave much thought to these meta-ethical questions. Most people don’t engage in meta-ethical theorising.
Second, it seems to me that any meta-ethical theory can be used by evil people to convince others to do crazy things. Consider forms of ethical naturalism which identify good and right with human flourishing. Many crazy things are justified in the name of flourishing. Suicide bombers for example believe that they will flourish in the after life if they blow themselves up. The Inquisition was often justified on the grounds of social peace and human flourishing. Stalinists justified atrocities on grounds it would bring about a more flourishing society. Or consider non naturalist Platonist views, Plato used these to argue for all sorts of unjust acts, and so on. There is no claim that is such that a evil person can not use it to try and manipulate others. Think of how many times people have appealed to alleged scientific claims to defend evil and crazy things. Does this mean these claims are false? Not at all.
So as I said the Taliban argument is simply an appeal to fear and prejudice.