My paper, “The Psychopath Objection to Divine Command Theory: Another Reply to Erik Wielenberg” has now been published by The European Journal for Philosophy of Religion here. The abstract is as follows:
Recently, Erik Wielenberg has developed a novel objection to divine command metaethics (DCM). The objection is that DCM “has the implausible implication that psychopaths have no moral obligations and hence their evil acts, no matter how evil, are morally permissible”. This article criticizes Wielenberg’s argument. Section 1 expounds Wielenberg’s new “psychopath argument” in the context of the recent debate over the Reasonable Unbelievers Objection. Section 2 discusses two ambiguities in the argument: in particular, Wielenberg’s formulation is ambiguous as to whether Wielenberg uses the word “obligation” in an objective or subjective sense. Section 3 argues that this ambiguity undercuts the argument. If Wielenberg is using the word obligation in a subjective sense, his arguments do not show that psychopaths “have no moral obligations”. By contrast, if Wielenberg is using the word obligation in an objective sense, his arguments do not show that divine command theorists are committed to denying that psychopaths have obligations.
A pre-published copy is available on my academia.edu page.
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A common objection to belief in the God of the Bible is that a good, kind, and loving deity would never command the wholesale slaughter of nations. In the tradition of his popular Is God a Moral Monster?, Paul Copan teams up with Matthew Flannagan to tackle some of the most confusing and uncomfortable passages of Scripture. Together they help the Christian and nonbeliever alike understand the biblical, theological, philosophical, and ethical implications of Old Testament warfare passages.
Hi Matt
I read through a number of your posts around the Sidgwick and Dawkins ones but comments are not open there and I am interested in this following comment of yours.
@Matt “Someone who asks, “if there is no God, why be good?” need not assume the only reason he or anyone else has for doing good is divine reward or punishment.”
So, what is/are the other reason/s for being morally required to be good that you alluded to, since you say that the property of being morally required is identical with the property of being commanded by God? I was expecting to see what you thought the other reasons were and didn’t see them. Or did I miss them?
In Theory Of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith said there are only two possible reasons to obey God – The first being the one Sidgwick mentioned about reward and punishment and that you mentioned in your Orewa talk, and the other being because God is the Creator and the created should be grateful and obey.
Do you agree with Smith, or are there any other reasons for obeying God that Smith didn’t know of.
I had a listen to your 10 January 2021 talk at Orewa Community Church, but did not hear the other reasons, just the one you said was not the only one.
Regards
Alan
Alan
Some philosophers believe there are what David Brink calls “impartial reasons” they contend the fact some action benefits or harms other people, provides an agent with reasons to perform or refrain from an action, and these reasons are not derived from the agents interests or aims.
My knowledge of Smith’s moral theory is not very comprehensive. However, I suspect he is committed to something like these reasons or at least needs them if his own moral theory is to work. My understanding is that Smith himself emphasizes “sympathetic” reasons as an important reason to behave morally. Smith understands moral judgments as judgements whereby we project what an impartial spectator would make. The fact an impartial person would be sympathetic to the plight of others provides some reason for us to act.
If moral wrongness is (identical to) the property of being contrary to God’s commands, then we will have strong impartial reasons to do what is morally required. God is an all-powerful, all-knowing, essentially benevolent, and impartial agent. So what God commands is co-extensive with prescriptions that a benevolent, impartial person who was fully informed and reasoning correctly would endorse.
The issue with the dualism of practical reason is not that we don’t have reasons to act impartially that aren’t derived from our aims or interests. The problem is that prudential and impartial demands conflict, whatever reasons we have are matched or even overridden by prudential and instrumental reasons to the contrary.