In my last post, I criticised David Brink’s argument that a divine command theory cannot vindicate the objectivity of morality. A different version of the objection comes from Elizabeth Tropman. Tropman begins by giving several reasons for thinking that moral realism is an attractive moral theory. She then argues that a divine command theory fails to vindicate this realist kind of objectivity.
[I]t is not even clear that divine command theory is compatible with a realist view of ethics after all. Divine command theory was supposed to secure the objectivity of moral demands by making morality independent of us. Yet, for many moral realists, morality’s obtaining independently of us is not enough for it to be objective. Objective moral
requirements are supposed to be independent of any subject’s moral attitudes, not just ours. As leading moral realist Russ Shafer‐Landau puts it (2003), objective morality is stance‐independent “in the sense that the moral standards that fix the moral facts are not made true by virtue of their ratification from within any given actual or hypothetical perspective” (p. 15, emphasis in original). On Shafer‐Landau’s view, objective moral standards are valid independently of anyone’s perspective on them. This perspective could be one of an actual or hypothetical agent, human or divine. The moral requirement to help those in need would be objective just in case it does not have to be ratified, preferred, or willed by any agent to be valid. Divine command theory does not count as a form of realism on this approach since moral rules are wholly determined by God’s will.[1]
We can summarise this as follows:
[1] Moral standards are objective
[2] moral standards are objective only if: the moral standards that fix the moral facts are not made true by virtue of their ratification from within any given actual or hypothetical perspective.”
[3] If a divine command theory is true, then the moral standards that fix the moral facts are made true in virtue of their ratification from within a given actual perspective.
The conclusion is that a divine command theory has implausible implications.
I think the argument fails for reasons similar to the reason’s Brink’s does.
First, as Tropman formulates her argument, [3] is false. Tropman relies on Russ Schafer-Landau’s idea of stance independence: the moral standards that fix the moral facts are not made true by virtue of their ratification from within any given actual or hypothetical perspective” this definition comes from p 15 of Shafer-Landau’s book “Moral Realism: A Defence” in this chapter, Shafer-Landau clarified the difference between moral realism and constructivism. As Shafer-Landau understands it, constructivism accepts the reality “of the moral domain” but sees it as “constructed” out of the attitudes of various agents. By contrast, realism affirms that moral reality is “stance independent” in the way specified. Tropman fails to notice a clarificatory footnote Shafer-Landau annexed to the very next paragraph:
How should we classify views that make the determination of moral truth dependent on God’s ratification of the relevant standards? Such views seem most naturally grouped with realism, even though on these accounts, there is a constructive function that explains the correctness of the proper moral standards. For my purposes it doesn’t matter how we serve this taxonomic problem. All divine command theories incorporate a constructive function, to be sure, but it is also the case that the relevant standard-setting attitudes are not those of any human being-the attitudes (no matter how refined) of us mere mortals do not do the relevant work. Place these theories as you like; I don’t think anything that follows will be importantly affected by assigning such views to one camp rather than the other.[2]
In this note, Shafer-Landau says divine command theories are “most naturally” classified as realist theories. Although, divine command theories entail those moral standards are “constructed” out of the attitudes of an agent. They are not ratified from the standpoint of actual or refined (idealised) human beings. This suggests that when Shafer-Landau referred to stance independence, he meant independence from the perspective of actual or idealised human agents.
This suspicion is confirmed by a later essay Shafer-Landau’s published
Moral realism is the view that …moral judgments are made true in some
way other than by virtue of the attitudes taken towards their content by any actual or idealised human agent.
If torturing a child is wrong, it is not because of anyone’s disapproval of such an action. It is not because the action falls afoul of standards that I endorse, or rules that any society accepts. Even the disapproval of an ideal observer – say, someone who knows all nonmoral facts, and is fully rational –is not what makes an action wrong. For moral realists, the ultimate standard(s) of morality are as much a part of reality as the ultimate laws of logic, or the basic principles of physics. Perhaps God (if there is a God) made them up, but human beings certainly didn’t. (emphasis added)[3]
Here Shafer-Landau defines moral realism as the view that moral judgements are not true in virtue of the attitudes that actual or idealised human agents take towards their content. Moral realism contends that moral facts are objectively true in the same sense that the laws of physics are real objective facts. It may be that God has created these laws. However, their truth does not depend on whether any actual or hypothetical idealised human agent ratifies them.
If my interpretation of Shafer-Landau is correct, Tropman’s argument has a false premise. If we accept Shafer-Landau’s definition of stance independence, The argument would be
[1] Moral standards are objective.
[2] moral standards are objective only if: the moral standards that fix the moral facts are not made true by virtue of their ratification from within any given actual or idealised human perspective.
[3] If a divine command theory is true, then the moral standards that fix the moral facts are made true in virtue of their ratification from within a given actual human or ideal perspective.
[3] is false. Divine command theories do not entail that moral standards are ratified from any actual or idealised human perspective. A divine command theory maintains that God ratifies moral standards. God is neither an actual human being or a hypothetical human being appraising under ideal methods or conditions.
However, there is a better way to read Tropman’s argument here. Instead of seeing her as adopting Shafer-Landau’s definition of stance independence. We could read her as advocating her own stronger understanding of stance independence. Whereby moral standards are objective only if they are valid independently of absolutely anyone’s perspective on them. Let’s refer to this account of stance independence as “unrestricted stance independence” in contrast to Shafer-Landau’s, which I will call “restricted stance independence”. Taken this way, Tropman is arguing the following:
[1] Moral standards are objective.
[2] moral standards are objective only if: the moral standards that fix the moral facts are not made true by virtue of their ratification from within any given actual or idealised perspective, human or divine
[3] If a divine command theory is true, then the moral standards that fix the moral facts are made true in virtue of their ratification from within a given divine perspective.
On this construal [3] is true. The problem, however, is now with premise [1]. For this argument to be valid, the word “objective must have the same meaning in premises [1] and [2]. Consequently, we should read premise [1] as claiming that it is plausible that moral standards presuppose unrestricted stance independence. But there appears to be no non-question-begging reason for thinking this is true. Consider the arguments Tropman gives for [1]
Those who think that morality is objective believe that moral requirements are not up to us; moral obligations would be as they are irrespective of our thoughts or feelings on the matter. For objectivists, lying, cheating, and stealing would still be wrong even if we thought otherwise or approved of these actions.… Moral realism is often seen as the default meta‐ethical position (see Brink 1989). It is natural to suppose that some actions are morally right or wrong, and that an action’s morality is something we discover, not create. Moral realism is appealing because it makes sense of moral error, moral progress, and the authority of moral demands. Since morality is not up to us, it is possible for us to make moral mistakes and genuinely disagree about what is morally right or wrong.[4]
None of these considerations gives us any reason for thinking that moral standards display unrestricted stance independence. The thesis of restricted stance independence can account for each of them. Suppose that the property of being morally required just is the property of being commanded by God. It will still be the case that moral requirements are “not up to us”. Lying, cheating, and stealing will still be wrong even if we thought otherwise or approved of these actions. Moral obligations will be as they are “irrespective of our thoughts and feelings on the matter”. Morality will still be something we “discover”, not “create”. People can make mistakes and genuinely disagree about what God has commanded. People can make progress in their fidelity to God’s commands. Individuals and societies can undergo religious reforms, where mistaken but socially accepted understandings of Gods will are repudiated. Moral facts will still be objective facts in the same sense that the laws of physics are objective facts. It will still be true that moral facts are not constructed from our desires via some idealised method or procedure. None of this is at all surprising; the only difference between restricted and unrestricted interpretations of stance independence is that the latter contends morality is independent of God. For all non-divine agents, the implication of each interpretation is the same.
In, Formulating Moral Objectivity, Tropman does give some reasons for formulating moral objectivity in terms of unrestricted stance independence. In this article, Tropman examines and criticises several attempts to define what it means for moral obligations to be objective. Early on, she discusses one definition which restricts stance independence to human agents. Tropman refers to this account as M2. She gives the following reason for rejecting it:
“The trouble with (M 2) is that it cannot treat other classes of anti-realist anti-objectivists as such. Divine Command Theorists maintain that an action is right just in case God says that it is. On this theory, moral facts would indeed be independent of any of our moral beliefs. To respect this intuition about objectivity, we can revise (M 2) to refer, not only to human moral beliefs, but to those of any agent, actual or hypothetical, human or otherwise.”[5]
Here, Tropman states that any definition of moral objectivity, which restricts stance independence is to human agents, is problematic. Why? Because, if you restrict it this way, a divine command theory would satisfy the definition and hence entail that morality is objective. Tropman is taking it as a desideratum of any account of moral objectivity that a divine command theory does not satisfy it. She uses this desideratum to determine which theories of objectivity and stance independence are acceptable theories.
Whatever one thinks of this method of theory selection. Tropman cannot use it in the present context. Tropman is arguing against divine command theory on the grounds that it contradicts a plausible definition of moral objectivity. If the definition is considered plausible because of this implication, the argument is contrived and viciously circular. Critics of divine command theory cannot stipulate that a plausible account of moral objectivity must be incompatible with divine command theories and then use these accounts to argue that divine command theories are not objective. To do this is just to rig the game.
Tropman, like Brink, fails to establish that divine command theories cannot vindicate the objectivity of morality. In both cases, I think the reason is similar. It isn’t enough to say that divine commands are not objective in some stipulated sense or other. If you define objective standards as standards valid independently of anyone, including God’s perspective, it will be trivially obvious that Gods commands are not objective standards. The question is whether divine command theories vindicate the kind of objectivity presupposed by our moral commitments. The type of objectivity it is plausible to attribute to moral standards.
[1] Elizabeth Tropman “Meta-ethics” Companion to Atheism and Philosophy ed Graham Oppy (Wiley-Blackwell, 2019) 345
[2] Russ Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism: A Defense (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 16
[3] Russ Shafer Landau, “Ethics as Philosophy A Defense of Ethical Nonnaturalism” in Ethical Theory an Anthology, Second Edition. ed Russ Schafer-Landau (Malden MA: Wiley and Sons, 2013).This article is reprinted from Metaethics After Moore Eds Terry Hogan and Mark Timmons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) which was published three years after Moral Realism: A Defence.
[4] Margret Tropman “Meta-ethics” 344
[5] Elizabeth Tropman “Formulating Moral Objectivity” Philosophia 6:2 (2018) 1028
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