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Does the Dualism of Practical Reason assume Egoism?

July 30th, 2021 by Matt

Recently, I have been examining the question, “If there is no God, why be good?” As I interpret it, this expresses an argument about the “dualism of practical reason” made by Henry Sidgwick and John Gay. This argument had three steps.

  • First, unless we assume that it is always in our long-term self-interest to follow the demands of impartial altruism, we will not always have decisive reasons to do our duty.
  • Second, secular accounts of sanctions and moral and accountability would, if true, undermine this assumption. They imply that it is not always in our long-term self-interest to follow impartial demands.
  • By contrast, if true, a divine command theory would vindicate this assumption and provide a coherent account of our fundamental intuitions about the authority and content of moral requirements.

The conclusion is that those divine command theories can coherently answer the question: “why should I always do my duty?” whereas secular ethical theories cannot.

The first step of this argument was motivated by concerns about “the dualism of practical reasoning”. A contradiction that results from three intuitively plausible premises:

[1] We always have decisive reasons to do what is morally required.

[2] An action is morally required if it is required by rules justified from a perspective of impartial altruism.[1]

[3] If there are cases where what is demanded by impartially justified rules conflicts with our long-term self-interest, we do not always have decisive reasons to do what is required by impartially justified rules.

These three premises entail that we must either: (a) embrace the thesis that impartial demands and prudential demands never conflict or (b) embrace a contradiction. Affirming both that we do and do not always have decisive reasons to do morality requires.

Some object that [3] assumes the truth of rational Egoism: the thesis that I have a reason to perform some action if and only if, and because performing that action maximises my self-interest. Walter Sinnott Armstrong, states.

Harming others is sometimes in some people’s best interest, even considering probable costs. In those cases, some theists say that only a divine threat of Hell provides a reason to be moral. Since atheists and agnostics do not believe in God, they do not believe in divine retribution for sins, so they have to admit that sometimes some people could get away with immorality and then they have no self-interested reason to be moral. Does that mean that these people have no reason at all to be moral? No. That conclusion would follow only if every reason had to be self-interested, selfish, or egoistic. There is no basis for that assumption. Many reasons are not based on self-interest…[2]

Armstrong provides cases where the fact an act would benefit other people provides us with reasons to do it. He concludes:

“The fact that an act prevents harm to another person can be a reason for me to do that act. These reasons are not self-interested. They are facts about the interests of other people, not me. These unselfish reasons can answer the question, “Why be moral?”[3]

I think this dismisses the problem far too quickly. In this post, I will explain why I think this.

At the outset, one must concede that some important defenders of [3] have appealed rational Egoism. Consider, John Gay; Gay argued that:

Thus those who either or don’t mention the will of God, making the immediate criterion of virtue to be the good of mankind; must either allow that virtue is not in all cases obligatory (contrary to the idea which all or most men have of it) or they must say that the good of mankind is a sufficient obligation. But how can the good of mankind by any obligation to me, when perhaps, However, its clear in particular cases, such as laying down my life, or the like, it is contrary to my happiness?[4]

Gay uses the word “obligatory” to refer to what agents have decisive reasons to do. However, he bases his conclusion on an egoist understanding of practical reasons. Earlier, he wrote, “Obligation is the necessity of doing or omitting any action in order to be happy” we are obliged to do or omit an action…” when there is such a relation between an Agent and an action that the agent cannot be happy without doing or omitting that action.”[5]

On some interpretations, Sidgwick held a similar view. According to David Brink: “Sidgwick wants to represent the dualism of practical reason as a conflict between a utilitarian account of duty and an egoistic or prudential account of rationality.”[6]

If rational Egoism is true, we have a powerful argument favouring [3]. Suppose we grant rational Egoism and affirm the antecedent of [3] we get.

[3a] We have a reason to perform some action if and only if, and because performing that action maximises my self-interest.

[3b] There are cases where what is demanded by impartially justified rules conflicts with our long-term self-interest

The conclusion that follows is

[3c] There are cases where we have no reasons to do what is demanded by impartially justified rules.

So, it is true that many people who have argued for [3] have appealed to Egoism. It is also true that rational Egoism would, if true, provide grounds affirming [3]. However, these facts do not show that [3] assumes rational Egoism. All they show is that some arguments for [3] depend on rational Egoism.

There are other arguments for [3] which, do not appeal to rational Egoism, which have the same result. Consider, for example, David Brink, whom I mentioned above. Brink is a leading secular meta-ethicist representing a position known as “Cornell realism“: a research project that attempts to vindicate objective moral facts within a scientific-naturalist view of the world. In doing so, Brink appeals to the thesis that all reasons for action are agent-relative: “Reasons for action are dependent on the aims or interests of the agent who has them.”[7] According to this thesis, what an agent has reasons to do, is a function of or derived from his desires and interests. Facts about reasons are simply facts about what humans desire are interested in or aim at under certain conditions.  This thesis is popular in contemporary philosophy. Brink summarises some of the reasons for its popularity:

Agent-relative assumptions seem to underlie many formal and informal discussions of individual rationality in philosophy, economics, and politics. Moreover, an agent-relative theory provides a reliable link between reasons for action and motivation, we expect one who recognises reasons for action to be motivated to act on them, and an agent seems more likely to be motivated by facts about his own interest or desires than by facts about the interest or desires of others. Also, when we explain an agent’s behaviour as an attempt to satisfy certain desires, given her beliefs, we are said to “rationalise” her behaviour. This suggests that genuinely rational behavior is that which would promote the agent’s desires or at least those desires that she would have if she met certain epistemic conditions.[8]

This thesis does not entail that all reasons are self-interested. Even if benefiting another does not promote my interests, it can still fulfil my desires or aims. What the thesis rules out is the existence of “impartial reasons”. Reasons to promote the good of others that don’t derive from the interests or aims of the agent in question.[9] Moreover, if the thesis is true, there is a sound argument for something like [3].

[3a]* An agent has a reason to perform some action if and only if, and because, that performing that achieves ّthe agents aims or promotes the agents’ interests

[3b]* there are cases where what is demanded by impartially justified rules conflicts with the agents’ aims and is not in the agents’ interest

Therefore

[3c] There are cases where we have no reasons to do what is demanded by impartially justified rules. [10]

Because this thesis entails that we have no reason to comply with morality in cases where doing so is not in our interests and contrary to our aims, other philosophers reject it. They contend there are also impartial reasons: reasons to promote the welfare of others that don’t derive from our interests and aims. However, even if one grants the existence of impartial reasons, worries about the dualism of practical reason still arise. Brink explains:

[W]e do not need to think of rationality in exclusively prudential terms to raise this worry. The worry can arise even if there are impartial reasons-that is, nonderivative reasons to promote the welfare of others. For as long as there are prudential reasons, a conflict between impartial reason and prudential reason appears possible. Without some reason to treat impartial reasons as superior, the supremacy of other-regarding morality must remain doubtful.[11]

Suppose impartial rules demand something contrary to our self-interests. If such cases occur, impartial reasons will point in one direction, and our interests and aims will point in another. This situation generates the sceptical question, “Why be Moral?” What reason do I have, in such cases, to follow impartial rules, not my self-interest? One cannot answer this question by pointing out we have impartial reasons to follow such rules. The question, after all, is why I should give impartial reasons precedence? Nor can it be answered by appealing to my interests or aims because the case is one where morality and such things conflict. 

Stephen Layman provides a vivid example of the problem:

Ms Poore has lived many years in grinding poverty. She is not starving but has only the bare necessities. She has tried very hard to get ahead by hard work, but nothing has come of her efforts. An opportunity to steal a large sum of money arises. If Ms. Poore steals the money and invests it wisely, she can obtain many desirable things her poverty has denied her: cure for a painful (but nonfatal) medical condition, a well-balanced diet, decent housing, adequate heat in the winter, health insurance, new career opportunities through education, etc. Moreover, if she steals the money, her chances of being caught are very low, and she knows this. She is also aware that the person who owns the money is very wealthy and will not  be greatly harmed by the theft …Ms. Poore faces the choice of stealing the money or living in grinding poverty the rest of her life. In such a case, I think it would be morally wrong for Ms. Poore to steal the money; and yet, assuming there is no God and no life after death, failing to steal the money will likely deny her a large measure of personal fulfilment, i.e. a large measure of what is in her long-term best interests.[12] 

Layman accepts that Ms Poore has impartial reasons not to steal.[13] However, these reasons conflict with powerful prudential reasons to steal. Plausibly, there are stronger reasons to break in cases like this than complying with impartial rules. Compliance will be “irrational—in the sense that it involves acting on inferior or weaker reasons.”[14] 

Let’s recap the dialectic: if rational egoism is true, we lack reason to obey impartial rules if doing so is contrary to our self-interest. If all reasons are agent-relative: we will lack reason to obey if doing so is not in our interests nor promotes our aims. By contrast, if there are impartial reasons, if compliance is not in our interest, prudential and impartial reasons will conflict. There is no reason always to treat impartial rules as having precedence in such conflicts. Even if rational egoism is false, a problematic dualism of practical reason looms.


[1] To avoid wordiness, I will use the phrase “impartially justified rules” to refer to rules which are justified from a perspective of impartial altruism.

[2] Walter Sinnott Armstrong, Morality Without God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 114

[3] Walter Sinnott Armstrong, Morality Without God 117

[4] John Gay on Gay, “Dissertation Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality”, available at https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/wollaston-british-moralists-vol-2#lf1368-02_head_022 accessed 29/7/21

[5] John Gay, “Dissertation Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality”, available at https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/wollaston-british-moralists-vol-2#lf1368-02_head_022 accessed 29/7/21

[6] David Brink, “Sidgwick’s dualism of Practical Reason” Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 66:3, 1998. 303. Brink’s interpretation of Sidgwick is controversial.

[7] David Brink, “A Puzzle about the Rational Authority of Ethics”, Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 6, Ethics, (1992) 1

[8] David Brink, “A Puzzle about the Rational Authority of Ethics”, 2

[9] David Brink “Kantian Rationalism: Inescapability, Authority and Supremacy” in In Garrett Cullity & Berys Nigel Gaut (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason. Oxford University Press (1997) 257

[10] See David Brink, “A Puzzle about the Rational Authority of Morality” and also “Kantian Rationalism: Inescapability, Authority and Supremacy” in In Garrett Cullity & Berys Nigel Gaut (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason. (Oxford University Press, 1997). 255–291 for the articulation of an agent-relative version of what is essentially the same problem.

[11] David Brink, “Self-Love and Altruism” Social Philosophy & Policy 14 (1997) 123

[12] C. Stephen Layman “God and the Moral Order” Faith and Philosophy, 23 (2006): 307

[13] Layman “God and the Moral Order” 305:

[14] Stephen Layman Letters to Doubting Thomas: A Case for the Existence of God, (Oxford University Press, 2006) 242

 

 

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