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What is the Question?: Henry Sidgwick’s Dualism of Practical Reason

March 26th, 2021 by Matt

In a previous post, I criticised Richard Dawkins’s discussion of the question: if there is no God, why be good? One criticism I raised was that Dawkins seemed to misunderstand the challenge this rhetorical question presents.  This raises the question as to how we should understand this rhetorical question. What exactly is the problem being alluded to when people ask, “if there is no God, why be good.”? I have been thinking a bit about this of late. In this post, I will begin an attempt to do this by looking at someone who developed an influential version of the problem, Henry Sidgwick.

Who was Henry Sidgwick?

Henry Sidgwick was a moral philosopher based at Cambridge University in the late nineteenth century. Outside of the world of Moral Philosophy, Henry Sidgwick is probably not a household name. However, within the world of moral philosophy, Sidgwick’s book “The Method of Ethics” (ME) is widely considered a classic of Moral Philosophy. Sidgwick represents the high point of the classical Utilitarian moral tradition tracing back to John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham. His work has widely influenced leading utilitarian philosophers such as Roger Crisp, Peter Singer and Derek Parfit. 

Interestingly, Sidgwick ended the book with a degree of pessimism about whether a coherent secular utilitarian moral theory was possible.  Sidgwick’s believed that secular versions of utilitarianism could not coherently answer the most fundamental question of ethics: why should I always do my duty? By contrast, Sidgwick thought Theism could coherently answer this question.

Sidgwick spells out the reasons he came to this conclusion in the final chapter of ME. As I interpret him, his argument contains three steps. 

  • First, he argued that unless we assume there is “harmony” between “rational benevolence” and “prudence”, morality cannot be entirely rational. Instead,  and our “fundamental intuitions” about morality will be “incoherent”. 
  • Second, he argues that secular accounts of sanctions and moral and accountability would, if true, undermine this assumption. They imply that “rational benevolence” and “prudence” are not in harmony. 
  • By contrast, a divine command theory, would if true, vindicate this assumption and provide a coherent account of our fundamental intuitions. 

The conclusion is those divine command theories can coherently answer the question: “why should I always do my duty?” whereas secular ethical theories cannot.  Because Sidgwick was both an agnostic and a utilitarian, this conclusion caused him considerable anxiety. He wrestled with it for much of his academic life.

Why do we need to assume harmony between benevolence and Prudence?

Let’s begin by looking at the first step in Sidgwick’s argument. Sidgwick begins the final chapter by (ME) arguing: “If morality is to be made completely rational, the harmony between the maxim of prudence and the maxim of rational benevolence must be somehow demonstrated.”[1]

Let me clarify the terminology here:

First, Sidgwick uses the term “rational benevolence”. In earlier chapters, Sidgwick had argued that analysis and systematisation of our common-sense moral beliefs suggest that moral requirements are requirements justified from a certain point of view. A point of view of impartial benevolence. It is a point of view which the welfare or the good of everyone, which does so impartiality; not considering anyone’s interest or welfare more important than anyone else’s. Sidgwick refers to this as “the point of view of the universe” or the “maxim of rational benevolence”. Because the phrase “moral requirements that are justified from the point of view of impartial benevolence” is unwieldy. I will use the phrase “impartial demands” as shorthand for this.

Second, Sidgwick says demonstrating the harmony between impartial demands and Prudence is necessary if morality is to be “completely rational”. What he means by “completely rational” is explicated later in the chapter. Failure to “completely” rationalise Morality” means: 

[P]ractical reason would still impel us decisively to the performance of duty in ordinary cases where what is recognised as duty is in harmony with self-interest properly understood. But in the rarer cases where we find a conflict between self-interest and duty, practical reason, being divided against itself, would cease to be a motive on either side. The conflict would have to be decided by which of two groups of non-rational impulses had more force.[2]

For morality to be “completely rational” means that we always have decisive reasons to do our duty. Someone has decisive reasons to act in a certain way when the reasons in favour of acting, taken together, are stronger than any set of reasons we may have to act in some other way.  

Sidgwick’s, claim then is this: unless it is in our long term self-interest to always comply with impartial demands, we will not always have decisive reasons to do our duty. Sometimes, the strongest reasons will favour doing our duty; on other occasions, they will not. Commitment to always doing what is right will at best be rationally optional and at worst irrational.

Why does Sidgwick think this? Sidgwick was concerned about a specific sort of practical dilemma which he thought irresolvable. Suppose it is not always in one’s long-term self-interest to act according to impartial demands. This will mean impartial demands sometimes come into conflict with prudential requirements. When they do, we face the question: What reason is there to act impartially, rather than in one’s self-interest. What reason do we have for assuming that impartial demands are always stronger or weightier than prudential requirements when the two clash?

Sidgwick raises this question repeatedly in the preface to the sixth edition. He asks what the  “rational ground.”[3] is for “subordinating self-interest…to “altruistic” impulses and sentiments” on “what ground?” do we make the “moral choice of the general happiness” or “acquiescence in self-interest.”[4]. What reasons other than “blind habit.”[5] were there in favour is making altruistic sacrifices of one’s self-interest in this way? Sidgwick concluded that no answer is forthcoming. Envisaging someone faced with such a dilemma, Sidgwick states: 

He might say, “I quite admit that when the painful necessity comes for another man to choose between his own happiness and the general happiness, he must as a reasonable being prefer his own, i.e. it is right for him to do this on my principle….It did not seem to me that this reasoning could be effectively confuted. No doubt it was, from the point of view of the universe, reasonable to prefer the greater good to the lesser, even though the lesser good was the private happiness of the agent. Still, it seemed to me also undeniably reasonable for the individual to prefer his own. The rationality of self-regard seemed to me as undeniable as the rationality of self-sacrifice.

Suppose Sidgwick is correct and there is no reason for giving impartial demands precedence over prudential requirements in a conflict. If a conflict occurs, the total reasons in favour of doing what is impartially demanded will not be stronger than the reasons against so acting. We can summarise Sidgwick’s conclusion here as an inference from three premises, which he takes to be intuitively plausible: 

[1] The strongest reasons always favour doing what is morally required.

[2] An action is morally required if and only if it is demanded from a perspective of impartial benevolence.

[3] If there are cases where, what is impartially demanded of a person, is an action that is contrary to their long-term self-interest, then the strongest reasons do not always favour doing the action that is demanded from a perspective of impartial benevolence. 

Suppose [1] [2] and [3] are correct. In that case, we must either embrace the thesis that impartial demands and prudential demands never conflict or embrace a contradiction.  To see this, suppose we assume these demands do conflict:

[3a] there are cases where an action is demanded from a perspective of impartial benevolence is contrary to one’s own long term self-interest 

It follows from [3] that, 

[3b] the strongest reasons do not always favour doing what is demanded from a perspective of impartial benevolence. 

And [3b] conjoined with [2] entails that;

[3c] The strongest reasons do not always favour doing what is morally required.

However, [1] states.

[1] The strongest reasons always favour doing what is morally required.

[1] and [3] are obviously in contradiction. Sidgwick concludes that the hypothesis of “harmony of duty and self-interest “is required” to avoid a basic contradiction in one chief part of our thought”. Denying this hypothesis results in “practical reason being divided against itself” and forces us “to abandon the idea of rationalising [morality] it completely.”[6] Sidgwick referred to this problem as “the dualism of practical reason”. “‘self-love’ and ‘Conscience’ claim to rule, and neither will yield to the other.”[7]

Why do Secular Moral Theories Undermines this assumption?

This brings me to the second step of Sidgwick’s argument. Sidgwick argues that secular accounts of sanctions and moral and accountability would, if true, undermine this assumption. In ME., Sidgwick examines what sanctions are attached to impartial rules. Sidgwick defines a sanction as “the pleasures that come from conforming to moral rules, and the pains that come from violating them”[8]. Importantly, he initially confines himself to sanctions we might call “secular” or naturalistic. “[T]he coincidence of duty and happiness considered as something that we know about from experience and can expect to show up in our present earthly life.”[9]. Sidgwick identifies several different kinds of secular sanctions which might attach to impartial rules Legal sanctions: “penalties inflicted by the authority of the state”. Social sanctions: “the pleasures to be expected from the approval and goodwill of our fellowmen” and internal sanctions: “the pleasurable emotion, or absence of remorse that accompanies virtuous action”. Linked with internal sanctions is also “sympathy”, where the suffering of others causes us to feel pain and suffering ourselves.

 Sidgwick examines whether the existence of these types of sanctions gives us any reason to think that it is always in our self-interest to comply with impartial demands. His discussion is subtle and detailed, and space prevents me from elaborating it in detail. However, his conclusion is pessimistic.: “when we carefully analyse and estimate the consequences of virtue to the virtuous agent, it appears improbable that this alignment is complete and universal.”[10] He concludes. “the more carefully we examine how the different sanctions—legal, social, and conscientious—operate in the actual conditions of human life, the harder it is to believe that they can always produce this coincidence ·of happiness with social virtue.”[11]

If the only sanctions annexed to impartial rules are secular sanctions, the assumption that it is always in our interests to act according to impartial demands is probably false. 

Why Divine command theories vindicate this assumption.

Sidgwick next turns to what he calls religious sanctions.

This [the failure of secular sanctions] has led other utilitarian writers to prefer to throw the weight of duty on the religious sanction;. From this point of view, the utilitarian code is conceived as the law of God, who is to be regarded as having commanded men to promote general happiness, and announced that he will reward those who obey his commands and punish those who don’t. It’s clear that if we feel convinced that an omnipotent being has somehow signified such commands and announcements, a rational egoist can’t need any further inducement to shape his life on utilitarian principles.[12]

The other utilitarians” Sidgwick is referring to here are advocates of the theological utilitarianism that was proposed by writers, such as Paley, Berkeley, John Gay, John Brown, John Austin. Theological Utilitarian’s had combined normative rule utilitarianism with a divine command theory of meta-ethics.[13]  These writers had argued that moral requirements are divine commands.  And this assumption enables them to coherently affirm [1] and [2] and [3] without contradiction.

Because God is both benevolent and impartial, omniscient and rational, he issues those commands that are justified from a perspective of impartial benevolence in light of all relevant facts.  Hence, a divine command theory, if true, entails the truth of [2].

Similarly, because commands were understood as prescriptions or rules, which God holds people accountable, one always had decisive reasons to comply with impartial demands. So, it is always in one’s long-term self-interest to act in accord with impartial demands. 

Consequently, If moral requirements are divine commands, then the assumption of harmony between impartial demands and prudential requirements is vindicated.  Note the issue here is not just that the coincidence is consistent with divine command meta-ethics. The claim is that would if true, entail or predict this coincidence.

Sidgwick then argues three things; (a) unless we assume that it is in our long-term self-interest always to follow impartial demands, we don’t have decisive reasons to do what is right;  (b) Secular accounts of morality, if true, undermine this assumption, and; (c) divine command theories, if true, vindicate it. 

Of course, I have not in a short post defended these claims. Advocates of secular forms of utilitarianism will contest each of these steps. But the point is there is a serious line of thought here that needs to be addressed. Just as a divine command theorist cannot just assert that God provides the best account of morality and has to address sceptical challenges to their position, such as the Euthyphro dilemma. Opponents of religious morality have to address concerns raised by Sidgwick’s dualism of practical reason. It is not enough to caricature it as the crude claim that “the only motive I have to be good is fear” and dismissing this claim as obviously ridiculous.

 


[1] Henry Sidgwick, The Method of Ethics, 242 available at https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/sidgwick1874.pdf accessed 20/3/21

[2] Ibid 284

[3] Preface to the Sixth Edition” Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidgwick available at https://www.laits.utexas.edu/poltheory/sidgwick/me/me.preface.s06.html accessed 20/30/21

[4] Ibid

[5] Ibid

[6] Henry Sidgwick, The Method of Ethics, 248 available at https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/sidgwick1874.pdf accessed 20/3/21.

[7] This quote is from Barton Schultz “Henry Sidgwick” in the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sidgwick/ accessed 26/3/21.

[8] Ibid 76

[9] Ibid, 75

[10] Ibid, 82

[11] Ibid 243

[12] Ibid 246

[13] See my posts  http://www.mandm.org.nz/2018/01/divine-command-theory-and-utilitarianism-forgotten-bedfellows-paleys-principles-of-moral-and-political-philosophy-part-one.html and http://www.mandm.org.nz/2018/01/divine-command-theory-and-utilitarianism-forgotten-bedfellows-paleys-principles-of-moral-and-political-philosophy-part-two.html accessed 26/3/21

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