Most versions of Divine command meta-ethics (DCM) contend that the property of being morally required is informatively identical with the property of being commanded by God.[1] A common objection to divine command meta-ethics is the horrendous deeds objection. We can formalise this objection as follows:
[P1] If DCM is true, then if God commands unjust actions unjust actions are morally required
[P2] It is possible for God to command unjust actions
[P3] It is not possible for unjust actions to be morally required.
These three premises, entail a contradiction. [P1] conjoined with [P2] entails that it is possible for unjust actions to be morally required. However, this conclusion explicitly contradicts [P3]. Moreover, [P1] is clearly true. If I contend that A and B are really the same property, then if any action that has A will also have B. So it follows that if an unjust action has the property of being commanded by God. It will also have the property of being morally required.
Philip Quinn responds to the abhorrent commands objection, by rejecting [P2].[2] Quinn notes that on standard conceptions of God has certain character traits essentially. God is omniscient, omnipotent, but he is also loving and just. It is impossible however for a loving and just person to knowingly and deliberately command something incompatible with love and justice. If someone did this, they couldn’t coherently be called just or loving. The upshot is that [P2] is false. Affirming that a loving and just being commands injustice is to affirm something logically impossible.
Hooker’s Critique
Brad Hooker offers a response to Quinn.[3] Hooker notes that DCM has the implication that “Before God made any commands, there were no moral requirements.” However, Quinn suggests that God has the property of being just essentially, this means that requirements of justice must exist antecedent to any commands God issues. But that means there are requirements of justice antecedent to requirements of morality.
Hooker then offers the following argument:
[P1] If DCM is correct all moral requirements depend on Gods commands.
[P2]: If all moral requirements derive from God’s commands, then the requirements cannot exist until the commands exist.
[P3]: Even before God made any commands, there were requirements of justice constraining His commands.
[C1] Before God made any commands, there were no moral requirements (from premises 1 and 2)
[C2] Requirements of justice were not moral requirements. (from P3 an C1)
However, Hooker argues that [C2] is false. He concludes:
Since the logic of the above argument is valid, then if the argument’s conclusion is false, at least one of the argument’s premisses must be false. Premiss 2 cannot plausibly be denied. To reject Premiss 1 is to abandon the Divine Command Theory. So is Premiss 3 the one to reject? According to Quinn, even before God makes His first command, His inherent justice would keep Him from making unjust commands. To reject Premiss 3 is to abandon Quinn’s defence of the Divine Command Theory … [4]
Response to Hooker
I agree with Hooker that, if the conclusion of the argument is false, then at least one of its premises must be false. I also agree that a divine command theorist cannot abandon P1 or P2 and abandoning P3 commits him to abandoning Quinn’s defence of DCM. The critical question is whether [C2] is false. Why is [C2] implausible? Hooker’s argument against [C2] is brief. He writes:
However, requirements of justice are moral requirements. If they are moral requirements, then presumably they also were moral requirements (and will continue to be). Conclusion 2, therefore, seems false… the Divine Command Theory commits us to the implausible view that requirements of justice are not moral requirements.
Noticing a subtle shift in this argument is important. In Hooker’s argument, C2 is the claim that “moral requirements of justice were not moral requirements. (emphasis mine). The “were” refers to the time before God issued any commands. P1 P2 and P3 do not entail that moral requirements are not moral requirements posterior to such commands. The divine command theorist could affirm, and I suspect probably will affirm, that antecedent to any commands by God, there were requirements of justice. But no one was under any moral requirement to act justly. Posterior to Gods commands, however, there is such a requirement. Hence while the requirements of justice are moral requirements now, they were not prior to God issuing any commands.
A distinction made by John Mackie is illustrative here. Mackie famously argued for moral nihilism. According to Mackie, our moral discourse presupposes that objective moral requirements exist. He then argued that no such requirements do exist and so our moral discourse is systematically mistaken. Claims such as “Bill is morally required to act justly are false.
Mackie’s thesis is jarring, to soften the blow he but that in denying moral requirements exist he points out he is “not denying that there can be objective evaluations relative to standards,” taking, as an example, the standard of justice:
In one important sense of the word, it is a paradigm case of injustice if a court declares someone to be guilty of an offence of which it knows him to be innocent. More generally, a finding is unjust if it is at variance with what the relevant law and the facts together require, and particularly if it is known by the court to be so. More generally still, any award of marks, prizes, or the like is unjust if it is at variance with the agreed standards for the contest in question: if one diver’s performance, in fact, measures up better to the accepted standards for diving than another’s, it will be unjust if the latter is awarded higher marks or the prize …”[5]
What follows from nihilism is instead that:
The statement that a certain decision is thus just or unjust will not be objectively prescriptive: in so far as it can be simply true it leaves open the question whether there is any objective requirement to do what is just and to refrain from what is unjust, and equally leaves open the practical decision to act in either way.[6]
On this Mackie is surely correct, a person who embraces nihilism and thinks nothing is really right or wrong can still understand the concept of what is loving and just. Such a person could know that this idea of justice entailed certain standards and paradigmatic examples and he or she could in many cases tell whether certain behaviour was loving or was in accord with the standards of justice. She or he also could choose to live in accord with these standards if he or she wanted to and she or he could choose not to live in accord with them. He or she could simply reject that there was any objective moral obligation to behave in accord with such standards. The question of whether an action is just and loving and whether it is obligatory are, in principle, separate questions.
This distinction is subtle but important, and it has application here. DCM entails that, prior to God’s commands, no action is morally wrong. This, however, does not mean that actions cannot be loving and just prior to God’s commands. Prior to God’s act of commanding, certain actions will be loving and just without it being the case that they are obligatory. Because God is loving and just he commands people to behave in loving and just ways so that actions which are just antecedent to his commands become morally required or obligatory posterior to such commands.
It seems then that Hooker then is mistaken when he states “Divine Command Theory commits us to the implausible view that requirements of justice are not moral requirements.” Hooker here has moved from C1 which claims moral requirements were not moral requirements antecedent to God’s commands to the claim they are not moral requirements posterior to God’s commands.
The only reason Hooker gives for this leap is to assert “If they [requirements of justice] are moral requirements, then presumably they also were moral requirements (and will continue to be).” But apart from Hooker’s presumption, there is no reason to think that, and certainly no reason for a divine command theorist to believe this. As far as I can tell its coherent to claim that actions could be unjust but not obligatory prior to God’s commands.
[1] I say most here, William Lane Craig, Robert Adams, C Stephen Evans, William Alston, and Peter Forrest all contend the property of being commanded by God and the property of being morally required are informatively identical. By contrast, Philip Quinn holds that Gods commands directly and immediately cause the existence of moral requirements. This difference though important will not affect the subsequent discussion of Philip Quinn.
[2] Philip Quinn, “Divine Command Theory” In The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory, ed. H. LaFollette, (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 2000) 70-71
[3] Brad Hooker “Cudworth and Quinn” Analysis 61: 4 (2001); 333-335
[4] Brad Hooker “Cudworth and Quinn” Analysis 61: 4 (2001); 335
[5] John Mackie “The Subjectivity of Values” in Ethics: Essential Readings in Moral Theory ed George Sher (Routledge, 2012) 184.
[6] Ibid.
Tags: Brad Hooker · Divine Command Theory · God and Morality · Philip Quinn6 Comments
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“On this Mackie is surely correct, a person who embraces nihilism and thinks nothing is really right or wrong can still understand the concept of what is loving and just. Such a person could know that this idea of justice entailed certain standards and paradigmatic examples and he or she could in many cases tell whether certain behaviour was loving or was in accord with the standards of justice. She or he also could choose to live in accord with these standards if he or she wanted to and she or he could choose not to live in accord with them. He or she could simply reject that there was any objective moral obligation to behave in accord with such standards. ”
But Mackie would not just claim that there are no objective moral obligations to live according to the standards of justice, he would claim that there are no objective obligations (full stop; not just no moral obligations) to live according to these standards. Mackie was suspicious of all intrinsic prescriptivity.
But Hooker’s [P3] says that, prior to God’s commands, there were requirements of justice. Now, I take it that you are claiming that it does not follow that these requirements are moral requirements. Perhaps that is true, but, nonetheless, [P1], [P2], and [P3] do entail that there were requirements concerning how we are to behave prior to God’s commands.
If requirements of justice are genuine requirements then,
(a) they are norms that govern our behavior.
(b) they are authoritative (i.e., they have what Mackie calls intrinsic presciptivity).
Now, I suppose, we can choose to not call these requirements moral, but that doesn’t change the fact that, in virtue of (a) and (b), they look an awful lot like moral requirements.
On the other hand, one might reject (a) and (b), but that is tantamount to rejecting [P3]. If “requirements of justice” are not norms governing behavior and are not authoritative, then they are not really requirements.
Jason, I am not sure I see the problem.
Mackie’s argument is that no objective categorical requirements exist (this is what I take him to mean by intrinsic prescriptively. But that’s compatible with claiming that there are requirements of justice. Or that relative to the standards of justice such and such is required. All Mackie needs is the claim that these requirements aren’t objective and categorical.
The same is true here, I can grant that without Gods commands there are requirements of justice. They just won’t be objective and categorical.
Consider an example, I can accept that Islamic law requires on people to not eat pork and so relative And I can grant that without holding these is an objective or categorical.
This is particularly pertinent for Hooker because Hooker is a rule consequentialist, he accepts that the correct moral rules are those which are justified from an impartial perspective, and he holds that we should follow those rules whose internalisation by most people would result in the best. This means that there must be requirements of impartiality, and standards of maximisation and an account of goodness prior to any justified moral rules because such rules are based on those things.
There are different kinds of behavioural standards. There are:
(a) moral standards
(b) legal standards
(c) standards of etiquette
(d) prudential standards
(e) ritual/religious standards
Some of these standards apply objectively and some of them are authoritative. To say that they apply objectively is to say that they apply to a person regardless of that persons goals, interests, desires, reactions, attitudes. To say that they are authoritative is to say that they are normative; that there are (normative) reasons to abide by them.
As I indicated in my previous post, my understanding is that, by calling requirements of justice “requirements,” Hooker is indicating that standards of justice are objective and authoritative.
Standards of etiquette, on the other hand, are objective, but they are not authoritative. Because of this, rules of etiquette do not really constrain our behavior. We can choose to abide by them, but they have no authority over us. Similarly, with respect to Islamic law, if we think that we are not constrained by these laws, we must say that they are either not objective or else not authoritative.
It seems to me that you are claiming that requirements of justice are not objective or authoritative. You say that they are not objective or categorical, which I take to at least roughly correspond to what I mean by “objective and authoritative.” But my point is that I don’t think Hooker would agree. He would say that requirements of justice are objective and authoritative/categorical. That is what we are saying by calling them “requirements.”
[P3] says that requirements of justice constrain God’s commands. It is difficult to see how anything could genuinely constrain God’s commands and not be objective and authoritative. Suppose requirements of justice are not objective, then they only apply to God given certain of his goals, interests, desires, etc. Thus, he can get out of them by altering his goals, interests, desires, etc. But if they are escapable in this way (for God), then they are not genuine constraints (for God). Further, suppose that they are not authoritative. Then they provide God with no reasons; they are not normative. But if they are not normative, in what sense are they constraints?
The upshot is that if we accept [P3], then we accept that the demands of justice constrain God’s commands. But then the demands of justice are objective and authoritative.
Jason
You suggest that by calling the calling requirements of justice “requirements,” Hooker is indicating that standards of justice are objective and authoritative.
I don’t think he can justifiably do this. Remember the context here. Critics of DCT have objected that God could command horrendous deeds. Philip Quinn and others dispute this, the claim that given God’s character his being essentially just, it is incoherent to claim God could command unjust actions. Consider P3
[P3]: Even before God made any commands, there were requirements of justice constraining His commands
Hooker makes it clear that [P3] expresses Philip Quinn’s response to the horrendous deeds objection. He states
If this is the case, then the word “requirement” cannot mean an “objective and authoritative” requirement. Because Quinn’s response to the horrendous deeds objection doesn’t commit him to the existence of a requirement in this sense. As you define these terms an objective and authoritative requirement is one that provides a reason to act, regardless of one’s motivational state. However, Quinn’s claim was given God’s character he is rationally constrained to issue certain kinds of commands. So Quinn isn’t here talking about a requirement that holds regardless of one’s motivational state, he is saying God has certain reasons in virtue of this state.
So if Hooker means to smuggle objectivity and authoritativeness into the word requirement in P3, his argument is a straw man.
Jason wrote:
The phrase “the requirements of justice constrain God’s commands” expresses Quinn’s claim that a being who has God’s character traits essentially could never rationally command injustice. So it’s that “sense” of the word constraint that is relevant.
Suppose then that such constraints express reasons are only “hypothetical” as opposed to categorical reasons. They provide God reasons to not command certain things, due to the fact God is essentially loving and just and so has certain desires, attitudes and goals which such commands would violate. I am not sure what the problem is, it will still be true that God doesn’t command these things, and if God is essentially loving and just and flawlessly rational, it will still be the case that there is no possible world in which God commands injustice. And that is all Quinn needs to rebut the horrendous deeds objection.
Perhaps hypothetical reasons like this arent “genuine constraints” because there are impossible worlds in which they don’t apply, if that’s the case then Hooker shouldn’t have used the word “constraint” to describe Quinn’s response. That however only goes to Hookers wording and doesn’t seem to really address Quinn’s argument which is that it isn’t possible for an essentially loving and just being to command injustice.
My thought is that Hooker probably understood them in this sense and that Hooker believed that Quinn understood them in this sense. It is true that Quinn was responding to the horrendous deeds objection, but Hooker is not primarily concerned with that objection. His concern is that Quinn’s response seems to commit him to the existence of genuine behavioural requirements (that are objective and authoritative).
I think that you are correct that Quinn need not have understood them in this sense, and that he did not. And I think that I agree with you that he need not think of the standards of justice as objective and authoritative to counter the horrendous deeds objection. However, that does not mean that Quinn is completely out of the woods. There is another problem lurking here: the arbitrariness problem.
You say,
Here is my worry: these hypothetical reasons are not sufficient to counter the arbitrariness problem. Only genuinely objective and authoritative constraints can counter that problem. Consider the deity that I have called Asura. Asura’s essential nature is such that he can never rationally command justice. The standards of injustice provide Asura with hypothetical reasons to not command certain things. Due to the fact that Asura is essentially hateful and unjust, he has certain desires and goals which such commands would violate.
I am not here concerned with whether Asura’s commands would constitute moral obligations, but with whether Asura’s commands are arbitrary. It seems to me that his commands are arbitrary in the sense that there are no normative reasons that support them.
Consider another analogy. A racist hiring manager has goals, interests, and desires that would be violated by his hiring a non-white applicant. When the hiring manager chooses candidate A over candidate B because of the race of the candidates, he is acting in accord with his nature (and with the hypothetical reasons that flow from his goals, interests, and desires). But racial discrimination is arbitrary. Hence the hiring manager’s behavior is arbitrary. And this despite the fact that his behavior accords with his nature and is supported by hypothetical reasons.
What makes the hiring manager’s behavior arbitrary is that it is contrary to normative reasons. The existence of hypothetical reasons does not mitigate the arbitrariness of his choosing one candidate over another on the basis of race.
These examples suggest that the existence of what you are calling hypothetical reasons is not sufficient for any behavior to be non-arbitrary. It seems to follow that Quinn’s response to the horrendous deeds objection commits him to a view that falls prey to the arbitrariness objection. God’s commands are not non-arbitrary merely in virtue of God’s having hypothetical reasons.