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Is Naturalism simpler than Theism? Some reflections on Graham Oppy’s “Best argument against God”

October 30th, 2018 by Matt

In Best Argument Against God (BAAG) Graham Oppy sketches a sophisticated argument for atheism. Oppy’s conclusion is the result of applying a particular method to the question of God’s existence. He contends that question of Gods existence should not be determined by examining the arguments for and against the existence of God. Instead philosophy of religion :“is concerned with the clash between theistic and atheistic worldviews (or theories),” The correct way to proceed is: “(1) to develop the best theistic and atheistic theories; (2) to assess the liability of these best theories to internal defeat; and (3) to make an assessment of the comparative theoretical virtues of these best theories, paying attention to simplicity, fit with data, explanatory scope, predictive accuracy, and the like.”[1] The putative data being such things as that “there is something rather than nothing; there being a universe; there being natural laws; there being cosmic fine-tuning; there being rational, conscious agents; there being moral laws; there being dictates of conscience; and so forth.”[2]

Oppy argues that when this method is followed, there is a good reason to reject the existence of God. He contrasts Theism with naturalism:     the view that “that causal reality is natural reality” and “no supernatural causes exist”.  Looking at how each worldview accounts for such things as the existence of the universe, fine-tuning, morality and various other “putative data”.

 While Oppy thinks both theism and naturalism can provide defensible, coherent theories and that fit the data; naturalism is a preferable worldview because it is simpler. One theoretical virtue we use to asses’ theories is simplicity: “If everything else is equal, we should prefer the more simple theory to the less simple theory.”[3] Oppy argues that  “prior to the introduction of data, naturalism trumps theism on the grounds of simplicity and that none of the data that we consider favours theism over naturalism.”[4]

I think Oppy claim that “prior to the data naturalism is simpler than theism” is mistaken. It is this claim that I will discuss in this post.

 Oppy’s argument for the simplicity of naturalism 

Let’s begin by asking why Oppy thinks naturalism is simpler than Theism? Oppy’s argument is succinct:

Naturalism is simpler than Theism: it postulates fewer kinds of entities, fewer kinds of primitive properties and fewer kinds of primitive principles. According to Theism, there are two kinds of entities – natural and supernatural – whereas according to Naturalism, there is only one kind. According to Theism, there are two kinds of causation – natural causation and supernatural causation – whereas according to Naturalism, there is only one kind.[5]

There are three ideas here: First,  Oppy claims that [1] According to naturalism there is only one kind of entity and one kind of causation. Natural entities and natural causes.   By contrast [2] theism postulates two kinds of entities and causes, natural and supernatural. Third, Oppy thinks [3] the fact theism postulates more kinds of entities and causes than naturalism means naturalism is simpler. I think each of Oppy’s premises is questionable.

Criticism of Oppy’s argument

Does Naturalism postulate only one kind of entity?
Let us begin with [1] the claim that according to naturalism there is only one kind of entity and one kind of causation. There are two potential problems here.

First, this conclusion is incompatible with Oppy’s own definition of naturalism. Oppy defines naturalism as follows: “Naturalism says that causal reality is natural reality: the domain of causes is nothing more nor less than the natural world.”[6]  However, according to this definition, naturalism is simply the denial of supernatural causation. It says nothing whatsoever about whether non-natural entices or properties exist, such entities and properties are perfectly possible, provided they don’t enter into causal relationships.

This brings me to the second problem, let’s suppose for the sake of argument naturalism did contend that only natural properties and entities exist.  This wouldn’t mean that only one kind of entity or property existed. Oppy states:

Any suitably elaborated naturalism will hold that some features of the natural world are primitive – not susceptible of further explanation – whereas other features of the natural world are fully explained in terms of those primitive features. Thus, for example, some naturalists suppose that all of the primitive features of the natural world are physical features – i.e. features that lie in the proper domain of the discipline of physics. Other naturalists suppose that there are features of the natural world – for example, the psychological states of human beings – that cannot be fully explained in terms of the fundamental physical properties. The key point to note is that all naturalists suppose that there are no supernatural causal properties[7]

Here Oppy here suggests that when he refers to natural features, properties and he isn’t using this word to refer to one kind of thing, such as material or physical things. Rather the natural world consists of multiple different primitive properties.

Does theism postulate two kinds of entities and two kinds of causes?

This brings us to [2] Oppy’s claim that theism postulates two kinds of entities and causes, natural and supernatural. I think this is false. theism is the claim that God exists, hence according to theism a supernatural being with supernatural causal powers exists. But theism by itself, prior to the data, entails nothing about the existence of natural entities or natural causes.

Nor is this a picky pedantic point because there are prominent forms of theism which affirm neither the existence of natural entities or natural causes. Let’s look first at the question of “natural entities” Some theists notably George Berkeley and Jonathan Edwards have been idealists. According to idealism, the only things that exist are immaterial minds or souls.  Physical objects are purely phenomenal: a physical object is a collection of sensations a mind has such as a perception of shape, colour, a feeling of texture, a smell, and a there is no underlying material substratum to such objects which exist only as sensations in immaterial human or divine minds.    Of course, Idealism has always been a minority view. Most theists today realists: they believe that physical objects do have an underlying substratum, distinct from mental sensations, which exists in space and time and God creates and sustains material objects in being.

The point, however, is that theism is part of and compatible with both idealism and realism. Whether a Theist postulates the existence of distinct natural entities or not depends on how he accounts for some of the purported data particularly the data that: “there is something rather than nothing; there being a universe; there being rational, conscious agent’s”. Prior to the data, theism affirms only that a supernatural being exists.

The same point can be made regarding “natural causation”.  Whether there exists natural causes distinct from God’s supernatural causation has been, and is, a matter of dispute amongst Theists. Many theists have advocated concurrentism. Concurrentism is the view that God created the material world with certain natural causal powers and He sustains it in existence, moment by moment, and concurs with the causal transactions that take place in it.  According to concurrentism, while distinct natural properties have natural causal powers exist, they do so by God͛’s creating and sustaining activity, and they require God ͛ s concurring causal activity to operate.

By contrast, occasionalists have denied the existence of distinct natural causes. All causation is reducible to the supernatural causation of God.    If objects, like fire, appear to cause another object, like cotton, to burst into flame, this is because God has decreed that when a fire is placed next to cotton, cotton will burn.  Natural causation does not involve powers inherent in nature; it occurs because there is a pre-existing law of nature that dictates that when certain events happen, other events will follow.  These laws of nature just are divine decrees.  The result is that all so-called natural causation is really divine causation.  God is the only and sole cause in nature. [8]

Theism itself a part of and compatible with both concurrentism and occasionalism. Whether a theist postulates the existence of distinct natural causes or not depends on how he accounts for some of the purported data particularly the data that “there are laws of nature”.  Prior to the data, theism affirms only that a supernatural being exists.

  1. If theism postulates more kinds of entities and causes than naturalism, does it follow that naturalism is simpler?

This brings us to Oppy’s third claim: that if theism postulates more kinds of entities and causes than naturalism does, then naturalism is a simpler worldview. This to contradict the criteria of simplicity which Oppy himself explicitly offers.  Oppy elaborates the criterion of simplicity as follows:

(a) Simplicity: If everything else is equal, we should prefer the more simple theory to the less simple theory. If everything else is equal, we should prefer the theory that postulates fewer (and less complex) primitive entities. If everything else is equal, we should prefer the theory that invokes fewer (and less complex) primitive features. If everything else is equal, we should prefer the theory that appeals to fewer (and less complex) primitive principles.[9]

This doesn’t say that all else being equal we should prefer the theory that postulates fewer entities.  It states that “If everything else is equal, we should prefer the theory that postulates fewer (and less complex) primitive entities.”Oppy thinks that on any view of the world there will be features which are ‘primitive’; features that are “not susceptible of further explanation” whereas other features of the world are “fully explained in terms of those primitive features” and it is the number, and complexity of primitive features not the number of features per se that is relevant to simplicity.

Consequently, even if theism does postulate more kinds of entities and causes than naturalism does, it doesn’t follow naturalism is simpler.  This will only follow if Theists hold that these additional types of causes and entities are primitive. This, however, is not the case.  As Oppy himself states, according to theism “God is the cause of the existence of the natural world, and the source or ground or origin of most – if not all – of its significant features.”[10]  Consequentially, the natural causal order isn’t a primitive unexplained entity.


[1]  Graham Oppy “What Derivations Cannot Do” Religious Studies (2015) 51, 328

[2] Oppy, “What Derivations Cannot Do”, 51

[3] Graham Oppy. The Best Argument against God (Palgrave Pivot) (p. 18). Palgrave Macmillan. Kindle Edition

[4] Oppy, Graham. The Best Argument against God (Palgrave Pivot) (p. 18). Palgrave Macmillan. Kindle Edition.

[5] Ibid 19

[6] Ibid 19

[7] Ibid, 13

[8] Both within Islamic and Christian intellectual circles there was a rigorous metaphysical debate between concurrentism and occasionalism.  Various Islamic philosophers such as al-Ash͛ari (873-935) founder of the influential Asharite school of Islamic philosophy, and Al  Ghazali  (1055-1111),  all expounded occasionalism.  It was also embraced by Christian theologians, such as Nicholas of Autrecourt (1300-1350).  Pierre d’Ailly (1351-1420), and Gabriel Beil  (1420-1495). George Berkeley, (1685 – 1753) Nicholas Malebranche (1638 – 1715). More recently, it has been defended by John Foster and Alvin Plantinga.

[9] Oppy, Best Argument against God, 14

[10] Ibid, 12

Tags: 2 Comments

2 responses so far ↓

  • I wondered why there were no comments here until I read the article for clarity and to save in my files. It seems in need of proofreading, as there were places where a word had to be inserted (e.g., ‘features’ in the third line of the second-to-last paragraph – “…there will be features which are primitive.”
    Too, since I am not as learned, I have to depend more upon grammar and punctuation to understand a text. There were several places in the body of the discussion that I had to supply punctuation (a comma or a dash, e.g.) to obtain that clarity.
    Please forgive me if I seem pedantic in this: you are the teacher and I am the student. I value your contribution to my understanding the issues on which you write..

  • Oppy, besides being a boring trifler ignoring the obvious, is just another poser treating reason as a morally obligating Mind-God, while ignoring the obvious assumptions and implications thereof. (Those shoe-brush dogs barking at the curtain are so irritating.)

    But then academic philosophy is over, especially since there’s that pesky glaring light on the boinking of students. It’s just not the same America.

    That perpetual Fear of Self-Reference and Evil Questions About Standards wasn’t a every good look anyway. Good riddance. Natural selection said no.

    And while I’m thinking about it, will someone *please* try to explain Blockchain and the prediction markets to Brian Leiter? Assuming he’s not already prepping in a bunker, of course. Thanks

    I guess all I’m really trying to say is that, in terms of theory choice:

    Somebody’s Not Reading Their Schopenhauer.