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Entries from March 31st, 2017

Erik Wielenberg and the Autonomy thesis: part four Intrinsic goodness

March 31st, 2017 23 Comments

In my last two posts, I argued that  Erik Wielenberg fails to show that Godless Normative Robust Realism (GRNR) avoids some of the standard objections to the autonomy thesis. This brings me to Wielenberg’s third claim III, Wielenberg suggests that GRNR is prima facie preferable to various theistic accounts of axiological properties. Several authors have […]

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Erik Wielenberg and the Autonomy Thesis: Part Three Standard Objections to the Autonomy Thesis, Human Rights and Dignity without God

March 25th, 2017 1 Comment

In my last post I looked at Erik Wielenberg’s response to the objection that, in the absence of God, people lack compelling reasons to comply with morality’s demands.  A second objection Wielenberg briefly addresses is that without certain theological doctrines, one cannot provide a plausible basis for human rights and dignity.  Wielenberg, here again, takes Craig […]

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Erik Wielenberg and the Autonomy Thesis: Part Two Standard Objections to the Autonomy Thesis, Reasons to be Moral Without God

March 20th, 2017 3 Comments

The autonomy thesis contends that there can be moral requirements to φ regardless of whether God commands, desires, or wills that people φ. In his monograph, Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism,[1] Erik Wielenberg offers arguably one of the most sophisticated defences of the autonomy thesis to date. Wielenberg argues three […]

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Carrier on infantile moral reasoning: one more time

March 16th, 2017 1 Comment

In a previous post, I discussed Carrier’s defence of “The infantile Objection” to divine a command theory (DCT) of meta-ethics. Some comments he makes in the same paper, suggest a slightly different version of the argument. Seeing I have found this version of the objection relatively common in oral discussions. It is worth having a […]

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Erik Wielenberg and the Autonomy Thesis: part one Wielenberg’s criticism of Divine command meta-ethics

March 11th, 2017 2 Comments

The autonomy thesis contends that there can be moral requirements to φ regardless of whether God commands, desires, or wills that people φ. In his monograph, Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism,[1] Erik Wielenberg offers arguably one of the most sophisticated defences of the autonomy thesis to date. Wielenberg argues that: […]

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