In Sam Harris on Divine Commands Part I I criticised Harris’ characterisation of divine command meta-ethics. I refuted Harris’ contention a divine command theory is pscyopathic in Is a Divine Command Theory Pscyopathic? Sam Harris on Divine Commands: Part II. In this last post in this series, I will address Harris’s contention that a divine command theory reflects a “psychotic moral attitude”. Harris says a divine command theory is “psychotic because this is completely delusional. There’s no reason to believe that we live in a universe ruled by an invisible monster called Yahweh.”

Harris’s argument in this regard seems to involve four premises. [1] A person can accept a divine command theory only if her or she believes in the existence of an invisible monster called Yahweh (which Harris earlier identifed as an “iron age God of war”); [2] there is no evidence for an invisible monster called Yahweh; [3] to believe something without evidence is delusional; [4] to be delusional is to be psyhcotic.

Turning to [1], a divine command theorist holds that the most plausible account of the nature of moral obligations is that moral obligations are constituted by, or are identical with, God’s commands. God is understood by the theorist to be a being worthy of worship, a necessarily existent, essentially loving and just, omniscient, omnipotent, personal being who created, sustains and providentially guides the universe. Holding this position does not commit one to believing in an invisible monster or a stone-age God of war for two reasons.

First, a divine command theory is compatible with being an athiest. Plantinga has noted that a person could argue that moral obligations are best accounted for in terms of God’s commands and then conclude from this that if God does not exist then moral obligations do not exist either. In this sense a divine command theory could be a premise in an atheistic argument for nihilism. Interestingly, when I was a grad student in the 90’s I attended a conference where one of the presenters offered an argument for nihilism very much along these lines.

Second, most divine command theorists accept the existence of moral obligations. Most would accept, for example, that moral claims such as that it is wrong to torture children purely for entertainment are true, and that, the action of torturing children in this way actually has the property of being wrong, further, that it does so independently of whether we or our society believe that it does.

A divine command theorist does not have to identify this God with Yahweh. Obviously, divine command theorists who are Jews or Christians will do this, but that’s in virtue of their Judaism or Christianity, it is not in virtue of their belief in divine command meta-ethics. Strictly speaking a divine command theorist could reject the identification and still maintain that moral obligations are best identified with the commands of God.

Third, even if one does identify God with Yawheh, it is evident that such an identification would rule out construing God as “an invisible monster” who is, according to Harris, ” a stone-age God of war”. If Yahweh is identified as a loving and just, invisible person, then he is neither an invisible monster or a stone-age God of war. Of course, a person who held this view might grant that at one piont in history, perhaps in the late Bronze Age or early Iron Age, various people groups believed that Yahweh was a God of war, but by identifying God as Yahweh, such a person is explictly rejecting this conception. The fact that people once concieved of something a certain way tells us nothing about whether that thing is, in fact, that way. Harris may as well castigate contemporary atomic theory by pointing out that ancient greek atomists held scientifically indefensible understandings of an atom.

So Harris’ [1], the contention that a person can accept a divine command theory only if they believe in the existence of an invisible monster is false.

Turning then to [2], the contention that there is no evidence for the existence of an invisible monster called Yahweh. Harris’s argument is circular. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that a divine command theorist does identify moral obligations with the commands of an “invisible monster” called Yahweh. The claim that there is no evidence for Yahweh’s existence will depend on whether a divine command theory is plausible in the first place. Robert Adams makes the point.

“[W]hat does the rightness or wrongness of an act consist in? I believe that the most adequate answer is provided by a theory that entails the existence of God–specifically, by the theory that moral rightness and wrongness consist in agreement and disagreement, respectively, with the will or commands of a loving God. One of the most generally accepted reasons for believing in the existence of anything is that its existence is implied by the theory that seems to account most adequately for some subject matter. I take it, therefore, that my metaethical views provide me with a reason of some weight for believing in the existence of God.^1″

If the best account of the nature of moral obligations is that those obligations are the commands of Yahweh, then the existence of moral obligations provides evidence for the existence of Yahweh. One has a straightforward argument from the best explanation that Yahweh exists. So, and this is the problem, one can only claim that there is no evidence for God’s existence if one has already ruled the divine command theory out as the most plausible account of the nature of moral obligations. To appeal to the lack of evidence for God’s existence as grounds for rejecting a divine command theory is to reason in a circle.

Harris here utilises an unfortunately common line of argument one sees in popular atheist writings. It is irrational to believe in God because there is no evidence for him and the reason there is no evidence for him is because all such arguments appeal to God to explain something and God cannot explain anything because belief in God is irrational.

This brings us to [3]. Harris’ contention that believing in the existence of something without evidence is delusional. There are two problems with this. First, according to the standard definitions of delusion this is questionable. According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) a delusion is:

“A false belief based on incorrect inference about external reality that is firmly sustained despite what almost everyone else believes and despite what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the contrary. The belief is not one ordinarily accepted by other members of the person’s culture or subculture (e.g., it is not an article of religious faith). When a false belief involves a value judgment, it is regarded as a delusion only when the judgment is so extreme as to defy credibility.”

So, even if there is not evidence for belief in God — at least not on the standard definitions — it does not follow that such belief is delusional. For that to be the case people’s belief in God would have to be based on incorrect inferences and not be basic belief. There would have to be incontrovertible proof that athiesm is true; belief in God would have to not oridinarily be  held by people in our culture, and belief  in God would have to not be an article of religious faith.

Second, if this contention were true then Harris’ own position would be a delusion. In his dialogue with Craig, Harris noted, correctly, that in order to criticise various atrocities performed by groups such as the Taliban one has to be able to say that their actions are objectively wrong. This means he has to believe that moral obligations exist, that certain actions actually have the property of being wrong. Harris conceeds this. He states “things can be right or wrong, or good and evil, quite independent of a person’s opinions.”

On what basis, however, does Harris claim that moral obligations exist? Can he infer their existence from purely factual or descriptive claims which do not already presuppose the existence of moral obligations of some sort? Harris’ answer is  no; he states:

“[T]hinking about moral truth in the context of science should only pose a problem for you, if you imagine that a science of morality has to be absolutely self-justifying in a way that no science ever could be. Ok, every branch of science must rely on certain axiomatic assumptions, ok, certain core values. And a science of morality would be on the same footing as a science of medicine, or physics, or chemistry. You need only assume that the worst possible misery for everyone is bad and worth avoiding, and indeed, the worst-case scenario for conscious life. And if science is unscientific, if this, if, having a value assumption at the core renders science unscientific, what is scientific?”

Now, I dont mean to question Harris’ claims here. I am inclined to agree that to engage in moral reasoning at all one presupposes the truth of moral claims as something like axioms. I also agree there is nothing irrational about this. I also agree that every science must have basic core beliefs which function like axioms. But note what follows from this: one is justified in believing in certain moral and factual claims even when there is no evidence for their existence. To know anything, one has to presuppose or assume, without argument, something.

This then is the problem for Harris. If its delusional to believe in the existence of something for which there is no evidence then it is delusional to believe in moral obligations. Harris’ own impassioned condemnation of the Taliban and religious terrorism is simply the expression of delusional attitude and as such, by Harris’ own reasoning, Harris’ moral attitude is psychotic. Anyone who believes as Harris does, that its wrong to throw “battery acid in the faces of little girls for the crime of learning to read” is expressing a psychotic moral attitude. The true non-psychotic person is one who believes no moral claims at all.

On the other hand if, as seems sensible, Harris contends that certain moral claims are axiomatic: the idea that inflicting suffering on children for no reason at all is wrong, and is something any sensible person will accept as a basic given then he cannot claim that that merely believing in the existence of something without evidence is delusional.

Harris’ argument that divine command ethics is “psychotic” therefore fails.

Hopefully, by now, my readers will see the pattern here that is spelt out in my previous posts. Harris’ argument combines powerful rhetoric which: (a) paints a strawman as to what divine command theorists actually believe; and then, (b) offers arguments which are circular; and, (c) involves special pleading by offering criticisms or arguments against a divine command theory which, if sound, apply with equal force the secular moral theories Harris himself makes and to the confident moral critiques he offers of religious fanaticism.

At the end of the day Harris’ picture of divine command ethics gains traction not because it is rationally sound or compelling, but because the spectre of “psychotic” in the name of religion is appealing in a post 9/11 context. The fear of religion resonates with a popular narrative in western culture which equates religion with violence and fanaticism whilst self-righteousely praising secular philosophies as progressive forces of peace.

This narrative is often riddled with self contradiction. Neither religious nor secular philosophies in and of themselves are dangerous or progressive. Some religious ideologies are used to justify terrorism and violence and some are used to condemn it. Similarly, some secular ideologies are used to justify terrorism and violence and some are used to condemn it. One cannot dismiss views based on sterotypical narratives. What is needed is an examination of the arguments of the positions in question and when they are examined Harris’ arguments, like those of other new athiests, is ridled with fallacious reasoning.

1. Robert Adams “Moral Arguments for Theistic Belief” in The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays in Philosophical Theology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987) 145.

Tags:   Debates · Divine Command Theory · God and Morality · Is the Foundation of Morality Natural or Supernatural? · Religion and Violence · Sam Harris · William Lane Craig2 Comments