In my last post, Sam Harris on Divine Commands: Part I, I criticised Sam Harris’ characterisation of divine command meta-ethics. In this post I want to turn to his second line of criticism of a Divine Command Theory. In Harris’ debate with William Lane Craig at Notre Dame, transcript here, Harris stated:
“I’m glad he raised the issue of psychopathy—we are being offered a psychopathic and psychotic moral attitude. It’s psychotic because this is completely delusional. There’s no reason to believe that we live in a universe ruled by an invisible monster Yahweh. But it is, it is psychopathic because this is a total detachment from the, from the well-being of human beings. It, this so easily rationalizes the slaughter of children. Ok, just think about the Muslims at this moment who are blowing themselves up, convinced that they are agents of God’s will. There is absolutely nothing that Dr. Craig can s—can say against their behavior, in moral terms, apart from his own faith-based claim that they’re praying to the wrong God. If they had the right God, what they were doing would be good, on Divine Command theory.”
Here, Harris suggests a Divine Command Theory expresses both a psychopathic and a psychotic moral attitude. I will address the charge of a Divine Command Theory being “psychotic” in a later post. Here, I want to address what I think is Harris’ main concern: a Divine Command Theory is psychopathic. It involves a “total detachment … from the well-being of human beings” and “so easily rationalizes the slaughter of children”. Why does Harris think this? “Because, at this moment Islamic terrorists are blowing themselves up convinced they are agents of God’s will, and a divine command theory can say nothing against their behavior in moral terms except the faith based claim that they are praying to the wrong God.”
A lot could be said about this argument. First, note that even if it were sound, it does not show the Divine Command Theory is false. Harris is, in fact, offering pragmatic arguments against the theory: it is dangerous, or is easily misused – but there are many things which are dangerous and easily misused that are nevertheless true.
More importantly, the argument is unsound. A Divine Command Theory contends that an action is obligatory if God actually commands that action. It does not contend that an action is obligatory if someone claims, or believes that God commands it. Obviously, simply believing something is the case does not mean that it is true. Harris, as an atheist, surely recognises this; many people believe and are convinced God exists yet Harris thinks they are mistaken.
Hence, the mere fact an Islamic terrorist believes God has commanded him or her to “blow themselves up” does not commit the divine command theorist to supporting terrorism. All a divine command theorist needs to say in response to Islamic terrorists is that God did not command them to engage in terrorism. This is not the same as claiming “they are praying to the wrong God”. It is quite possible they are praying to the right God yet they are also violating his commands.
Praying to God does not mean one is obeying him.Many religious believers with earnest prayer lives candidly admit that they fail to perfectly obey God. Moreover, if a Divine Command Theory is correct then every person, theist or atheist, who refrains from murder, rape, or theft is obeying God’s commands. It does not follow they are praying to any God. Harris here seems to presuppose a caricature of a Divine Command Theory whereby it affirms that an action is right if it is done by someone who prays to the right God. No divine command theorist I know of, and certainly not William Lane Craig, has ever contended this.
Suppose then a divine command theorist responds to Islamic terrorism by affirming that God did not command any terrorist to blow themselves up. What is the problem? Harris seems to suggest this denial is a “faith-based claim” and cannot be known apart from faith. This, however, is extremely implausible. Is Harris really suggesting that we cannot know that a loving and just God does not command people to engage in terrorism apart from faith? Harris himself presumably thinks that God did not command Islamic terrorists to blow themselves up; has Harris based his conclusion on faith?
This point was made by Craig in the debate:
Harris: This is the kind of morality that you get out of divine command theory that, again, offers no retort to the Jihadist other than, “Sorry buster, you happen to have the wrong god.”
Craig: But that’s exactly your retort, Sam, that God has not issued such a command, and therefore, you’re not morally obligated to do it.
Harris: No, if God did, he would be evil. So I can get behind that God, if God is issuing that command, he’s an evil bastard.
This exchange is insightful as it shows the special pleading in Harris’ position. Harris objects that the only retort a divine command theorist can make to a jihadist is “you happen to have the wrong God” . Yet his own response to the jihadist is to state “the God you’re following is an evil bastard”; by this I take it Harrs means: the conception of God the Jihadist holds is one that is atrocious, a being that fitted that description would be unworthy of worship – but isn’t this just another way of saying the Jihadist is following the wrong God?
Contrary to Harris’s protestations, the answer he gives the Jihadist is actually the same as the one Craig suggests: God has not issued such a command. The only reason it appears to be a different answer is terminological. As I pointed out in my previous post, Craig, in this debate, is using the term “God” as a title given to any person who is “the greatest possible being”, who is “worthy of worship”. Hence, when Craig says that God has not issued such a command, what he means is that the command was not issued by a person worthy of worship, it was not issued by a person who was maximally great. Consequently, to point out that any person who issued a particular command is an “evil bastard” is, given Craig’s terminology, to point out it was not commanded by God. There is therefore no substantive difference between the reply Craig offers the Jihadist and that offered by Harris.
This raises an obvious problem for Harris. If the claim that God did not issue the command is merely a faith based claim then Harris’ own response must be a faith based claim, as it is the same response. Harris seems to think that the divine command theorist’s response is inadequate yet his own response is – but it is exactly the same response!
Harris’ comments show the divine command theorist can offer an adequate answer to Jihadists without reverting to mere “faith” claims. Harris’ comments show that when a person asserts that God has commanded some atrocity one can use normal moral reasoning to show that it is unlikely that God (understood as a person worthy of worship) commanded the action in question. Because we have some grasp of what justice and love are, we can tell that certain actions are likely to be commanded by a loving and just person and certain actions are not. Harris’ repeated polemic against Jihadism and the Taliban involves just that, he argues that these groups claims to be following God are false because any person who was not “an evil bastard” would not command the sorts of things those groups claim God commands. Hence, those actions were not commanded by a loving and just God who is worthy of worship. This attitude is no more psychopathic when expressed by Craig than it is when expressed by Harris.
Let me conclude by noting another odd feature of Harris’ criticisms here. In the citation above he offers the objection that: if a jihadist had the right God then what jihadists do would be good on Divine Command theory. What exactly is the problem here? Its true that if the theology of Osama Bin Laden is true then 9/11 was justified. Similarly if, what Hitler believed was true then exterminating Jews is permissible. If what Marxists claim is true then dictatorship of the proletariat is just. This is just the uncontroversial point that false ideologies often have false implications. It is unclear to me why Harris would want to deny this. Much of his polemic involves him arguing that certain religious beliefs are such, that if true, they have false or absurd implications. In fact, as I noted above, Harris states that he would reply to the Jihadist by stating “if God is issuing that command, he’s an evil bastard” which suggests that he believes if jihadism is true then evil things follow. Once again Harris seems to think that when a divine command theorist says the same thing he says it is absurd but when he says it it is really sensible. Unfortunately the truth of a proposition is not determined by whether Sam Harris utters it. It is determined by the facts.
Harris’ argument that a Divine Command Theory expresses a psychopathic moral attitude therefore fails. Of course Harris’ arguments resonate with a popular narrative of the secular west, that religion is the source of wars, division and violence, that it suppressed science ushering in the dark ages, inquisitions, witch hunts and freedom. Liberty and peace descended on Europe only due to the enlightenment advocacy of reason over faith. The problem is this narrative is false. Post 9/11 many people again feel the fear of religious violence and clinging to this narrative no doubt helps them make sense of these fears. Unfortunately bad history does not excuse bad arguments. Nor does it exonerate the blatant contradictions and special pleading in Harris’ arguments.
I look at Harris’ final remarks in Is a Divine Command Theory Psychotic? Sam Harris on Divine Commands Part III.
Tags: Debates · Divine Command Theory · God and Morality · Is the Foundation of Morality Natural or Supernatural? · Religion and Violence · Sam Harris · William Lane Craig11 Comments
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Hi,
The problem I have with divine command theory is not that terrorists mistakenly think they are commanded to commit acts of terrorism. It’s easy enough to believe that people who are obviously insane are mistaken about God.
What I do find disturbing is that divine command theory makes God’s motivation opaque. The idea of a will (even a divine will) being the sole basis for the good is frightening. It fails to give a reason why God should not order terrorist acts occasionally, for a good cause. It leaves the possibility open.
Hi Peter
I addressed that objection in my earlier post here: http://www.mandm.org.nz/2013/02/divine-commands-and-psychopathic-tendencies.html.
Hi Matt,
With all due respect, it doesn’t really address my objection, it simply makes the case that God as understood by orthodox Christianity is very unlikely to issue the kinds of divine commands that a terrorist would want to carry out. This may well be the case, but it still makes the answer to “what is good” simply “whatever God says is good”. It equates the good to an act of will. This seems a little “Islamic” to me. It suggests a God who transcends reason which if I understand correctly, is the Islamic understanding of God.
That only is true if you think it’s very unlikely that a fully informed, rational, loving and just impartial person would command terrorism, and as I pointed out in the linked post, this would entail that its possible for terrorism to be just, an act of love, in accord with impartial beneficent concern, and a rational response to the facts. And if you think this then any moral theory religious or secular will have the same implication.
This is false, as I pointed out in my first post, http://www.mandm.org.nz/2013/05/sam-harris-on-divine-commands-part-one.html no divine command theorist I know claims that “what is good” is “whatever God says is good”. DCT is a theory of moral obligation not goodness in general, and it claims that whats obligatory is what a loving, just impartial, omniscient God would command. Nor does this suggest a good who transcends reason, it suggests a God who acts in accord with reason and the facts an is motivated by things such as justice, love, impartiality and so on. So your objection simply does not follow.
Hi Matt,
That only is true if you think it’s very unlikely that a fully informed, rational, loving and just impartial person would command terrorism.
The impression I took, maybe a mistaken impression, is that it would be exactly the other way around: if God commands it then by definition it’s rational, loving, just and impartial. In other words it’s those things by virtue of having been commanded/willed and not inherent in the act itself.
As you say, there are secular theories with the same implication: utilitarianism for example. If it can be shown that blowing up a bus full of schoolchildren will “maximise happiness” (maybe because you think 1,000,000 children will be better off because the imperialist infidel capitalists will leave you in charge of the country) then the act is just, or at least rational. This is the sort of conclusion you can come to when the moral aspect of an action is external to the action itself.
it suggests a God who acts in accord with reason and the facts an is motivated by things such as justice, love, impartiality and so on
That is the Christian understanding of God, but on the face of it DCT doesn’t appear to make any statement either for or against that understanding. It seems to me there is no reason why DCT could not be compatible with any kind of god.
At the least, it would appear that DCT has dangerous implications taken in isolation, out of context. Perhaps that’s true of all theology. I understand C S Lewis had some reservations towards the implications of DCT as well.
Perhaps it’s like this: in theory, God could create universes with any number of dimensions, any configuration of space and time. So conceivably God could create square circles, in a universe which could support that kind of geometry. But in the actual existing universe, you can’t have square circles. You could say that square circles are irrational because God defined them as irrational (maybe a sort of DCT, since in this view the irrationality is determined by fiat) but that would ignore the fact that square circles are inherently irrational due to the nature of the universe and space-time. In a similar fashion, the fact that “justly killing the innocent” is an inherent contradiction is due to the configuration of reality in this universe as willed by God. In other words, commanded indirectly?
Caveat emptor: IANAT (I am not a theologian).
[Let’s try again to post this response]
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Peter: “That is the Christian understanding of God, but on the face of it DCT doesn’t appear to make any statement either for or against that understanding. It seems to me there is no reason why DCT could not be compatible with any kind of god.”
It’s impossible for a being who actually *is* God to be not-good. Any conception of ‘God’ wherein ‘God’ is not-good is incoherent — so yes, in the limited sense of one’s ideas being “compatible” with incoherency, one might “reason” that “there is no reason why DCT could not be compatible with any kind of god.”
Peter: “At the least, it would appear that DCT has dangerous implications taken in isolation, out of context. Perhaps that’s true of all theology. I understand C S Lewis had some reservations towards the implications of DCT as well.”
*Everything* “has dangerous implications taken in isolation, out of context.”
* the “Leave a comment” form has a line for one’s “website” … but, apparently, I hates it when one’s website is a blog under the Blogspot.com domain, and sends one’s post to Limbo.
I’ve recently noticed this behavior in the commbox of WordPress.com blogs.
“That only is true if you think it’s very unlikely that a fully informed, rational, loving and just impartial person would command terrorism, and as I pointed out in the linked post, this would entail that its possible for terrorism to be just, an act of love, in accord with impartial beneficent concern, and a rational response to the facts. And if you think this then any moral theory religious or secular will have the same implication.”\
The problem is WLC does in fact think that his “God” commanded genocide, and seems to be A-OK with this. Given WLC also thinks that his “God” is still active in the world I guess he could not object if some nut shot an abortion doctor and said they did it because they were commanded by God… well not a lot he (or you) can say against this. You can’t argue they were wrong, because it MIGHT be the case that the all-knowing God knew that this act would bring about a good result… in fact you are left paralyzed with no answer whenever anyone says “God” commanded a certain action.
Moron Eater
Actually that’s false. Craig is explicit that he does not think God commanded “Genocide”. His argument is that the text does not describe Genocide and he even goes so far as to argue that nothing in the text tells us that non-combatants were killed. However, he offers an argument that if God did command this that’s compatible the existence of just and loving God.
Craig basically suggests that while a loving and just fully informed God would issue a general prohibition on killing non-combatants that is the default moral presumption governing all normal circumstances, in rare circumstances a being with these attributes could exempt people from this rule for the sake of some greater good, or to avoid some lesser evil.
(Something analogous to this btw is widely defended in secular ethics today, and implicit in most secular moral theories.)
The Craig supports Genocide canard is simply false and based on a failure of Craig’s critics to actually read what he says carefully.
Neither of those claims follows, First, even if God is still active in the world it does not follow we should expect him to offers commands like that to people today . There is a long standing position in Protestantism which holds the prophetic utterances ceased with the closing of the Canon a position known as cessationism). Cessationism is quite compatible with the claim God is still active in the sense of sustaining and providentially guiding creation, responding to prayers, assisting people, sanctifying them and so on .
Second, even if prophetic utterances can occur today, nothing in his position suggests that he must believe God has issued such an utterance merely because someone said he had. Even for non-cessationists, claims to prophetic revelation need to be based on some evidence before they are believed and have to pass certain tests to be seen as authentic. So your inference simply does not follow.
That doesn’t follow either, the mere fact God “might” have commanded something does not mean you are paralysed with no answer whatsoever before any “claim” that he did.
An analogous line of reasoning can show this, it’s possible for people to hallucinate, hence at any time when I perceive some object, it might be the case that I am hallucinating, this does not mean I can never trust my perceptual judgements and must adopt a global scepticism towards all perceptual claims.
Similarly, when a friend phones me and asks me a question its possible he was hired by the SIS to spy on me. The fact he might be a spy does not mean I should be paranoid that every friend who calls me is a spy. The mere fact something “might” be the case and someone “claims” it is does not mean I cannot act on the default assumption that that claim is false until I have compelling evidence to the contrary. Nor does it mean I must accept any claim made that this possibility is actualised without any evidence at all.
A final and important point is that even if Craig’s views on “Genocide” are problematic that tells us only that somethings wrong with those views, not that his meta ethical views are mistaken. The debate was on meta ethics not Craig’s stance on scripture or scriptural interpretation, so the point is actually moot.
“Actually that’s false. Craig is explicit that he does not think God commanded “Genocide”. His argument is that the text does not describe Genocide and he even goes so far as to argue that nothing in the text tells us that non-combatants were killed. However, he offers an argument that if God did command this that’s compatible the existence of just and loving God. “
Genocide. Slaughter. Murder. Mass murder… whatever word you want to use. Whether or not the killing “God” ordered meets the standard of “genocide” or is merely mass murder is not really that important. It is nasty either whatever you choose to call it.
“Neither of those claims follows, First, even if God is still active in the world it does not follow we should expect him to offers commands like that to people today.”
Perhaps. But to claim that “God” used to make commands to kill to individuals, but now does not is a claim with no evidence at all. It makes one more claim about “God” to make the theory work. Completely ad hoc.
”Second, even if prophetic utterances can occur today, nothing in his position suggests that he must believe God has issued such an utterance merely because someone said he had.”
Exactly. Which is what makes this ethical theory so useless. If I claim that God told me to kill your son, how can you tell whether this was an ethical action or not? You have no way of doing so. You either have to make the ad hoc claim that God does not ask people to do things anymore, or else you have to claim that you have special knowledge of God’s intentions. But this is countered by my similar claim. Any and all actions can be justified by claiming special revelation. And you can’t even fall back on “but God would not order you to kill my son because it is against his nature…” because you have already accepted that there are special instances where God will use murder for some greater good. You have no special way of knowing which instances this is. So should murderers be able to use the “God told me to do it” defence?
“Even for non-cessationists, claims to prophetic revelation need to be based on some evidence before they are believed and have to pass certain tests to be seen as authentic.”
Now this claim I just don’t buy. It is another ad hoc claim (plucked out of the air) to strengthen a very weak hypothesis. I can just say that no, God told me to kill the boy and it was absolutely certain that he did so… I don’t recall Abraham having an ecclesiastical committee rule upon his revelation. God does not have to work according to your rules, however inconvenient that may be for your theory.
With a WLC style of reasoning one could argue that the Holocaust was in fact an act instigated and supported by God, and that it was done for some greater good.
In fact, some American Evangelicals say exactly this.
This should be enough to demonstrate the moral bankruptcy of this theory. It fails for two reasons:
(1) It justifies some of the most vile actions ever taken by humans. All they need do is say “God told me to” or “God is on my side” and atrocities are justified. This has happened time after time throughout history and continues to happen today, whether it is terrorists flying planes into buildings, or the president of the USA claiming God supports his war.
(2) It has no teeth. There is no way to use this theory to decide whether or not an action is good or bad. Should I murder my friend? Yes if God thinks that would be a good idea… does God think that? No idea. Should I give to charity? Same answer. Maybe God knows that me giving to charity would lead to some evil down the road.