40 responses so far ↓

• Thom

  Oct 3, 2012 at 9:06 am

  

  Do all Christian’s really think that human fetuses are innocent human beings?

  Also, a living thing’s status as a human being appears to be a distraction. If what grounds the prohibition against killing the thing is its status of bearing God’s image, then the relevant question is rather whether the living thing bears the God’s image. So why think that a human zygote bears God’s image? (Given the murkiness of the phrase “to bear God’s image” something else is probably motivating most Christians to adopt the pro-life position. )
• Matt

  Oct 3, 2012 at 9:18 am

  

  Thom, I don’t think its controversial that fetuses are human beings, there is pretty much a consensus on that in the literature at least if your talking about fetuses and not pre-embryos.

  I did say that one could avoid this conclusion if you held that the fetus was an aggressor, outside of cases of threats to the women’s life and perhaps rape I don’t think those arguments are plausible, but some take this line. Doing so requires you to make assumptions about sex, responsibility and parenthood which I think are mistaken and also quite harmful.

  The historical consensus however is pretty much that fetuses are innocent human beings except in cases where the women’s life is in danger.

  As to your last comment, my position is that all human beings bear the image of God and so the issue is who is a human being? You can try and seperate humanity from the imago dei but I suspect that will lead down the same road as “personhood” arguments and lead to endorsing infanticide.
• Thom

  Oct 3, 2012 at 9:27 am

  

  But I’m suggesting that what you are calling the uncontroversial point is actually a potentially irrelevant point. The work is done by your assumption that all human beings bear God’s image, and that the stringency of the prohibition against killing is grounded in this image-bearing status. But how do you defend your assumption that all human beings–including human zygotes–bear God’s image?

  On the question of the innocence of fetuses, what about the imputed sins of Adam? Don’t many Christians think that all human beings somehow share in the guilt of Adam simply by blood relation or something?
• Matt

  Oct 3, 2012 at 11:10 am

  

  Thom, on the issue of imputed sin, even those traditions that understand that in terms of original guilt, would not see this as relevant because the claim “its wrong to kill innocent human life” is not referring to innocence in this sense, its referring to something like a person who is either a material aggressor or has been found guilty of a criminal activity. The human courts for example can’t prosecute because they have original sin they have to have violated an actual human law.

  The issue of the image of God would take a blog post of its own, I am inclined to read scripture as teaching that all human beings are made in God’s image, but spelling out what that means would go beyond a com box.
• Thom

  Oct 3, 2012 at 11:23 am

  

  My first point is only to highlight the way in which there is no obvious connection, of the required kind, between “human zygotes” and “bearing the image of God”–even granting the premise that God created man in his image. To introduce the issue of status as a human being is, it seems, beside the point, despite the rhetorical advantage that it generally provides. People are willing to concede that it is generally wrong to kill human beings probably for the same reason that they are as willing to concede that a human being could not fit through the eye of a needle, or that a human being could not survive a year without respiration. The obvious point is this: when people concede such claims about “human beings” they are not taking the concept to include human zygotes.

  If human fetuses are not truly innocent, but rather deserve a punishment far worse than earthly death (eternal torment in hell, perhaps), then it is far from clear why this should be morally irrelevant. If a man deserves to be tormented severely, this plausibly has bearing on the badness of doing something that might cause the same man to suffer a minor headache.
• Matt

  Oct 3, 2012 at 2:55 pm

  

  Thom, you’ll note I was referring to foetuses not zygotes, you’ll I granted there can be dispute about the status of zygotes and early embryos.
  But second, I think any attempt to use “human” in a more qualified sense along the lines you suggest will run into the same problems that occurs when people try and distinguish biological humanity from personhood. There is no real way of defending this that does not also entail infants are not human and I am quite sure that when people hold that “all humans are made in the image of God” they intended to include human infants in this category. Certainly, the tradition suggests that almost everyone who has made this claim has understood it this way.

  If human fetuses are not truly innocent, but rather deserve a punishment far worse than earthly death (eternal torment in hell, perhaps), then it is far from clear why this should be morally irrelevant. If a man deserves to be tormented severely, this plausibly has bearing on the badness of doing something that might cause the same man to suffer a minor headache.

  I disagree, even if someone deserves something it does not follow its permissible for me to treat him in the way he deserves. Suppose for example someone has killed my wife and children, I know this, and suppose murder deserves death under criminal law. It doesn’t follow I can execute him. Only the state can do this, and even then only after a fair trial. I have the same duty to not kill him that I have towards everyone else who has not commited murder. So even if foetuses deserve eternal damnation it does not follow that “other human beings” can treat them badly.
• Julie

  Oct 3, 2012 at 4:26 pm

  

  Kewl interview, though all my roomies felt the same – your accent is so thick we couldn’t understand everything you said lol
• Thom

  Oct 3, 2012 at 4:50 pm

  

  So you concede that early stage embryos might not bear the image of God. What is it that a developing embryo then comes to possess such that it acquires the image-bearing status? Do you suppose that it is a gradual process, or do you think it happens suddenly? Does it come in degrees?

  Notice that I have nowhere attempted to defined “human”. On the contrary, I have repeatedly pointed out why this might be a distraction.

  Notice, finally, that precisely how I phrased my point about the potential relevance of innocence and guilt:

  If a man deserves to be tormented severely, this plausibly has bearing on the badness of doing something that might cause the same man to suffer a minor headache.

  In particular, notice that I avoid speaking in terms of permissibility. I spoke of the badness of an action that has certain effects. This badness may have relevance to questions of policy and morality. It’s certainly not obvious that it doesn’t. Your response attacks a straw man.
• Matt

  Oct 3, 2012 at 5:42 pm

  

  So you concede that early stage embryos might not bear the image of God.

  No I concede that there are questions around whether an early embryo is a human being. I think all human beings were made in God’s image.

  “ What is it that a developing embryo then comes to possess such that it acquires the image-bearing status? Do you suppose that it is a gradual process, or do you think it happens suddenly? Does it come in degrees?”

  Like I said I think the fetus is made in the image of God because it’s a human being. if you start claiming that a human being does not have moral status until it gains some morally relevant property latter in development then you will find you cannot avoid infanticide, I think the literature shows this quite clearly. I argue this point in my PhD thesis in some detail.

  Also if the property comes in degrees you will find it hard to justify the claim that all people are equal in dignity and worth.

  Notice, finally, that precisely how I phrased my point about the potential relevance of innocence and guilt:
  If a man deserves to be tormented severely, this plausibly has bearing on the badness of doing something that might cause the same man to suffer a minor headache.
  In particular, notice that I avoid speaking in terms of permissibility. I spoke of the badness of an action that has certain effects. This badness may have relevance to questions of policy and morality. It’s certainly not obvious that it doesn’t. Your response attacks a straw man.

  My example works as far as I can tell on the question of badness as well. Suppose I a private citizen kill the man who murdered my wife. Is this a bad thing? It seems to me it is. In fact one could argue for its lack of justification precisely on the basis of its bad effects, on rule utilitarian grounds one could argue that adoption of a rule that allows private individuals to kill everyone they are convinced killed someone is going to have really bad effects whereas adopting a rule where everyone leaves that to the authorities subject to an investigation, trial, appeal process and so in has good effects.
• Thom

  Oct 4, 2012 at 3:10 am

  

  You seem to rely on the following kind of inference: All human beings bear the image of God; every zygote is a human being; therefore, every zygote bears the image of God. The inference is valid, but the first premise is questionable. To put pressure it, we ask, “Why do you think human zygotes bear the image of God?” Your temptation is to answer, “Because human zygotes are human beings and all human beings bear the image of God.”

  Notice, however, that this kind of reasoning has a parallel: All human beings have blood, bones, and brains; every human zygote is a human beings; therefore, every human zygote has blood, bones, and brains. The argument is again valid, and we should again put pressure on the first premise. As before, we can ask, “why do you think human zygotes have blood, bones, and brains?” The temptation will again be to answer, “Because human zygotes are human beings and all human beings have blood, bones, and brains.”

  Do you see the sophistry? It lies in the way that “human being” is used in ordinary language. If we ask a person whether any human being can fit through the eye a needle, people will answer “no”. This is not because they think human zygotes can’t fit through the eye of a needle. Rather, it is because they are not taking “human being” to encompass human zygotes. Because this tendency is pervasive in ordinary language, pro-life arguments that rely on claims about human beings (e.g., “human beings have an inviolable right to life”) tend to be sophistical.

  In the present case, we can neutralize the sophistry by pressing the following question: why do you think that all human beings–including human zygotes–bear the image of God? What is your answer? (And at this point it should now be clear why you should try to avoid simply repeating, “all human beings bear the image of God.”)

  Your PhD thesis introduces a separate argument than the ones in discussion here. I’d happy to pursue it separately, if you wish.

  Your further remarks about innocence and badness rely on a common fallacy. To demonstrate that the non-innocence of a person never affects the badness of a consequence or state of affairs in which the person is harmed, it is not enough to demonstrate that there is one case in which the non-innocence of a person doesn’t affect the badness of a consequence or state of affairs in which the person is harmed.
• Hugh

  Oct 26, 2012 at 4:15 pm

  

  In the present case, we can neutralize the sophistry by pressing the following question: why do you think that all human beings–including human zygotes–bear the image of God? What is your answer? (And at this point it should now be clear why you should try to avoid simply repeating, “all human beings bear the image of God.”)

  I can’t speak for Matt, but I’d be inclined to think of scripture such as Psalm 139:13-16.

  For you created my inmost being;
  you knit me together in my mother’s womb.
  I praise you because I am fearfully and wonderfully made;
  your works are wonderful,
  I know that full well.
  My frame was not hidden from you
  when I was made in the secret place,
  when I was woven together in the depths of the earth.
  Your eyes saw my unformed body;
  all the days ordained for me were written in your book
  before one of them came to be.

  There’s a strong notion of being a person designed and known by God even in the earliest stages of human development. I’d like to think that this is sufficient grounds to believe that imago dei applies to even zygotes.
• Thom

  Oct 27, 2012 at 4:35 am

  

  Hugh, sometimes pro-lifers think that they can make their argument on non-religious, scientific grounds. Your argument is certainly not such an argument. Once we’ve introduced scripture, however, two new questions are raised: 1. Do particular scripture passages really offer the radical pro-life positions? 2. Do the scriptures also support arguments against the radical pro-life positions? I think the answer is “yes” to the second question. But let’s look at the first question, and Psalm 139 in particular.

  The Psalmist, who is known, I think, to speak rather loosely, says that God knit him together in his mother’s womb. Does this mean that the psalmist bore God’s image at the moment of conception in his mother’s womb? Obviously not, since the “knitting” may have taken place over time in the mother’s womb. Does it even mean that, at some point while still in the mother’s womb the Psalmist bore God’s image. No. Between the time Victor knitted Frankenstein together and the time Frankenstein had many of his most noteworthy properties, a great amount of time may have elapsed. So also with God’s knitting together of the psalmist and that mysterious property called “bearing God’s image.”

  The psalmist also mentions that God knew him while he was still in his mother’s womb. Elsewhere it is suggested that God knew his people before the creation of the world. Does this mean that people bear God’s image well before the moment of conception? It would certainly suggest this if your inference from Psalms is legitimate.

  So, then, on a closer examination, this Psalm doesn’t provide very good evidence at all for the radical pro-life position.
• Hugh

  Oct 30, 2012 at 11:38 am

  

  Thom,

  Your argument rests on the idea that Human Zygotes aren’t included in the notion of all humans bearing the image of God. You’re right in saying, in most use cases, human zygotes aren’t in mind when we typically refer to human beings (you gave the example of how people would agree that humans cannot fit through the eye of a needle). The problem I see here is that most people have an overly restrictive idea of ‘human being’ which sits at the forefront of their minds. For example, if I also ask a person “how many legs does a human have?” they would say “two”. This is not because they believe that amputees, or people born without legs are not human, it’s because they don’t take humans here to encompass such people. If however you were to prompt the person in your example, “well, what about a human zygote?” they might say “well yeah, I thought you meant like, a fully grown human”.

  So what’s relevant in the case of bearing the image of God, since it is a theological notion, is not what the average person typically thinks of when talking about humans, but what the biblical authors thought and referred to. The term used for ‘man’ in Genesis 1:26, in Hebrew, is “adam”, which actually refers to humankind as a whole. This is where Genesis authors establish the *human race* as set apart from the rest of creation, and given special inherent value. I don’t see why we have to treat bearing God’s image as something which suddenly occurs for each person at a specific point in development. So the important question is, is there anything in scripture to suggest that the unborn are considered qualitatively different in this regard?

  Where Psalm 139 comes in is that the Psalmist demonstrates that even as we enter humanity as an unformed body in a dark place needing to be “knitted” or “woven” together, we were valued by God, so if anything it reinforces the idea that the unborn are part of this creation who are made in His image.

  My question for you is, what scripture can you provide which disqualifies the unborn as being God’s image bearers?
• Andrew

  Oct 31, 2012 at 12:22 am

  

  Regarding whether or not zygotes have “the image of God”.

  Let’s assume for the moment that the “Imago Dei” is the property moral status. That is to say, let’s assume that the “Imago Dei” is the property that demands moral consideration.

  Now it’s a conceptual truth that “Persons” possess moral status “essentially”. In other words, persons are such that they cannot lack moral status and yet still be persons. But if that’s the case, then it follows that the “Imago Dei” is a property that persons possess essentially. After all, if the “Imago Dei” and “moral status” are identical (one and the same thing), and persons possess “moral status” essentially, then by the law of identity, the “Imago Dei” is also an essential property of persons.

  It’s also the case that “I” am numerically identical with the zygote that I once was. I’m not qualitatively identical with that zygote, but I am numerically so. Thus if you were to show me a picture of the zygote that I once was, and a picture of me now, then what you’d be showing me is a picture of the same thing albeit at different stages of maturity.

  Now if “I” am numerically identical to the zygote that I once was, then any essential property that I now possess, I also possessed as that zygote. Since, as we discovered a moment ago, the “Imago Dei” is an essential property of persons (in virtue of being the very same property that grounds moral status), it follows that the zygote that I once was also possessed the “Imago Dei”.
• Thom

  Oct 31, 2012 at 4:55 am

  

  Andrew, I find your argument more interesting than the standard radical anti-abortion fare. You make, however, five dubious assumptions:

  1. That the issue is settled by determining whether or not human zygotes have “moral status” (or, as you alternatively put it, that they “demand moral consideration”). Most, however, would be willing to concede that human corpses and non-human animals also have moral status, and that they demand, or deserve, moral consideration. This may just mean things like this: one shouldn’t torture a mouse for entertainment; one shouldn’t piss on a human corpse. Granting “moral status” to a human embryo may just mean that one shouldn’t flush it down the toilet after the abortion.

  2. That “person” univocally means what you take it to mean. But–and especially if we swap out “moral status” for something that could secure a radical anti-abortion conclusion–your relevant “conceptual truth” claim is implausible. “Person” is sometimes stipulated to mean a certain thing (like, “an entity with an inviolable right to life”), but these stipulations don’t exactly amount to conceptual truths about “person”. In ordinary language, literature, and law, “person” is used to mean a great variety things–including corporate entities, legal artifices, selected properties of a human being, and even human genitals.

  3. That you are essentially a person. While in some sense of “person” this may be quite plausible, in the sense of “person” you would need your assumption here is quite dubious.

  4. That numerical identity is what is important in moral concerns about a person’s life. Parfit-style arguments effectively undermine this assumption.

  5. That you are numerically identical to the zygote you once were. Is this again supposed to be a conceptual truth? Consider the case of identical–i.e., monozygotic–twins. Given the transitivity of numerical identity, at least one of the twins cannot be numerically identical to the zygote “that it once was”–at least prior to the twinning. But this shows that you are at best making a dubious empirical claim when you say that you are identical to the zygote “you once were.” That claim would be undermined if you ever had a twin–even for so brief a time that your identical twin perished soon after the twinning.
• Matt

  Oct 31, 2012 at 4:28 pm

  

  “Given the transitivity of numerical identity, at least one of the twins cannot be numerically identical to the zygote “that it once was”–at least prior to the twinning. But this shows that you are at best making a dubious empirical claim when you say that you are identical to the zygote “you once were.” That claim would be undermined if you ever had a twin–even for so brief a time that your identical twin perished soon after the twinning.” The same argument would show the tree in my back yard today is not identical with the same tree in my back yard yesterday, why, because its possible to cut the tree in half and get two trees, so because this is possible the there is no continuity.
• Thom

  Nov 1, 2012 at 3:26 am

  

  The same argument would show the tree in my back yard today is not identical with the same tree in my back yard yesterday, why, because its possible to cut the tree in half and get two trees, so because this is possible the there is no continuity.

  Not so. But because Matt’s comment reveals a significant misunderstanding of the reasoning involved, let me clarify. The argument shows that at least one twin isn’t identical to its pre-twinned zygote. The tree analogy would have to go something like this: on the assumption that the seed from which your tree grew “twinned”, your tree might not be numerically identical to it’s pre-twinned seed–given (a) that your tree is not numerically identical to its twin; and (b) the transitivity of numerical identity. In other words, at least one of the tree twins isn’t numerically identical to its pre-twinned seed, and the one that isn’t might be yours.

  Even when corrected, however, the tree analogy isn’t so good because, unlike with human zygotes, we don’t commonly recognize “twinning” tree seeds.
• Hugh

  Nov 1, 2012 at 12:27 pm

  

  Given the transitivity of numerical identity, at least one of the twins cannot be numerically identical to the zygote “that it once was”–at least prior to the twinning. But this shows that you are at best making a dubious empirical claim when you say that you are identical to the zygote “you once were.” That claim would be undermined if you ever had a twin–even for so brief a time that your identical twin perished soon after the twinning.

  A zygote only possesses this capacity to twin for about 14 days. So all this means is that you wouldn’t be numerical identical to the zygote which existed for the first two weeks. After this time frame when the zygote loses this capacity to twin and there would be complete ontological continuity between it and the fully grown man/woman. Given that this is around the minimum time it even takes for a woman to discover that she’s pregnant in the first place, there is no doubt that the entity to be destroyed via clinical abortion is an individual person which will become, and not produce, a fully grown person.

  Btw, could you please respond to my post earlier. Thanks.
• Matt

  Nov 1, 2012 at 2:10 pm

  

  Not so. But because Matt’s comment reveals a significant misunderstanding of the reasoning involved, let me clarify. The argument shows that at least one twin isn’t identical to its pre-twinned zygote. The tree analogy would have to go something like this: on the assumption that the seed from which your tree grew “twinned”, your tree might not be numerically identical to it’s pre-twinned seed–given (a) that your tree is not numerically identical to its twin; and (b) the transitivity of numerical identity. In other words, at least one of the tree twins isn’t numerically identical to its pre-twinned seed, and the one that isn’t might be yours.
  Actually, there is no understanding at all and I understand the argument from twinning I read it some time ago.

  First, I said nothing about seeds, I talked about adult trees, a person can cut a tree in half and plant one half in one garden and the other half in another garden, when one does this one in essence twins trees.
  Second, the analogy stands, your correct if an embryo twins then the transivity of identity shows that the two twin embryos cannot both be not “numerically identical” to the pre-twinning embryo and so the twins did not begin at conception. Similarly, if you cut a tree in half and plant each half in a new garden neither of the two new trees, is identical with the pre-cut tree.
  However, the point of my tree analogy is to show that this does nothing to show that, in cases where twinning does not occur, the embryo cannot be numerically identical to the zygote from which it originates. If I don’t cut the tree in half then it remains numerically identical with the tree that was there the day before.
  So the twinning argument does not show that a fetus is not numerically identical with a zygote, it shows only the small number of mono zygotic twinned embryos are not.
  The mere fact an organism can twin does not show it lacks numerical identity with its predecessor unless the twinning actually occurs.
• Matt

  Nov 1, 2012 at 2:39 pm

  

  Thom,
  The sophistry is in your misinterpretation not my argument.

  you seem to rely on the following kind of inference: All human beings bear the image of God; every zygote is a human being; therefore, every zygote bears the image of God. The inference is valid, but the first premise is questionable.

  Well actually as I said above in comment Oct 3, 2012 at 2:55 pm I was referring to foetuses not zygotes, so I don’t know why you have choosen to repeat the argument as referring to zygotes when I explicitly said that was not what I was argument.

  Notice, however, that this kind of reasoning has a parallel: All human beings have blood, bones, and brains; every human zygote is a human beings; therefore, every human zygote has blood, bones, and brains. The argument is again valid,

  That argument is neither valid nor a parallel to the one I provided.
  Its invalid in that the first premise uses the word human in a collective sense, the same way we might use it to say that its true that “females can get pregnant” or “mammals suckle there young”. However, the conclusion follows from the second premise only if you use the word human being in the distributive sense, and so the argument commits the fallacy of equivocation.
  The argument I offered is not parallel to this because when people say “God created human beings in his image” or “its wrong to kill human beings without justification” they are using human beings in the distributive sense and used this way the argument is valid.

  Do you see the sophistry? It lies in the way that “human being” is used in ordinary language. If we ask a person whether any human being can fit through the eye a needle, people will answer “no”. This is not because they think human zygotes can’t fit through the eye of a needle. Rather, it is because they are not taking “human being” to encompass human zygotes.

  I disagree they say it because they are using the word “human being” in a collective as opposed to distributive text. You’d get a similar answer if you asked “is it true that women can get pregnant and men can’t” the typical person would answer yes, it would not follow they were not using “women” to not encompass menopausal women or sterile women. It would simply follow they were using the term women collectively as opposed to distributively.

  Because this tendency is pervasive in ordinary language, pro-life arguments that rely on claims about human beings (e.g., “human beings have an inviolable right to life”) tend to be sophistical.
  Again, I disagree, there is no sophistry because when people say “its wrong to kill human beings” or “its wrong to torture human beings for fun” or moral claims like that they typically use these terms distributively, its true in other contexts people use the word human collectively but that is not the context its used in this discussion

  In the present case, we can neutralize the sophistry by pressing the following question: why do you think that all human beings–including human zygotes–bear the image of God? What is your answer? (And at this point it should now be clear why you should try to avoid simply repeating, “all human beings bear the image of God.”)

  No, actually the answer “all human beings bear the image of God” is a perfectly adequate answer once you understand that when people say this they use the term distributively. Whereas the examples you use involve the terms being used collectively.

  Your PhD thesis introduces a separate argument than the ones in discussion here. I’d happy to pursue it separately, if you wish.

  Actually my PhD thesis involved the claim that its wrong to kill human beings without justification.

  Your further remarks about innocence and badness rely on a common fallacy. To demonstrate that the non-innocence of a person never affects the badness of a consequence or state of affairs in which the person is harmed, it is not enough to demonstrate that there is one case in which the non-innocence of a person doesn’t affect the badness of a consequence or state of affairs in which the person is harmed.

  Actually I have already pointed out that the sense of the word “innocence” as its used when moral theologians talk about it being wrong to kill innocent human beings, is not the same as it is when people talk about all people being guility of original sin ( assuming for the sake of argument, that all Christian’s understand original sin in terms of original guilt which is false) so repeating this point simply repeats the error I have already pointed to.

  Notice also that issue of the “badness” of the consquences of a child dying also lack relevance when the issue is not whether the consequences of killing a fetus is bad, but whether its morally wrong or permissible to kill the fetus. I have already pointed out that the fact a person is guilty in the sense you mention does not entail its permissible to kill him.
• Thom

  Nov 2, 2012 at 2:16 pm

  

  I see there’s a backlog of comments that await responses from me: two posts by Hugh and two by Matt. Let me take them in their chronological order. For the sake of clarity, I will respond to each point raised as I have time, as opposed to trying to respond all at once to any posting in its entirety (as each of the four postings raise multiple points). With the hope to add clarity to our discussion I will number my points to facilitate future reference.

  1. I have argued that as the term is commonly used in ordinary language and in law “human being” (and its semantic near equivalents) does not encompass human zygotes. My evidence: consider how people would respond if we asked them if every living human being has blood, bones and brains, or whether any human being can fit through the eye of a needle, or whether any human being can survive subzero temperatures for a year without receiving food or water. When people answer “no” to these questions it is not because they believe that human zygotes have brains, or that they have brains, etc.; it is rather because, in ordinary language, “human being” does not encompass human zygotes.

  Now Hugh thinks that such responses are rather due to people’s “overly restrictive idea of ‘human being’”. As evidence, Hugh asks us to consider how people would respond if we asked: “How many legs does a human have?” But to understand what is going on with Hugh’s question, we again need to pay attention to the subtleties of ordinary language. In this case, we need to understand how questions of the form of Hugh’s question are commonly used. Questions are commonly used to solicit generalizations of a certain sort: human beings have two legs; birds fly, grass is green, etc. As generalizations, each of these statements is true, and they are true despite counterexamples (humans with no legs, flightless birds, brown grass, etc.). So, when Hugh’s question is asked of ordinary people, they will ordinarily take it to be soliciting such a true generalization.

  Notice, however, that my questions about human beings are carefully phrased to avoid this generalization-soliciting interpretation (notice how they begin: “Does every living human being…”; Can any human being…”). Now here is the telling question: if we rephrase Hugh’s question so as to rule out the generalization-soliciting interpretation, what kind of answer would we expect in response. That is, what kind of response would we expect regarding this question: “Does every human being (in the world) have two legs?” I expect that very few people would answer “yes.”
• Thom

  Nov 2, 2012 at 4:07 pm

  

  2. To support his idea that each living human zygote bears the image of God, Hugh appeals to the fact that in Genesis 1:26, the Hebrew word typically translated into the English word “man,” “actually refers to humankind as a whole.” But now notice how we would then render the relevant passage, following Hugh’s recommendation:

  Then God said, “Let us make humankind as a whole in our image, in our likeness, so that human kind as a whole may rule over the fish in the sea and the birds in the sky, over the livestock and all the wild animals,[a] and over all the creatures that move along the ground.”

  So now, (from the perspective of the authors of Genesis) far from showing that that every particular human zygote bears the image of God, this passage of itself doesn’t even show that any particular human being–adult or otherwise–bears the image of God. To think otherwise is to commit a fallacy of division, i.e., it is to infer that the individual members of a group have some property from the fact that the group as a whole has that property. To infer that any particular human being bears the image of God from the fact that humankind bears in the image of God is just as fallacious as inferring that some individual human being has lived on Earth for millennia from the fact that humankind has lived on Earth for millennia.

  But all this discussion about the image of God might ultimately be beside the point. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that we are able to show that every human zygote bears the image of God. Why should we think that this implies that every human zygote has an inviolable right to life? The suggestion is sometimes made that the status of bearing God’s image is what morally distinguishes human beings from non-human animals. But suppose that the status of bearing God’s image is only a necessary condition for possessing the inviolable right to life. As a merely necessary condition, this would indeed suffice to morally distinguish human beings from non-human animals, as it would secure the idea that, unlike human beings, non-human animals could not have an inviolable right to life (granting the common assumption that non-human animals don’t also bear the image of God). But, as a merely necessary condition for the inviolable right to life, bearing the image of God wouldn’t ensure that every image bearer also has the inviolable right to life. So it wouldn’t ensure that human zygotes possess an inviolable right to life even if we assume that every human zygote bears the image of God.

  So, for this religious argument to secure the radical anti-abortion conclusion, what needs to be shown is two things: First, why every human zygote bears the image of God, and second, why bearing the image of God is not (or not merely) a necessary condition for possessing the inviolable right to life, but also a sufficient condition. Neither has been shown.
• Matt

  Nov 2, 2012 at 5:13 pm

  

  “man,” “actually refers to humankind as a whole.” But now notice how we would then render the relevant passage, following Hugh’s recommendation:
  Then God said, “Let us make humankind as a whole in our image, in our likeness, so that human kind as a whole may rule over the fish in the sea and the birds in the sky, over the livestock and all the wild animals,[a] and over all the creatures that move along the ground.”
  So now, (from the perspective of the authors of Genesis) far from showing that that every particular human zygote bears the image of God, this passage of itself doesn’t even show that any particular human being–adult or otherwise–bears the image of God. To think otherwise is to commit a fallacy of division,

  Except that the author quite deliberately interchanges “adam” as a reference to the human race and adam as an individual person throughout the first chapters.

  Moreover, the authors of Genesis disagree with you here, because they allude back to the passage again after the flood narrative

  “Whoever sheds man’s blood,
  By man his blood shall be shed,
  For in the image of God
  He made man.”

  Your interpretation, would suggest implausibly the author is saying “who ever sheds the blood of mankind as a whole, by mankind as a whole will his blood be shed” obviously this is mistaken, one can’t shed the blood of mankind as a whole one can only shed the blood of an individual man similarly mankind as a whole can’t execute people only individual human beings can do this. So Genesis 9 interprets the phrase “distributively” not merely “collectively”.

  Similarly the new testament adopts a similar interpretation

  “With the tongue we praise our Lord and Father, and with it we curse human beings, who have been made in God’s likeness. 10 Out of the same mouth come praise and cursing. My brothers and sisters, this should not be. “ James 3:9-10

  Is James here stating we curse human beings as a whole? Again implausible he is talking about cursing individual human beings, so again the image of God is understood distributively.

  Notice also Gen 9 seems to make the image of God a sufficient condition not a merely necessary one.
• Thom

  Nov 2, 2012 at 5:29 pm

  

  Matt, you’ll have to take this up with Hugh. I only assumed Hugh’s suggested interpretation for the sake of responding to Hugh on his own terms. My general challenge on these points, however, is a challenge to anyone who wants to make “bearing the image of God” bear weight in their radical anti-abortion argument:

  So, for this religious argument to secure the radical anti-abortion conclusion, what needs to be shown is two things: First, why every human zygote bears the image of God, and second, why bearing the image of God is not (or not merely) a necessary condition for possessing the inviolable right to life, but a sufficient condition. Neither has been shown.
• Thom

  Nov 3, 2012 at 3:29 am

  

  3. Hugh observes that a human zygote loses its natural capacity to twin after two weeks, but he concedes “that you wouldn’t be numerically identical to the zygote which existed for the first two week.” Hugh’s suggestion, I take it, is that you are numerically identical to the embryo that is more than two weeks old. The implication is that this is relevant to the anti-abortion position. I’ll make three points in response.

  A. Hugh concedes more than he probably should. The mere capacity to twin doesn’t of itself imply a break in numerical identity. What implies a break in numerical identity is the actual occurrence of twinning. So, the capacity to twin at best implies uncertainty about whether or not a person is numerically identical to his/her very early-stage embryo when it has the capacity to twin. If you can’t be certain that no twinning occurred, then you can’t be certain that you are numerically identical to the early-stage embryo. This should also make clear why Matt’s attempted tree analogy is inapt (see his comment at Oct.31, 2012 at 4:28).

  B. On the hypothesis that numerical identity underlies the moral argument against abortion, we can now see in the weakness of all inferences of the form: “I have an inviolable right to life; I was once an X; therefore Xs have an inviolable right to life.” Our observations about twinning reveal that the truth of claim “I was once an X” does not guarantee that I am numerical identity to X. So, even if the inviolable right to life follows numerical identity, this wouldn’t secure the desired conclusion: that anything I once was also had an inviolable right to life. Here is the interesting upshot: appeals to numerical identity undermine anti-abortion arguments that rely on appeals of this form: “I was once a fetus/embryo/zygote.”

  C. The observations about twinning reveal the peculiarity in attempts to make moral matters depend on questions about numerical identity. Sam is not numerically identical to his 14-day-old embryo from which he and his very short-lived identical twin arose, but Sam is numerically identical to the post-twinned 15-day-old embryo. Those who rest such weight on claims of numerical identity seem to suggest a peculiar thing: Sam’s 15-day-old embryo shares Sam’s inviolable right to life, even though the embryo might not have had an inviolable right to life just a day before. More peculiarly still, Sam’s 13-day-old embryo would have had an inviolable right to life if it hadn’t later twinned on the 14th day! So, numerical identity looks to be a very peculiar feature upon which to ground the right to life.
• Matt

  Nov 3, 2012 at 6:05 am

  

  Hugh concedes more than he probably should. The mere capacity to twin doesn’t of itself imply a break in numerical identity. What implies a break in numerical identity is the actual occurrence of twinning.

  I agree and that was the point of my tree analogy

  So, the capacity to twin at best implies uncertainty about whether or not a person is numerically identical to his/her very early-stage embryo when it has the capacity to twin. If you can’t be certain that no twinning occurred, then you can’t be certain that you are numerically identical to the early-stage embryo. This should also make clear why Matt’s attempted tree analogy is inapt (see his comment at Oct.31, 2012 at 4:28).

  Correct, so at best twinning shows we can’t be “certain” we were once zygotes.

  You however draw an unjustified conclusion from this claim. You state.

  On the hypothesis that numerical identity underlies the moral argument against abortion, we can now see in the weakness of all inferences of the form: “I have an inviolable right to life; I was once an X; therefore Xs have an inviolable right to life.” Our observations about twinning reveal that the truth of claim “I was once an X” does not guarantee that I am numerical identity to X.

  This clearly doesn’t follow,

  First, the fact you can’t be “certain” you once were a zygote does not entail that you were not once a zygote, nor does it entail you are unjustified in assuming you were. I am not certain that my brother will not die in a car crash tomorrow, does it follow I should not make plans to see him for Christmas or my belief I will see him is irrational?

  Second, contrary to what you say here, if the twinning argument were decisive. ( and we have seen its not, all it shows is we can’t be “certain” of a conclusion not that the conclusion is unjustified) that would not mean ““I was once an X” does not guarantee that I am numerical identity to X” It would show its not true I once was an X. If it is true that I ( as opposed to someone else) once was an X, then I am numerically identical to X.

  Note also again, my comments were about fetuses not zygotes so this argument is irrelevant.
• Thom

  Nov 3, 2012 at 12:15 pm

  

  So Matt’s tree analogy, then, was always directed against a straw man. The very statements Matt quotes before introducing the analogy avoid the error that Matt’s tree analogy commits.

  But Matt himself goes farther than I have gone when he says this: “at best twinning shows we can’t be ‘certain’ we were once zygotes.” Even if Sam isn’t numerical identical to the zygote “he once was,” why cannot Sam still once have been that pre-twinned zygote? All the occurrence of twinning shows is that at least one of the twins isn’t numerically identical to the pre-twinned zygote. Suppose that Sam is a twin who isn’t numerically identical to the pre-twinned zygote. How does that prove that Sam was never that pre-twinned zygote? Matt’s implicit assumption must be this: Sam can only once have been something that is numerically identical with Sam. But why should we believe that?
• Matt

  Nov 4, 2012 at 4:47 am

  

  Matt’s implicit assumption must be this: Sam can only once have been something that is numerically identical with Sam. But why should we believe that?

  Because if the embryo is not identical with Sam, then it is not Sam but something else, and hence Sam was never the embryo someone else was. You can’t say that an embryo “was Sam” but also it was not “Sam” at the same time.
• Thom

  Nov 5, 2012 at 4:18 am

  

  I don’t see any obvious contradiction in the claim that Sam was once X, although Sam isn’t numerically identical to X. Indeed, even after we show people that Sam isn’t numerically identical to the embryo “he once was,” many such people are still going to refer to the that embryo as the embryo Sam once was. My main point in 3B is valid so long as this observation about ordinary language is true. And it clearly is.
• Thom

  Nov 5, 2012 at 4:44 am

  

  4. Matt repeatedly insists that we should be talking about human fetuses, as opposed to human zygotes. Do his arguments not apply to human zygotes? If not, why not? If his arguments do apply to human zygotes, then why does Matt so strenuously resist discussing his arguments in terms of human zygotes?

  Matt has emphasized that he thinks that all human beings bear the image of God, and that–because (a) human fetuses are human beings, and (apparently) (b) bearing God’s image is a sufficient condition for possessing an inviolable right to life–human fetuses have an inviolable right to life. If Matt doesn’t think that the same argument applies to human zygotes, he should say why—given that the extension to human zygotes is otherwise such an obvious inference. Does he suspect that human zygotes are not human beings? Or, does he suspect that bearing the image of God isn’t really a sufficient condition for possessing the inviolable right to life?
• Matt

  Nov 6, 2012 at 2:59 am

  

  I don’t see any obvious contradiction in the claim that Sam was once X, although Sam isn’t numerically identical to X.

  Actually that comment expresses a straight forward contradiction. If the individual that is embryo was not the individual who is Sam then Sam never was an embryo, some other individual was and that individual ceased to exist before Sam came into existence.

  Indeed, even after we show people that Sam isn’t numerically identical to the embryo “he once was,” many such people are still going to refer to the that embryo as the embryo Sam once was. My main point in 3B is valid so long as this observation about ordinary language is true. And it clearly is.

  Perhaps the oridinary lay person speaking loosely might state that Sam once was an embryo. (Though I doubt anyone who was explained what numerical identity was would in fact say this). However, the argument you were responding to was not couched in loose laymans language. It was an argument coached in the language of contemporary analytic philosophy and so the words are not being used in the sense you refer to in that argument.. If you are going to actually refute the argument Andrew put forward you need to respond to what he said, not what other people who don’t use the language of analytic philosophy might mistakenly think he said.
• Matt

  Nov 6, 2012 at 3:16 am

  

  4. Matt repeatedly insists that we should be talking about human fetuses, as opposed to human zygotes.

  No I said the argument I made on the video which you were responding to was about foetuses. Your welcome to keep talking about zygotes if you want, however if you do you will not be refuting the argument I actually made.

  Do his arguments not apply to human zygotes? If not, why not? If his arguments do apply to human zygotes, then why does Matt so strenuously resist discussing his arguments in terms of human zygotes?

  It works like this. I stated that foetuses are human beings. you responded by arguing zygotes are not. You did so by noting features of embryological development such as “twinning” which is unique to the early embryonic stage. That’s clearly a straw man. Because, even if your arguments were sound it would not refute the point I made.

  Matt has emphasized that he thinks that all human beings bear the image of God, and that–because (a) human fetuses are human beings, and (apparently) (b) bearing God’s image is a sufficient condition for possessing an inviolable right to life–human fetuses have an inviolable right to life. If Matt doesn’t think that the same argument applies to human zygotes, he should say why—given that the extension to human zygotes is otherwise such an obvious inference. Does he suspect that human zygotes are not human beings? Or, does he suspect that bearing the image of God isn’t really a sufficient condition for possessing the inviolable right to life?

  Neither my argument was rather that, even , if you grant for the sake of argument that zygotes are not human beings because of the phenomena of twinning or totipotency. That does not address my claim that fetuses are human beings.

  You seem to think that if a person grants a proposition for the sake of argument and argues that even if that proposition is true , then the conclusion that is proposed does not follow. The person is really accepts the proposition in question and is somehow being dishonest or evasive . Unfortunately, that’s not the case, one can argue that certain propositions don’t entail certain other propositions without affirming or denying the truth of the proposition in question.
  So when your ready to respond to the argument I actually made instead of continually attacking one I did not make and then suggesting some kind of motive problem when I make the reasonable request to respond to what was actually said. Let me know.
• Thom

  Nov 6, 2012 at 11:23 am

  

  Matt opines that the following “expresses a straight forward contradiction”: “Sam was once [a given embryo], although Sam isn’t numerically identical to [that embryo].”

  Matt, it should be noticed, is making an extraordinary claim. Consider all the varied ways in which we say that one thing was once something else. Think of this usage: “This piece of paper was once a tree.” Can this be a truthful claim? Unless you are going to deny ordinary usage and prescriptively stipulate how the words in question must be used, you will have to answer “yes.” But does this claim then imply that the piece of paper is numerically identical to the tree? That would be absurd. It would be absurd because, whatever else numerical identity implies, it is a transitive relationship (we might also point to a piece of furniture made from the same tree and truly say, “And this too was once a tree”).

  Matt seems think that anti-abortion argument that appeal to observations like “I was once an embryo” are not couched in ordinary language—that they are instead “couched in the language of analytic philosophy.” Matt here shows his unfamiliarity with the language of analytic philosophy. Analytic philosophy employs ordinary language as readily as it employs artificial, technical jargon. As well as simply using ordinary language, a large and reputable part of analytic philosophy also involves the analysis of ordinary language.

  Any argument that simply appeals to the claim that “I was once an embryo” is using a phrase from ordinary language. While “numerical identity” may be a piece of technical vocabulary, the claim that “I was once an embryo” means “I am numerically identical to that embryo” is either a substantive—and disputable–piece of analysis, or it is a statement of artificially imposed definition phrase from ordinary language. When anti-abortion arguments so use the ordinary language phrase only to give it an artificially imposed definition (this is apparently Matt’s interpretation of such arguments) they borrow the plausibility of the ordinary language phrase to increase the plausibility of their substantive claims about supposed relations of numerical identity or their significance. That is, they accept the benefits of an equivocation. That is not good analytic philosophy. It is sophistry.
• Hugh

  Nov 6, 2012 at 5:37 pm

  

  Thom,

  Yes some phrases can be interpreted in different ways but in order to have a meaningful conversation it is important that participants are operating with consistent definitions. It is common in “ordinary language” for people to infer a numerical identity relation as well. Consider a Grandfather telling his son “I once was a young boy, too”. This obviously means that he once was the same person at a young age.

  The fact that there can be varied interpretations of “I once was X” is a massive red herring in this discussion because it’s clear how both Matt and Andrew are using it, and even if it wasn’t, you should be charitable about it. In fact I think it’s sophistry on your part to think that you are somehow combating anti-abortion arguments by showing that part of what they say can be interpreted differently, despite the fact that it’s not what they are aiming to communicate
• Thom

  Nov 6, 2012 at 5:54 pm

  

  Hugh, on the point you’ve just raised, here’s my simply challenge: pick your preferred radical anti-abortion argument that turns on the claims involving the ordinary language phrases such as “X was once Y” or “is the same person as”; then reword it so as to replace those phrases of ordinary language with the more technical jargon of “numerical identity” or “is numerically identical to”. Let’s then see how compelling the restated argument is.
• Matt

  Nov 8, 2012 at 2:21 am

  

  Thom, in response to Hugh you simply change the subject. Andrew offered an argument, you responded by interpreting his phrase a particular way, a way different from the way he obviously intended it .
  Both Hugh and I pointed this out, you then respond by asking someone give you an argument which had already done.

  But for the record, the idea of “I once was a fetus” in the way I suggested. is used in the argument of Jim Stone against abortion, its also used by Don Marquis. Philip Devine also appears to understand it this way. Stephen Buckle notes this use in his work on analysising the concept of potentiality. You’ll also find its used by people like Eric Olsen to show that psychological accounts of personal identity fail, when he argues for example that psychological accounts entail that we were never infants.

  Far from being an “extra ordinary claim” what I say is actually not at all that uncommon in the literature when you understand the positions and terminology people in the literature actually stake out.

  Like I said your welcome to respond to the arguments people “actually make” instead of responding to positions they don’t but which you choose to attribute to them. Confidently claiming things about others “not being familar” with analytic philosophy and speaking with an over confident tone does not make straw man arguments any less fallacious.
• Matt

  Nov 8, 2012 at 2:24 am

  

  Also Thom i’d be interested if you think its common language to say “I once was a sperm”? or any where in the literature where this claim is taken seriously?
• Andrew

  Nov 8, 2012 at 2:12 pm

  

  Thom,

  You attribute this claim to me:

  “That numerical identity is what is important in moral concerns about a person’s life.”

  I never said this. Numerical identity isn’t want gives people moral status, the Imago Dei is. What I claimed is that if it is an essential property of me that I am made in the image of God *AND* I am numerically identical with the foetus that I once was, then any essential property that I have now, I had also as a foetus. Notice that numerical identity isn’t here supposed to be the thing which creates moral status, the imago dei plays that roll.
• Andrew

  Nov 8, 2012 at 2:23 pm

  

  Thom,

  Referring to my claim that persons “essentially” possess the property of moral status you say “but these stipulations don’t exactly amount to conceptual truths about “person”.

  So are you telling me that moral status is only an accidental property of persons? Are you telling me, for instance, that I could have lacked moral status? Contrast two worlds If moral status is only an accidental property of persons then it follows that it’s possessed solely in virtue of some property that could come in degrees. But then if that’s the case, then some persons can be of greater moral value than others.
• Andrew

  Nov 8, 2012 at 2:38 pm

  

  Other than that, I think that Matt and Hugh have done a fairly apt job of defending my argument for me.

  I couldn’t help but laugh when I read the claim that there was no contradiction between “Sam once was X” and “Sam is not numerically identical to X”, and yet Thom has the gall to say that Matt lacks familiarity with analytic philosophy.