The Naturalisms in Ethics conference will be running at the University of Auckland from 14-15 July and will feature this blog’s own Matthew Flannagan.
Here is the blurb from organiser Chris Tucker’s page (which includes registration information – see also the Facebook Event page):
‘Naturalism’ is a multiply ambiguous term—hence the title Naturalisms in Ethics— but it is related to a range of questions concerning the relationship of morality to science, evolution, biology, religion, and natural properties (whatever those are). Many otherwise disparate moral theories have been labeled as ethical naturalisms, including virtue ethics (both neo-Aristotelian and neo-Humean), moral functionalism, Cornell realism, and natural law theories. Some potential paper topics include the following (but the list is hardly exhaustive):
- What are the different types of ethical naturalism?
- Why should we endorse/reject ethical naturalism or some specific version thereof?
- What can science or evolution tell us about morality, moral psychology, or the rationality of moral judgments?
- Are naturalistic accounts of morality better off than theistic ones?
Speakers include:
- Rosalind Hursthouse (University of Auckland)
- Stephen Finlay (University of Southern California)
- John Hare (Yale Divinity; Seelye Charitable Trust Distinguished Fellow
- Mark Murphy (Georgetown University; Auckland University Distinguished Visitor)
- Glen Pettigrove (University of Auckland)
- Charles Pigden (University of Otago)
- Neil Sinhababu (National University of Singapore)
- Christine Swanton (University of Auckland)
- Erik Wielenberg (DePauw University)
Matt’s paper, “Is Ethical Naturalism more Plausible than Supernaturalism? A Reply to Walter Sinnott-Armstrong” will be chaired by Erik Wielenberg of DePauw University. Matt’s abstract is below:
Abstract for: “Is Ethical Naturalism More Plausible Than Supernaturalism? A Reply to Walter Sinnott-Armstrong”
In several debates and addresses, William Lane Craig has defended the conditional:
1. If God exists then a divine command theory of moral obligation is a plausible account of the nature of moral obligation.
In support of 1, Craig has appropriated the divine command theory of Robert Adams. He has identified the property of being morally obligated to do X with the property of being commanded by God to do X.
Recently, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has contended Craig’s conditional is “incredible”; he argues that a particular form of ethical naturalism is far more plausible than a divine command theory. Armstrong contends that wrongness is (identical with) the natural property of causing harm to other people without reason. This theory accounts for the objectivity of moral obligations in a more economical manner than a divine command theory.
In this paper I criticise Armstrong’s claim. I argue Armstrong’s naturalism is not more economical neither is it more objective than a divine command theory. Moreover, I argue that Armstrong fails to establish that his version of ethical naturalism can explain the other features of moral obligations that Robert Adams and others have appealed to, such as, the social nature of moral obligation, that certain actions which do not harm people appear intuitively wrong and the fact that moral obligations provide an overriding or decisive reason for acting.
A common objection to belief in the God of the Bible is that a good, kind, and loving deity would never command the wholesale slaughter of nations. In the tradition of his popular Is God a Moral Monster?, Paul Copan teams up with Matthew Flannagan to tackle some of the most confusing and uncomfortable passages of Scripture. Together they help the Christian and nonbeliever alike understand the biblical, theological, philosophical, and ethical implications of Old Testament warfare passages.
Where will we be able to purchase or download this paper?
Regards, Dimmitri.
Matt’s paper will probably turn up on this blog at some point after the conference.
Saint Peter’s College never taugh us what can science or evolution tell us about morality, moral psychology, or the rationality of moral judgments.
I look forward to reading about Dr. Flannagans answer to this,
– Aidan
To whet your appetites read:
http://www.mandm.org.nz/2010/09/walter-sinnott-armstrong-and-the-moral-scepticism-objection-to-divine-commands.html
http://www.mandm.org.nz/2009/09/walter-sinnott-armstrong-and-infantile-religious-morality.html
http://www.mandm.org.nz/2009/07/walter-sinnott-armstrong-on-god-morality-and-arbitrariness.html
http://www.mandm.org.nz/2009/04/walter-sinnott-armstrong-william-lane-craig-and-the-argument-from-harm-part-i.html
http://www.mandm.org.nz/2009/04/walter-sinnott-armstrong-william-lane-craig-and-the-argument-from-harm-part-ii.html
Matt has been reading the latest developments on this topic and will have tweaked the paper for this conference along those lines but those links should still give you some food for thought.
Saint Peter’s College never taugh us what can science or evolution tell us about morality, moral psychology, or the rationality of moral judgments.
I look forward to reading about Dr. Flannagans answer to this,
I don’t think evolution can tell you much about the rationality of moral judgements or their truth, those are philosophical questions which go beyond the empirical data. Some theories propose hypothesises as to the origin of moral dispositions, just as they can give us hypothesises as to the origins of our dispositions to do math, no one thinks this means math is irrational or false.
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Thank you Mr. & Mrs. Flannagan. Excellent info. Always had a hunch that evolution could tell you much about the rationality or judgements and/or their truth. My biology teacher begs to differ funnily enough.
Thankyou for your time.
A big thats to our Saint Peter’s College RE facility, and Dr. Stollenwork for using Mr. Flannagans anti-abortion arguments for a recent Internal Assessment (worth credits for NCEA).
His input contributed to an excellence mark.
best wishes,
Aidan MacNaughton
Matt
Although I agree with you that the question of morality is something that should be left to philosophical discussion rather than scientific investigation, I can’t help but be a bit discouraged after reading so much online about how different animals have experienced the same exact sort of behavior that us humans take to be moral obligations. Have you ever looked into such claims, and if so, what did you think of them?
Grayson
yes I have read that stuff including several critiques of it.
I am not sure what the problem is. You state different animals have experienced the same exact sort of behavior that us humans take to be moral obligations
This seems to conflate an important distinction that between instinctively doing or liking an action Q and being under a moral obligation to do Q. I am not sure how showing an animal does the former somehow calls into question the reality of the latter. Moreover in some sense we have known this for centuries, we have known for example that animals often are devoted to their offspring and protect them, no one ever considered this mean’t we have no obligation to our offspring.
Its also clear some animals have rudimentary calculating abilities. No one suggests this calls into question the truth of mathematical claims, other animals have rudimentary technological developments, does this call into question the reality of scientific truths we discover using technology?.
I do think one might be able to create sceptical arguments about our moral intuitions if one conjoins atheism and evolution, but that seems to me to be a problem with conjoining those options and not provide a compelling reason for denying obligations. exist