Last week I had the privilege of hearing Professor John Hare, of Yale Divinity school, speak on God and morality at the Naturalisms in Ethics and APRA conferences. One idea Hare proposes, which fascinates me, is that commitment to morality presupposes belief in what he calls “strong providence” the position that “the world is so ordered that a person’s own virtue is consistent with her own happiness, whether other people are virtuous or not.”[1]
Here is one line of argument he gives for this conclusion:
“Consider the fact that we try to teach our children to be moral. We also want them to be happy. If we thought that being virtuous would make them miserable, we would be more ambivalent about teaching them virtue than we actually are. But many people persevere in the attempt to bring up their children to be morally good people even though they do not think their children will be living in a society in which most of their fellows are morally good people. … What lies behind such perseverance is surely a belief that the world is so ordered that when their children grow up, they can be both morally good and happy, and that this is secured not by general human virtue but by something else. The nature of this something else is often, I think, left indeterminate.”[2]
This example is interesting because it focuses not on one’s own happiness but on the happiness of others. Appeals to self-interest and one’s own happiness are often dismissed as corruptions to moral motivation. In Hare’s example, one is concerned about the happiness of others, in particular one’s children, so the concerns he highlights are altruistic as opposed to egoistic.
I am inclined to think there is something to Hare’s argument. I do think that if we thought being virtuous would make our children miserable then a lot of parents might be less disposed towards bringing up their children to be pursue good. Most I talk to agree; it is hard to comprehend how a loving and caring parent could teach children to be virtuous if doing so would result in their unhappiness. However, our practice of trying to teach our children to be moral suggests we do not believe being virtuous and being happy are incompatible.
This has me wondering, does commitment to morality as an institution, where we attempt to follow its precepts and encourage them in others, commit us to assumptions about some kind of moral providential order to the world? What would happen to morality if we rejected this? Would there be something sadistic about inculcating moral virtue in our children or encouraging it in others?
[1] John Hare Moral Faith and Providence, a paper presented at the 1996 Annual Wheaton Philosophy Conference, accessed 27 December 2010.
[2] Ibid.
Don’t miss hearing John Hare speak in Auckland next week, he is not in New Zealand for long. All the following events will be held at the University of Auckland and are open to the public, click on the links to get the details:
- Tues 26 July Ethics: What Does God have to do with it? A panel discussion and Q&A featuring John Hare, Mark Murphy and Glen Pettigrove, moderated by me – this will be very lay friendly.
- Thurs 28 July Divine Command Theory A public lecture.
- Fri 29 July Can we be good without God? A public lecture.
Tags: God and Morality · Happiness · John Hare36 Comments
A common objection to belief in the God of the Bible is that a good, kind, and loving deity would never command the wholesale slaughter of nations. In the tradition of his popular Is God a Moral Monster?, Paul Copan teams up with Matthew Flannagan to tackle some of the most confusing and uncomfortable passages of Scripture. Together they help the Christian and nonbeliever alike understand the biblical, theological, philosophical, and ethical implications of Old Testament warfare passages.
Hopefully they’ll release those lectures on audio or video.
The panel discussion will definitely be videoed and released online – I know because I am doing the videoing and I will be involved in its being put on You Tube into a playlist. Both Thinking Matters and this blog will then post it as well.
You’d have to ask the Theology and Philosophy departments if they intend doing the same with the talks with John Hare that they are running – it might be worth emailing them and asking as if they don’t know that there is interest in that happening they may not do it.
Does he discuss the idea that when you teach someone else to be moral, it is the teacher that also benefits (i.e. don’t lie, becomes don’t lie to me, don’t steal becomes don’t steal from me) – and this benefit (those less overtly vocalized as the motivating factor when teaching your child “moral”) may be an equal driver of moral instruction (even more so at a religious level).
Additionally, doesn’t teaching children “good morals” have aspects of teaching children how to not be arrested and how to successfully not be reliant on the teacher of the “morals” for ever.
This has me wondering, does commitment to morality as an institution, where we attempt to follow its precepts and encourage them in others, commit us to assumptions about some kind of moral providential order to the world?
I would say that it makes one committed to the idea that what we think of as morals, really are just useful heuristics generally thought to produce overall human flourishing.
This is the kind of stuff that naturalists atheists tend to say, and it even veers close to the sort of arguments (though poorly formulated) by guys like Sam Harris, or Richard Carrier.
In other words, what we think of as morality is really just utility.
[…] [HT: Matt] […]
Enenennx you write.
Does he discuss the idea that when you teach someone else to be moral, it is the teacher that also benefits (i.e. don’t lie, becomes don’t lie to me, don’t steal becomes don’t steal from me) – and this benefit (those less overtly vocalized as the motivating factor when teaching your child “moral”) may be an equal driver of moral instruction (even more so at a religious level).
I don’t think this addresses Hare’s argument at all. What Hare is arguing that that people would not do encourage children to be moral if they believed certain things, and they however teach their children to be moral which suggests they are rationally committed to the belief in question.
Pointing out that people have self interested reasons for teaching children to be moral ( and putting moral in scare quotes to make it appear sinister) does not address this it merely changes the subject.
Drj “I would say that it makes one committed to the idea that what we think of as morals, really are just useful heuristics generally thought to produce overall human flourishing.This is the kind of stuff that naturalists atheists tend to say, and it even veers close to the sort of arguments (though poorly formulated) by guys like Sam Harris, or Richard Carrier.In other words, what we think of as morality is really just utility.”
I am not sure this works, because even if moral obligations are just utility maximizations it does not follow that its increases ones own happiness. Utilitarian demands can in fact demand quite significant sacrifices of ones own happiness for the greater good. Moreover the example Hare provides is one where they “bring up their children to be morally good people even though they do not think their children will be living in a society in which most of their fellows are morally good people” hence it would be a situation where people were not promoting utility in general.
I think that this is a strong case for saying people believe that personal happiness is maximized by personal virtue.
However an atheist might simply believe that most people their child will encounter will respond positively to a virtuous person
If an atheist were preparing their child for life in a hostile environment where it was well known that virtuous behavior resulted in suffering, then the atheist might be less inclined to instruct their child to be virtuous.
Ooh… sorry about the scare quotes around moral – didn’t even really realize it would come across that way. Thanks for pointing it out. I think I just meant I felt like moral has a wide spectrum of use here and the risk of conflation is high.
Is what Hare is arguing require that what people do is necessarily rational? It seems that this thesis relying on a connection between belief and action that may not be justified (e.g. if a christian believes their non-believing child is going to hell, are they really doing all they can to convince that hell-bound child to come to belief, or do they often just do some basic stuff, and then go pray and shrug their shoulders and say something about free-will, and call it good).
Hare writes: “The nature of this something else is often, I think, left indeterminate.” Is he insinuating that this indeterminacy is God?
Hare says “But many people persevere in the attempt to bring up their children to be morally good people even though they do not think their children will be living in a society in which most of their fellows are morally good people. ” Is there a poll or something that justifies this assertion that people who raise their kids to be moral feel that most people will be immoral (as in most people are going to be lying to, cheating, and stealing from you)?
Matthew Flannagan says: “What Hare is arguing that that people would not do encourage children to be moral if they believed certain things, and they however teach their children to be moral which suggests they are rationally committed to the belief in question.”
I have difficulty with the phrasing of your reply. I think that people applying post-hoc reasons for what they do (here the possibility of attributing the teaching of morals to their children to an understanding of a providentailly ordered morality, when the teaching of morality (don’t steal, don’t lie, don’t cheat) may be attributed to creating an environment in which it is easier to raise your child at less detriment to oneself . We create lofty post-hoc reasons all the time for our daily mundane choices. In the quote provided, I don’t see Hare’s argument addressing this option.
Is what Hare is arguing require that what people do is necessarily rational? It seems that this thesis relying on a connection between belief and action that may not be justified
No, I think your misinterpreting him here, he seems quite willing to say people can and do act in irrational ways, in fact one point he makes is that people who do not believe in strong providence and are commited to morality are acting in some kind of irrational way.
His point is rather that certain things we believe and do, presuppose or commit us rationally to accepting other beliefs. If we then reject these beliefs our stance is irrational even if we continue to live in accord with it.
As to the indeterminacy issue, here again I think you misunderstand his point is that if someone commits themselves to morality they presuppose or commit themselves to belief that “the world is so ordered that when their children grow up, they can be both morally good and happy, and that this is secured not by general human virtue but by something else” Many people probably do not fill in the gaps with any story as to what this something is whether Karma, or God, or whatever.
He does go on to argue that certain secular views of the world provide reasons for doubting providence is true, and hence make commitment to the moral life unstable rationally, and he argues that theism makes belief in providence more intelligible, but that is a further step in the argument.
I am not sure this works, because even if moral obligations are just utility maximizations it does not follow that its increases ones own happiness. Utilitarian demands can in fact demand quite significant sacrifices of ones own happiness for the greater good
Right, but our brains have ways of dealing with that. We have moral switches that can be pulled and that means ethical systems develop within societies. If we were to break those rules we would feel bad about it (and we’d likely be excluded from the society that created them) so our moral instincts act to create cohesiveness in much the same way pain stops us doing stupid things.
If leading a moral life avoids a source of upset, and lets you be a functioning member of society, it’s not surprising it’s something parents would teach their children.
David, right obligations are associated with feelings of guilt and social alienation. But again I am not sure how this addresses Hare’s argument, his claim is not that its suprising that we teach our children to be moral or that we lack motivation to do so, its rather that we would not do this unless we “we thought that being virtuous would make them miserable” and so our practise entails we presuppose this is the case.
Its not clear to me at all that feelings of guilt or social alienation are enough to bridge the gap between whats in our self interest and whats required by utilitarian demands, Sidgwick for example one of the most important proponents of utilitarianism recognised this fact for example. In many cases the loss of self interest utilitarianism requires is actually significantly greater than any guilt we will feel and any sanctions which society will place on us. In many conceivable social contexts the societies do not censure immoral conduct.
Matt writes:
I am not sure this works, because even if moral obligations are just utility maximizations it does not follow that its increases ones own happiness. Utilitarian demands can in fact demand quite significant sacrifices of ones own happiness for the greater good.
It could be that some sorts of personal happiness or situational selfishness are important to utility maximization. There are some rather innate and non-malleable characteristics of human nature that seem to make this so.
For example, you can’t require people to give away all their wealth to starving kids, because you’ll simply remove the incentive to generate wealth in the first place… and overall prosperity falls.
So I don’t think its really as hard as some seem to say, to align utility maximization with some amounts of personal happiness.
Moreover the example Hare provides is one where they “bring up their children to be morally good people even though they do not think their children will be living in a society in which most of their fellows are morally good people” hence it would be a situation where people were not promoting utility in general.
Perhaps the parents think that the moral rules will still serve their children well (and even themselves), even in a society where most others don’t abide by those same rules. Or maybe they feel like teaching morals to their kids could help influence the rest of society, thereby securing more happiness for themselves.
I guess I don’t really understand how its supposed to follow from this that one becomes rationally committed to the idea of providence.
Matt Says:
As to the indeterminacy issue, here again I think you misunderstand his point is that if someone commits themselves to morality they presuppose or commit themselves to belief that “the world is so ordered that when their children grow up, they can be both morally good and happy, and that this is secured not by general human virtue but by something else” Many people probably do not fill in the gaps with any story as to what this something is whether Karma, or God, or whatever.
So would it be right to say that he’s arguing that we live in a world where personal happiness tends to line up with what is moral, and this is extremely surprising? And its so surprising in fact, that this rationally compels us to believe in providence?
If so, I think this inverts the relationship between morals and happiness (or utility). If we lived in a world where human nature was such that selfishness and a total lack of empathy maximized happiness and well-being, we’d live in a world where those things were considered moral, and we would hardly doubt the truth of it. It would be an incomprehensible thing for the people of that world to believe that empathy and selflessness are virtuous.
Maybe he would say that what I’m talking about ceases to become morality, since its rather contingent upon facts about human nature and the universe – but it seems mostly when he means “moral”, he’s talking about ways one ought to behave, which is really all I mean too.
Drj, you write
It could be that some sorts of personal happiness or situational selfishness are important to utility maximization. There are some rather innate and non-malleable characteristics of human nature that seem to make this so.
For example, you can’t require people to give away all their wealth to starving kids, because you’ll simply remove the incentive to generate wealth in the first place… and overall prosperity falls.
I agree, but even if you don’t require people to give away all theirwealth to starving kids, what utilitarianism demands of is still a quite demanding sacrifice of our self interest. Perhaps you should read Peter Singer’s utilitarian discussion of famine relief. To see an modern utilitarian example.
Moreover, your ignoring the important role co-oridination plays in utilitarianism. Consider an example, voting, obviously utility in a society is maximised if most people vote. Here is the problem: To vote is a pain, one has take time out to travel to the booth etc. Moreover the pay off does not really justify it seeing one single vote makes no difference the result. The same person will win wether or not you as an individual vote or not, no one has ever lost an election due to a single vote. Utility is maximised in cases like this by co-ordination, by inculculating rules so that vast majority see it as there duty to vote when this happens even the individual voters benefit from the overall improvement to society. So what does not maximise utility at the level of the individual does in isolation, but what he does in co-oridination with other individuals who follow the same demands.
Note however Hare’s example here.
“But many people persevere in the attempt to bring up their children to be morally good people even though they do not think their children will be living in a society in which most of their fellows are morally good people.”
Hare’s example is of one where other people in society are not commited to morality and co-oridinated seeking of utility does not occur.
Perhaps the parents think that the moral rules will still serve their children well (and even themselves), even in a society where most others don’t abide by those same rules. Or maybe they feel like teaching morals to their kids could help influence the rest of society, thereby securing more happiness for themselves.
I guess I don’t really understand how its supposed to follow from this that one becomes rationally committed to the idea of providence.
With respect perhaps you should look at the argument, he argues:
[1] If we (most people) believed being virtuous would make our children miserable we would not preservere in teaching them virtue.
[2] We (most people) do preserve in teaching their children virtue and they do so even when they when we think their children are living in a society in which most of their fellows are not morally good people.
Therefore,
[3] We be think world is so ordered that when their children grow up, they can be both morally good and happy, and that this is secured not by general human virtue but by something else.
Now if I perform the simplification function on [2] separating the first conjunct from the second and I then use the first conjunct in a modus tollens with [1] I get the conclusion.
[4] Most do not believe being virtuous will make there children miserable.
This conjoined with the second conjunct via the conjunction rule entails these people believe this even when they believe other people in society are not virtous, and so the happiness cannot have been secured by general human virtue.
Descriptive claims motivations people might have to teach their children to be moral does not address this argument. If people have the motivational tendancies in [1] engage in the practises mentioned in [2] and claim that they do not believe in strong providence there is something irrational in their position.
Again, I’m having a difficulty here where Hare says “But many people persevere in the attempt to bring up their children to be morally good people even though they do not think their children will be living in a society in which most of their fellows are morally good people.”
Where is the evidence for this, i.e. the evidence that people presume their children are going to grow up in a society where they think the majority of the population do not have good morals.
It seems reasonable to presume parents teach their children the morals they see existing in the population at large because the parents see the benefits of fitting in at large and how this fitting in will be of benefit to their child.
Also, one can’t easily dismiss the benefits the parents derive from telling their kids not to lie cheat or steal.
I agree, but even if you don’t require people to give away all their wealth to starving kids, what utilitarianism demands of is still a quite demanding sacrifice of our self interest. Perhaps you should read Peter Singer’s utilitarian discussion of famine relief. To see an modern utilitarian example.
I guess I’m dense here, because I’m not sure what the objection is supposed to be. Are you suggesting its improbable or impossible for a practicing utilitarian to secure happiness, and remain consistent with his moral theory?
Moreover, your ignoring the important role co-oridination plays in utilitarianism. …. …. So what does not maximise utility at the level of the individual does in isolation, but what he does in co-oridination with other individuals who follow the same demands.
Likewise, are you suggesting here that it is impossible or improbable for a practicing utilitarian to be happy if he has little cooperation from the rest of society?
All this seems to hinge on the assumption that morality is real, and needs to be explained in some way.
If, like most naturalists, you think morality is more or less a trick our brains play on us then the fact that parents bring children up to be good (most of the time at least) just tells us that “be good” is a pretty useful heuristic for being happy – that societies and brains are built in such way playing by the rules will (most of the time at least) lead to better outcomes.
There will no doubt be plenty of cases where, like all of our instincts, that doesn’t work out (and as drj points out, parents don’t usually bring up children to be utterly self-sacrificing) but if you don’t think morality is identical to ‘human flourishing’ or whatever then all you are left with is a belief that being good will help your children in life.
“In other words, what we think of as morality is really just utility.”
Is the above statement just useful to you, or are you actually saying something about how one ought to construe what we think of as morality?
Is the above statement just useful to you, or are you actually saying something about how one ought to construe what we think of as morality?
I’m expressing my opinion – its both a useful statement and, or so I believe, more or less accurate, and therefore it also generally says something about how one ought to construe morality.
parents teach their children to be moral simply because people can’t survive without following rules. if you don’t follow moral rules, you are screwed. simple enough. we don’t need to go philosophical about this.
“I’m expressing my opinion – its both a useful statement and, or so I believe, more or less accurate, and therefore it also generally says something about how one ought to construe morality.”
The question is how one can know that moral statements are *merely* useful, and also claim that everyone is obligated to believe this, when saying everyone ought to construe morality this way is itself a moral claim about obligating people’s thoughts.
And how do you know your statements about moral claims being merely useful are themselves exempt from the same kinds of mere-usefulness claims? I’m trying to get at what the specific criteria is for the reduction.
[1] If we (most people) believed being virtuous would make our children miserable we would not preservere in teaching them virtue.
I agree with this premise.
[2] We (most people) do preserve in teaching their children virtue and they do so even when they when we think their children are living in a society in which most of their fellows are not morally good people.
There is some weird wording in this premise. Essentially it says that most people perservere in teaching morality to their children, even when most people are immoral. This suggests that many people who find no value in morality, are teaching their kids to be moral. Weird.
Other than that, don’t really disagree with this premise either. I would say most people do try to teach their kids morals, even in a society where many people are immoral.
Therefore,
[3] We be think world is so ordered that when their children grow up, they can be both morally good and happy, and that this is secured not by general human virtue but by something else.
And this is where it gets funky for me, “.. this is secured not by general human virtue, but by something else”. The first premise in this argument established that virtue leads to happiness. Then this premise says that not virtue, but something else, leads to happiness.
Premise [1] simply says that virtue leads to happiness. Premise [2] says that people still teach morals, even when most others arent moral. Doesnt premise three then nearly (or compltetly) contradict premise [1]? It certainly doesn’t follow necessarily from either premise.
Correction: In my post above, every time I say “premise [3]”, I really mean “the conclusion”.
The question is how one can know that moral statements are *merely* useful, and also claim that everyone is obligated to believe this, when saying everyone ought to construe morality this way is itself a moral claim about obligating people’s thoughts.
Not really sure I understand the thrust of the question. Let me clarify what I think “ought” means. To me, “ought” means “possesses a rational reason, above all else, to …”
And “obligaton” is a synonym for “ought”.
In the meantime, can you rephrase? I’m really having trouble parsing the meaning out of your post.
Different people assess rationality different, and assess first-order rationality issues differently, as in criminal trials. I don’t see what obligates in any sense here, plus I have not seen any reasons for judging one class of statements to be merely useful, while statements not of that class have some other characteristics such as being true regardless of usefulness, as in universal claims about the status of moral claims.
It might help to define obligation. If obligation merely means rational, I would just talk about rationality and rational preferences and dispense with the needless quagmire of should, ought, and obligated this or that.
Furthermore, rationality doesn’t obligate me a whit. I happen to value it, but that’s as far as it goes, and all specific attempts to be rational involve mere subvalues of that, such as inquiry, inferential validity, collecting available data, and so on. But in back of that, the value of reason is just sort of a self-imposed kharma of if-then’s that is observed, nothing more. But that’s enough for me.
David Winter, I don’t think most naturalists do think of morality as non existent in the way you suggest. A number of naturalistic scientists apparently think this way often on grounds of evolutionary psychology, but I think that in the field of meta-ethics or ethical philosophy in general that is not the majority view at all.
That should give scientists outside the field some pause before they make pronouncements ;-).
I would however note that if we have a choice between believing [1] its wrong to torture people for fun and [2] a highly controversial empiricist epistemology is true. I think the rational thing would be to accept [1] over [2], there is not really a compelling case for [2] from premises more plausible than [1] is.
Well, obviously I don’t know what philosophers have to say about these problems. In my experience, most people who are atheists would say something like “there is no good or bad in the universe, there’s just people” and that sounds a like like moral anti-realism (or skepticsm or whatever the term should be). Perhaps my experience in non-representative.
You’ll not be surprised to hear i think you’re offering a false dichotomy in the rest of your comment. I think torturing for people is wrong. I just think it’s wrong in an ethical system that emerges from the way our brains work. I just don’t think it’s wrong in any ultimate, cosmic or metaphysical sense.
Interesting – it does appear that we are fighting an uphill battle trying to instill morals in our children – who then must survive an immoral world. But we do it, because it is the right thing to do. Excellent article
Furthermore, rationality doesn’t obligate me a whit. I happen to value it, but that’s as far as it goes, and all specific attempts to be rational involve mere subvalues of that, such as inquiry, inferential validity, collecting available data, and so on. But in back of that, the value of reason is just sort of a self-imposed kharma of if-then’s that is observed, nothing more. But that’s enough for me.
That’s enough for me too.
David, there is no false dichotomy. Just confusion on your part.
If the claim “its wrong to torture children for fun” is true then moral skepticism is false, because skepticism is the view you can’t know moral truths. Similarly, anti-realism is false because anti-realism denies moral claims can be true.
I just think it’s wrong in an ethical system that emerges from the way our brains work. I just don’t think it’s wrong in any ultimate, cosmic or metaphysical sense.
This kind of argument proves to much, our mathematical systems, systems of formal logic, and scientific theories all come from an evolved capacity of the brain, it does not follow that logical or scientific truths are an illusion.
But second, your comments about “cosmic sense” are misguided. All true claims are metaphysical to some extent. A statement is true if and only if it corresponds with reality.
If I claim my son is six foot tall that’s true if a thing in reality my son, actually has the property of being six feet tall. If my son does not exist or he does not have this property then my claim is false, even if it is a belief I strongly hold. Similarly, a moral claim: its wrong to torture children for fun is true if an act in the world, torturing children for fun, has the property of being wrong. If this property does not really exist but is simply something humans make up then saying its wrong to torture children is like saying my son has a pink unicorn.
It seems obvious to me that the claim “its wrong to torture children for fun” is true. Its as obvious to me as claims such as “nothing can be blue all over and red all over” or “the colour blue does not snore” any theory that denies this bears a very strong burden of proof.
Drj, sorry but your analysis is rather confused.
There is some weird wording in this premise. Essentially it says that most people perservere in teaching morality to their children, even when most people are immoral. This suggests that many people who find no value in morality, are teaching their kids to be moral. Weird.
No, the argument is this, take most people, ask each of each of the them individually if they would continue to teach their children to be virtuous even if they believed most other people in society were immoral, the answer you will get is yes.
And this is where it gets funky for me, “.. this is secured not by general human virtue, but by something else”. The first premise in this argument established that virtue leads to happiness. Then this premise says that not virtue, but something else, leads to happiness.
No the first premise states that people will not perserve in teaching their childrento be moral if they believe doing so will make them unhappy. The second states people do perserve in teaching their children to be happy even when they believe most other people are not commited to virtue. The third premise is a conclusion, it infers that people are therefore commited to believing that happiness and virtue come together even when most other people are not so commited, In otherwords it is not secured by the general virtue. There is no contradiction here just a misreading.
Not really sure I understand the thrust of the question. Let me clarify what I think “ought” means. To me, “ought” means “possesses a rational reason, above all else, to …”
And “obligaton” is a synonym for “ought”.
Two things, first if you hold ( and I agree) that one is only obligated to do X if one has a greater reason to do X than not X then Hare’s point can be made stronger. Because this commits you to the conclusion that moral obligations always provide you with reasons for action that are stronger than prudential ones, on this view it can never be the case that one can have self interested reasons stronger than moral ones.
But second, obligation is not synonomous with “a rational reason above all else” its possible that the best reasons support some action, but that it would be unreasonable to blame or reproach or demand that someone do the action in question, acts of supererogation can be like this actions like giving a kidney to needy stranger. In this case one would have reason above all else to do the action and yet it not be your obligation to do it. Obligations are actions you can appropriately blame and censure people for not doing, this is one reason why obligations appear to to be conceptually tied to what another person demands and holds you accountable to. Utility does not have this feature. Divine Commands do.
Well, I’ll put it more simply.
Thinking about torturing someone certainly feels wrong, and there’s no doubt it wrong within our ethical systems (like handball is against the rules in football). But I don’t think there are any good reasons to believe our moral instincts are based on anything outside of ourselves, or at least emergent properties of ourselves (there are good reasons to think scientific inferences and mathematical deductions are) and creating objective moral truths that exist outside of human brains from the way we feel about things seems utterly absurd to me.
David,
“Thinking about torturing someone certainly feels wrong”
Agreed, we appear to percieve something in a non empirical way analogous to the examples I gave above about math, logic, knowing the colour blue does not snore and so on. Rationalists ( non empiricists) have noted this for centuries.
“But I don’t think there are any good reasons to believe our moral instincts are based on anything outside of ourselves, or at least emergent properties of ourselves (there are good reasons to think scientific inferences and mathematical deductions are) ”
Well I think this is false, the only way one could show apart from immediate intution that mathmatical or logical truths exist is by some kind of inference, and this would involve logic and so be circular. Its impossible to provide any non circular inference for these truths, either we know them immediately or we don’t know them at all in which case your skepticism becomes global.
“and creating objective moral truths that exist outside of human brains from the way we feel about things seems utterly absurd to me.” Well its clearly not absurd to you that the claim, its wrong to torture children for the sake of it, is true. and if its true then it must be a fact that this action has the property of being wrong, and that means wrongness exists as a property of actions. It also seems obvious that if someone did not believe it was wrong to torture children or a society endorsed such torture they would be mistaken, in which case this fact seems to not be based on societal conventions or personal beliefs. All else being equal an ontology that accounts for this is preferable to one that does not.
In light of MandM’s post here:
http://www.mandm.org.nz/2011/07/does-moral-commitment-presuppose-belief-in-providence.html
please see also John Hare on National Radio:
The audio should be available soon…
http://www.radionz.co.nz/national/programmes/nights
7:15 Good Without God
Yale professor of philosophical theology, John E Hare, talks about morality and the part it plays in our lives, especially with western culture moving away from traditional Christian values.
You’ll not be surprised to hear i think you’re offering a false dichotomy in the rest of your comment. I think torturing for people is wrong.
He he he, and I think David Winter is wrong.
But who cares what I *think* if it is nothing more than just chemical brain activity.
I just think it’s wrong in an ethical system that emerges from the way our brains work. I just don’t think it’s wrong in any ultimate, cosmic or metaphysical sense.
And presumably some people’s brains have emerged to make them unethical (which is actually ethical when comparing to themselves).
I suspect that David’s creation story drives his view on ethics. Funny how Darwinism leads so nicely to either moral relativism or an ungrounded (except for brain chemistry) morality.