The debate between Sam Harris and William Lane Craig at The University of Notre Dame on the topic “Is the Foundation of Morality Natural or Supernatural?” will be streamed free and live on Notre Dame TV at 7:00pm EST on 7 April 2011 [11:00am NZ time on 8 April 2011].
Hat tip: The Apologist
UPDATE: The audio is now available as an MP3 over at Apologetics 315.
RELATED POSTS: Matt has written a few posts here on MandM defending Divine Command Theory for those interested in reading a little more on the position William Lane Craig defended.
Also see Matt’s:
Debate Review: Sam Harris and William Lane Craig on Divine Command Theory Part I
Tags: Debates · Is the Foundation of Morality Natural or Supernatural? · MP3 · Notre Dame · Sam Harris · William Lane Craig36 Comments
A common objection to belief in the God of the Bible is that a good, kind, and loving deity would never command the wholesale slaughter of nations. In the tradition of his popular Is God a Moral Monster?, Paul Copan teams up with Matthew Flannagan to tackle some of the most confusing and uncomfortable passages of Scripture. Together they help the Christian and nonbeliever alike understand the biblical, theological, philosophical, and ethical implications of Old Testament warfare passages.
Apparently Sam Harris isn’t interested in arguments for his position, but focused on the art of ridicule. His most recent response was literally about eight consecutive minutes of ad hominem against the “ludicrous,” “deluded” people who worship an “invisible moral monster.” It truly is a shame (and I think most intelligent atheists would agree) that Harris is seen as representative of their view by the public at large.
I don’t think Harris has paid attention to what Craig actually said. In his closing statement he summed up Craig’s argument as “we have a book that says we are right.” It should be noted that the only person to bring up the Bible in this debate thus far is Harris…not Craig.
My feed does not allow me to watch it, but all the comments I have heard suggest it has deterioated to Harris simply engaging in ad hominens and straw men after Craig’s early rebuttals.
It took me awhile to get it to show up on my computer. It was really bad at the end with Harris offering no arguments at all for his position on morality or anything else really. The Q&A was interesting, but the questions were not very challenging for either debater.
I am dismayed that people like Sam Harris can continue to demand the respect and adoration of so many. He spent the entire time insulting the majority of the worlds population, misrepresenting both Christian and Muslim beliefs and selectively misquoting the Bible. He failed to put forward a coherent argument, mainly because any argument he postulated was punctuated with insults and innuendo, and barely managed to stay on topic. Matt, you would have had a field day with him when he started dropping the usual genocidal quotes.
WLC on the other hand proposed a two pronged argument and outlined his Divine Command Theory position rather well. He rebutted with a sound, if somewhat complex, knock down argument of Harris’s position. Craig had done some serious homework on Harris and by the time he’d finished his opening speech he had backed Harris into a corner before he even said a word.
I actually thought this was going to be a great debate but it was terrible. Dr. Harris just was not ready or prepared for this debate. It was not even close on any level. I am not saying this because I like Dr. Craig so much but because Dr. Harris did so poorly. After the opening the best thing he said was, and I am paraphrasing, is: “If I am guilty of just defining things a certain way then so is Dr. Craig for defining God as perfectly good.” Dr. Craig gave a response and then Dr. Harris dropped it altogether (iirc).
The highlight was the ahtheist who said he wanted advice about how “last night he was visited by God and God said that homosexual relations were just as good, pleasing, etc. as hetero-sex.” Dr. Craig replied that he was not going to answer such a silly question and that the kids faux sincerity is showing through.
Harris did a good job of exposing the baseless ludicrous, and dangerous position Craig’s divine command morality (it’s right because my imaginary friend says so) holds. His parallel between Craig’s nonthinking approach to morality, and the child psychopath’s uncaring approach, was patcitularly effective.
That was a terrible counterexample, and I’m kind of disappointed that Craig didn’t call that out rationally as far as I can remember.
It is not psychopathic to follow the prescriptions of an authoritative commander, since, if that commander is really authoritative, it just is correct that one ought to follow its prescriptions. If it is not correct that one ought to follow its prescriptions, it’s not authoritative.
In the end, though, Harris managed to establish a sort of impression that God’s commands could possibly vary wildly, leading to all manner of moral absurdity, like “rape is okay if God commands it.”
This is an absurd line of argument, but not one that, as far as I can recall, was properly dealt with. One might as well argue that, since if it were true that one ought to rape frequently, that then one ought to rape frequently, and therefore, since such an absurd moral conclusion ensues from using the word “ought,” one ought to abandon ethics altogether.
Welcome the atheist trolls.
Sam Harris achieved nothing, because like all his new atheist kind he starts with the assumption that he is the man, and wisdom dies with him (Job reference for the uneducated).
Of course an atheist accusing anyone of being “unthinking” is merely engaging in projection.
Howard’s comment above is a good example of something I’ve been thinking of lately. Atheist commenters on blogs are frequently devoid of argument and flowing with insult. If I saw such a comment on threads pertaining to other topics I would think that the over the top rhetoric was a clear indicator of a Christian parodying atheists. The problem is that the common atheist troll’s rhetoric has risen to the level of the parody, and it’s impossible to tell between the two.
I think Sam Harris had some good points to make but he’s not good at this debate format. I’ve heard him speak in other formats and do well.
Dr Craig adores this format, and it shows.
If I were a Christian then Dr Harris’ arguments would not make me an atheist.
If I were an atheist (assuming that I’m not already) then Dr Craig would not have made me a Christian.
It seemed that both speakers were addressing their own audiences, each of which will mark their speaker down as the victor.
For the truly unaligned it must have seemed like white noise.
It was a wasted opportunity for all.
Dr. Harris did not hold back in demonstrating, not only how dangerous religious morality is, but how it is untenable and illogical. “Whatever my god says is moral; and it’s moral because he said it” This position made Craig’s accusation that atheists have no moral basis seem impotent By basing morality on the objective minimization of suffering, Harris appealed to a real world sense of morality that most people relate to already. Win for Dr. Harris!
Well the ultimate way to minimise suffering is to kill anyone who experiences even the smallest discomfort. No life, no suffering.
Uneducated atheists will claim that Harris made points, when all he did was throw out red herrings. The question was one of ontological morality, where does the good come from? Harris (and atheists elsewhere, not naming names) seem obsessed with trying to justify their own rightness in their own eyes.
Atheists are good without God? Sure they are. Since there is no atheistic morality, and each atheist is a law to himself, whatever they want to be good is good. Give to charity? Good. Kill and eat seventeen men? Still good. Of course the end result is that “good” becomes meaningless.
Of course Vox Day in The Irrational Atheist points out that the worst Christian ruler, Charles IX of France, murdered 10,000 Huguenots after the prompting of his mother. Nearly 1800 theocratic Christian rulers have existed through history without the same willingness to slaughter their own citizens.
On the other hand, out of the 89 atheists who have ruled 28 countries with overtly atheistic regimes, 52 have murdered more than 20,000 of their own citizens. Think about that. More than half of atheist rulers are twice as lethal to their own citizens as the worst Christian ruler. In their own eyes they were still good.
Harris himself has expressed a belief that some people should be killed for holding certain beliefs which he sees as contrary to the good (however he defines that). That there are atheists who worship him almost scares me.
Amazing how Christians are suggesting that Harris didn’t offer an argument, I wonder if they listened to a different debate that I did. I think both sides presented very effective cases for their position, but ultimately Craig’s position was nothing more than the assertion that objective morality requires a god. In truth, god’s morality would be just as subjective as ours if not more so given the fact that he doesn’t even have to abide by the rules he “crafted” for us. If morality is based upon our well-being then it’s something we’re capable of determining without a god’s direction and if morality is anything else then it’s merely arbitrary and just as subjective as anything we could come up with on our own.
Marshall,
I think he attempted an argument in his opening, but struggled from that point on, constantly going putting forth red herrings to move away from the topic. Since you think he made a good argument, possibly you could outline it here so that we could talk/think through it?
If morality is based on our well being , surely it is subjective not objective. The very meaning of “objective” is “separate from us”.
Whats more if morality is based on our well being then it is also relative. What constitutes well being?. To a man who has always been rich just having enough to survive on would not constitute well being, to a starving african having enough to survive on would be well being beyound measure. And what constitutes survival?
I thought Harris offered some quite well thought out arguments on lots of things [he also descended to insult rather than argument] but mostly they simply werent actually on the topic which was the “source of good”.
Furthermore he committed the same mistake such atheists always seem to make, ie if God doesnt exist [which he maintains] then everything he blamed on God and religion are actually the products of human kind not God. He completely misses that fact that on atheism all his problems still exist. The starving millions still die, the bombs still explode, so who are the real culprits? We are, whether God exists or not, we do these things to ourselves.
Kiwi atheists please bring Sam Harris out to New Zealand. Pretty please 🙂
If we can have (as we do have) objectively good and bad cooking or gardening without invoking top-down divine authorization, why can’t we have good and bad behaving (ie morality)? Just asking – not very familiar with Divine Command Theory so I need some expert help.
Peter,
I think you are working toward an argument different from the argument from morality.
Can we have objectively good gardening? Well, I think there is objectively good music, such as Faure’s Requiem V: Agnus Dei or Barber’s Adagio for Strings.
But what is objective about them? It’s not the ability with which they are performed (although that can factor into our experience of the music), nor the quality of the instruments (although that can also factor into our experience). But there remains something that is objectively beautiful and transcendant irrespective of the skill of the performers, the quality of their instruments, etc. Even a bad performer with a poor quality instrument can provide a glimpse of the beauty of such works.
Does gardening have a similar transcendent quality? I think a case can be made that a garden is objectively beautiful, irrespective of the physical abilities of the gardener who planted and tended it or the instruments used to plant, prune, etc. The Butchart Gardens in Canada are objectively beautiful. Nobody would disagree with their beauty, and if they did then we would agree that the individual had some incapacity, haha.
If the garden were recreated elsewhere using different plants, flowers and trees (of the same kind), it would still be objectively beautiful. There is a transcendent quality of beauty which arises beyond its material composition or locale.
Thus, I think you could outline an argument similar to this:
1. There is a transcendent quality of beauty at Butchart Gardens that transcends its location, individual material makeup, etc. (i.e. it could have been in another place with other trees, flowers, etc. of the same kind).
2. If the physical cosmos is all that exists, then abstract qualities do not exist apart from material particulars and thus cannot be transcendent.
3. Therefore, a worldview that denies the reality of transcendental values (such as materialism) is false if (1) is true.
I think some things are clearly objectively beautiful apart from personal preference, and thus I find that materialism cannot fit my experience of the world. Although atheism does not entail materialism, atheist non-materialism is both difficult to defend and define (there are forms of non-materialist naturalism that even allow for a god of sorts nowadays).
Anyways, such transcendent values are much more likely in a theistic worldview, where the creation has the objective standard of the infinite Creator to compare itself against. Although no “proof” of God, transcendental values do serve as a critique of materialism and are more likely in a theistic framework.
Peter,
Also for clarification sake on your comment, I don’t think we would say that good and bad behaving constitutes a morality. We are arguing that there is an objective standard that such behaviors match up against such that we can call certain behaviors good and others bad.
I wouldn’t rule out a theistic apologetic based on a sense of transcendence inspired by gardens or cooking. But my point was a simpler one. Cooking and gardening are civilization-long human activities within which certain rules for good and bad practice can be more or less accepted as objective (that is, not just relative to culture or personal opinion). For instance, keep enough seed for next year; don’t underheat the chicken left-overs. I was simply wondering if human moral practices are all that different and if so in what way.
Peter, Divine command theories are accounts of the nature of moral obligation, not moral goodness. So the goodness of a garden is not relevant. Moreover, the reason DC theorists argue that moral obligation is consituted by divine commands is that they think that when one looks at how obligations function, what features they have and so on divine commands are the best account of what they are. To cite one example, Robert Adam argues that obligations ( in general) are social requirements, they involve a demand made by one person on another under certain conditions. He argues the role guilt, censure, blame, punishment, forgiveness and so on are best made sense of by suggesting they are social obligations of some sort and that these features are unique to obligations in a way that simply doing something irrational, or imprudent or bad is. Bad gardening for example is not something we thing other people ought to censure, or punish, we do not think that bad gardening means I am guilty of offending and need to seek forgiveness from another part for the guilt to be expiated and so on.
There are other features as well, for example moral obligations seem to trump all others, and they are properties of certain types of actions and so. The idea is that one can explain all these aspects of obligation best if we identify them as Gods commands.
Thanks for that clarification Matt. I’ll give it all some more thought.
Gosh – they are a good looking couple now ain’t they?
Howard, Jason and Marshall, perhaps you could point to the specific argument Harris made that refutes a Divine Command theory. ( as opposed to some other topic) You could also perhaps show me where he responded to the three major criticisms including the one about identity that were made of his position.
A playlist of the debate videos is here.
Dr Craig wins on points and polish I would say. However if DC theory is to retain “best explanation” status it will need to engage with a whole new array of science of ethics theories based on evolutionary and cognitive psychology, neuroscience and the like.
See EDGE 323.
http://www.edge.org/documents/archive/edge323.html
Indeed the day may come when theistic meta-ethics is found to function better within a theistic evolutionary belief-system than on a simple divine command model. Am I right Matt?
Peter, you might be interested in some of the latest moral arguments against naturalistic ethics which focus on this point.
http://commonsenseatheism.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/Linville-The-Moral-Argument.pdf
I think if you consider, that the property of moral wrongness, is one we can recognise in many instances, and we know certain actions are wrong because they are wrong. Then the considerations you suggest could be incorporated into a divine command theory of moral obligation.
Thanks, I’l check it out.
If you’re interested in a critique of Craig’s “knock-down argument” against Harris, see: http://rationesola.blogspot.com/2011/04/william-l-craigs-knock-down-argument.html
Hi Sola, While nothing stands or falls for me on that argument I am not entirely convinced by what you say here. Take the relevant quote
It is also conceivable that a science of human flourishing could be possible, and yet people could be made equally happy by very different ‘moral’ impulses. Perhaps there is no connection between being good and feeling good—and, therefore, no connection between moral behavior (as generally conceived) and subjective well-being. In this case,rapists, liars, and thieves would experience the same depth of happiness as the saints. This scenario stands the greatest chance of being true, while still seeming quite far-fetched. Neuroimaging work already suggests what has long been obvious through introspection: human cooperation is rewarding. However, if evil turned out to be as reliable a path to happiness as goodness is, my argument about the moral landscape would still stand, as would the likely utility of neuroscience for investigating it. It would no longer be an especially ‘moral’ landscape; rather it would be a continuum of well-being, upon which saints and sinners would occupy equivalent peaks.
Worries of this kind seem to ignore some very obvious facts about human beings: we have all evolved from common ancestors and are, therefore, far more similar than we are different; brains and primary human emotions clearly transcend culture, and they are unquestionably influenced by states of the world (as anyone who has ever stubbed his toe can attest). No one, to my knowledge, believes that there is so much variance in the requisites of human well-being as to make the above concerns seem plausible.”
Harris seems here to be saying that its (i)possible that well-being could be correlated with evil behaviour.(ii)If this occurred the world would not be a “moral” landscape but one could still use science to determine well being, and then (iii)conceded that although this is a worry, empirical evidence suggests this possibility is not actualised the a real actual world.
That seems to me to concede that there is a possible(though not actual) world in which happiness and morality are not identical. And if that’s the case the rules of identity suggests they are not identical in the actual world. It would not suprise me if a neuroscientist did not understand the modal issues around identity and made a mistake like this.
The fact that Harris responds to this worry not by saying, “hey in that situation rape and murder would be OK” but rather saying, “don’t worry this is not actual” tends to confirm this. Why go on about it not being actual if its actualisation would mean rape was not wrong anyway? Moreover, why respond by saying “don’t worry its not actual” if you understand the modal issues and know that possibility is the issue. The response that its not actual would not address this concern.
I could be wrong and Harris might mean something else but it looks to me like Craig’s reading was plausible.
Moreover, as you admit Harris could have clarified this in his rebuttal if it was as simple as you say. But instead changed the subject. I am inclined to think that if he could have knocked the argument down simply by clarifying he would have. The fact he responded with “that’s interesting” and the changing the subject tends to suggest something different.
Matt, one more question on DC theory for clarification please.
Suppose I view human life itself as a God-given miracle (so am neither atheist nor sceptic) and suppose I have no conceptual problem with picturing God as a supreme personal spirit who wills the good of all creatures … then how should I conceive of the chain of reasoning which links a moral duty today (eg. build tsunami-proof power plants) to the timeless divine imperative which makes that duty an objective one?
@Matt
You seem to be ignoring the crucial point of Sola’s analysis, namely:
“All that follows from this is that the relevant behaviours in PW are not identical to the behaviours in AW. Rape in PW is not the same thing as rape in AW. It does not follow that moral goodness in PW is not the same thing as moral goodness in AW. In both AW and PW, moral goodness remains identical to human well-being. This is why Harris can say, in effect, that, even in a world like PW, ‘my argument about the moral landscape would still stand’”.
Hi Nick, sure I saw the argument by Sola that you cite, my point is however that I don’t see anything in the text he cited from Harris that suggests Harris was making that argument. Take for example the quote you cite “This is why Harris can say, in effect, that, even in a world like PW, ‘my argument about the moral landscape would still stand’”. But what Harris said in that quote ( take from Solas own site) is
. However, if evil turned out to be as reliable a path to happiness as goodness is, my argument about the moral landscape would still stand, as would the likely utility of neuroscience for investigating it. It would no longer be an especially ‘moral’ landscape; rather it would be a continuum of well-being, upon which saints and sinners would occupy equivalent peaks.
Harris here is not saying that in the PW rape would be morally good, he appears to be saying that in PW what he have is not a moral landscape, but rather a continuum where saints (i.e good people) and sinners (i.e bad people) occupy equivalent peaks. In otherwords he is granting that in the PW moral goodness and well being come apart. His comment in the next line is to say
Worries of this kind seem to ignore some very obvious facts about human beings: we have all evolved from common ancestors and are, therefore, far more similar than we are different; brains and primary human emotions clearly transcend culture, and they are unquestionably influenced by states of the world (as anyone who has ever stubbed his toe can attest). No one, to my knowledge, believes that there is so much variance in the requisites of human well-being as to make the above concerns seem plausible.
Here he seems to be rejecting the worry that moral goodness and wellbeing come apart by noting that it’s unlikely such given scientific facts such a world is actual.
If Harris understood the modal issues, he would not try and refute a an argument that rejects an identity claim on the basis of a PW by noting its unlikely, given contingent scientific facts, that the PW could be an AW. Because this argument is simply irrelevant.
As to Sola’s comments “the relevant behaviours in PW are not identical to the behaviours in AW. Rape in PW is not the same thing as rape in AW” I think this is false. It seems to me that rape is defined as sexual intercourse with a person without there consent. A world where people who do this flourish and one where people do not do this does not differ as regards to the fact the action is rape. The causal properties of rape would differ, but the fact that it is rape would not.
In fact I would argue that there are cases in possible where rape has the same causal properties as it does in the actual world where acts of rape enhance human wellbeing, but are still morally wrong and certainly not morally good. Take one of those Psychopaths Harris mentions that actually exist, who enjoys rape and who has wellbeing. Suppose one is a doctor, he sexually molests women under general anaesthetic, he leaves no injuries of any sort and the woman never knows about it. The rapists enjoyment has gone up, the woman knowing nothing probably will not suffer any loss of well being at all. Hence, this is a case in a world with all the same causal properties as the actual world where moral goodness and enhancing well being come apart.
Now suppose you work in this doctor’s surgery, you discover he did this. If you blow the whistle the women will find out and hence probably feel violated and have lowered well being. The doctor will be caught, and suffer lowered well being, all his patients will be shocked and start to worry. It seems that the good and right thing on Harris account is to keep quiet and cover it up. Blowing the whistle would be wrong and covering it up would be right. This again is another case where wellbeing and goodness come apart in possible worlds with causal properties very much like the actual world.
[…] “Is Good from God?” at the University of Notre Dame on 7 April 2011. We’ve already linked to the debate MP3 and a playlist of the video and we have published a two part review but now, as an MandM exclusive, […]
[…] “Is Good from God?” at the University of Notre Dame on 7 April 2011. We’ve already linked to the debate MP3 and a playlist of the video and we have published a two part review but now, as an MandM exclusive, […]