Last week Sam Harris and William Lane Craig debated the question: “Is the Foundation of Morality Natural or Supernatural?” at the University of Notre Dame. Given my interest in divine command meta-ethics I found the debate and the subsequent online discussion concerning it extremely interesting. I was particularly interested in how the ‘new atheist’ movement would address this issue given Dawkins’ neglect of moral arguments in The God Delusion. Unfortunately, the debate turned out to be very one-sided. [Both the debate video and the debate MP3 are now online.]
In this review I will analyse the debate in two parts. In Part I, I will look at the discussion of Craig’s contention that,
1. If God exists then we have a plausible account of (a) the nature of moral goodness and (b) the nature of moral obligation.
In Part II, I will examine Harris’s contention that,
2. If atheism is true then we have a plausible account of (a) the nature of moral goodness and (b) the nature of moral obligation.
A couple of definitions are necessary here; what both Craig and Harris are defending are rival accounts of what both goodness and moral obligation are. When Craig or Harris offers an account of the nature of goodness, each is offering an account of what moral values and obligation are, that is, their ontological or metaphysical nature. Similarly, when Craig refers to God, he is referring to a personal immaterial being who is necessarily existent, omniscient, omnipotent and morally perfect.
Craig’s Argument for a Divine Command Theory
In support of 1(a) Craig argued that if theism is true, goodness could be identified with God himself. His view is that goodness is best understood in terms of an exemplar, that good is identified with the perfect paradigm of a good person and that the goodness of everything else is measured by its resemblance to this paradigm. An analogy to this idea is the official “metre stick” that exists in France today. The metre stick is exactly one metre long, and the length in metres of every other length is determined by comparison with it. In the same way, God is both perfectly good and is the standard of goodness for everything else. God’s goodness, for Craig, is cashed out in terms of certain character traits. To claim God is good is to claim that he is truthful, benevolent, loving, gracious, merciful and just, and that he is opposed to certain actions such as murder, rape, torturing people for fun and so on.
In support of 1(b) Craig argued that if God exists, moral obligations can be identified with Gods commands. He therefore advocated the version of a divine command theory of obligation proposed by Robert Adams in Finite and Infinite Goods.
While Craig sketched his account of goodness and obligation in his opening statement, he never offered any actual argument for why he thinks that if theism is true, this account is correct; yet later in the debate he said it was obvious. While I myself agree with a certain version of divine command theory, I think this suggestion is inadequate. There have been many objections raised against such theories in the literature, and hardly any of them presuppose the non-existence of God. I think these objections fail, and most of them fail miserably. But it would be a gross overstatement to claim that, given the truth of theism, a divine command theory is obvious.
Later in the debate,Craig did offer an argument of sorts for a divine command theory. He contended that obligations arise only in response to imperatives or demands by an authority. As moral obligations are a type of obligation, they share this feature, of which divine command theory is the best explanation. The obvious question here is, why should we think obligations arise only in response to imperatives from an authority? Craig does not say. Moreover, there do appear to be counter-examples to this claim. For instance, consider the non-moral social obligations people have to friends or hosts, these are not grounded in imperatives from an authority.
Consequently, considered by itself, Craig’s argument for a divine command theory seems insufficient. However, I suspect his comments at least suggest a more defensible argument. Robert Adams has persuasively argued that the role that guilt, censure, punishment, forgiveness and social inculcation play in morality suggests moral obligations are a form of social requirement; “being obligated to do something consists in being required (in a certain way under certain situations) by another person or groups of persons not to do it”[1]. If this is the case then a divine command theory plausibly explains, in a way that naturalistic and secular theories struggle to, how moral obligations can be objective and also how they can be a demand made by a person. Unfortunately, Craig did not develop this point.
Harris’s Response
Harris’s first rebuttal ignored 1a) and raised four main objections to 1b), which I will outline below.
Abhorrent Commands
Harris objected that a divine command theory entails that any action at all could be right, no matter how abhorrent. However, Craig pointed out in his opening statement that this objection falsely assumes that God could command anything at all, including abhorrent acts. A divine command theory does not identify our obligations with the commands of just anyone but only with the commands of God defined as omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect. And it is impossible for a morally perfect being to command abhorrent acts. Consequently, this objection fails. Despite Craig pointing this out, Harris continued to allude to this objection several times. He never tried to demonstrate how an omniscient being that was perfectly good could command what is abhorrently evil.
Old Testament Barbarisms
A second line of argument Harris made against 1b) was his allegation that the Old Testament teaches the permissibility of genocide and slavery. While I disagree with this claim, and have argued for my views elsewhere on this blog [see my genocide and slavery tags], the major problem in this context is that even if the claim is true, it does not refute 1b). Contention 1b) simply asserts that if God, understood as an “essentially omniscient, omnipotent, morally perfect being”, exists then it is plausible to identify our moral obligations with God’s commands. Nothing in this thesis says anything or commits one to saying anything, about whether the Old Testament is an authentic revelation of this God’s commands. While many divine command theorists believe in biblical infallibility, many do not. A divine command theorist could claim that the wrongness of an action is determined by God but we know what is right and wrong from our conscience—not from a written revelation. Philip Quinn once suggested this kind of theory.[2] Similarly, a divine command theorist could reject some Old Testament stories as immoral, as Robert Adams appears to[3]. Hence, as a rebuttal of 1b) this argument is a red herring. Craig repeated this fact early on in the debate, yet Harris continued to ignore it, repeating the red herring over and over again.
Miscellaneous Objections to Christian Theology
Harris’s main rebuttal of 1b), however, was four-fold. He contended:
(i) that the existence of evil in the world suggests that God does not exist;
(ii) that the doctrine of hell as a place of eternal conscious torment is unjust;
(iii) that the doctrine of exclusivism is unjust;
(iv) that these beliefs are jointly psychopathic.
What is bizarre about this is that none of these arguments actually address Craig’s contention.
Consider (i), the claim that evil proves God does not exist. Craig’s contention in 1b) was a conditional statement that: If God exists then we have a plausible account of the nature of moral obligation. Arguing that God does not exist does not refute this conditional since the conditional does not claim that God exists. Again, this was pointed out by Craig repeatedly in the debate and Harris repeatedly ignored it.
Similarly, Harris’s arguments in (ii) and (iii) do not refute 1b). Hell and particularism are doctrines in Christian theology. But the moot was not about whether Christianity is true. Craig’s contention was that, if God exists then we have a plausible account the nature of moral obligation. Nothing in this conditional requires one to embrace a particular view of hell or Christian soteriology or even Christianity at all. In fact, one could accept 1b) without even being a theist. Once again, this was pointed out to Harris by Craig early on, yet Harris continued to ignore it and instead resort to making jibes at Christian doctrines.
In the same way, (iv) is equally beside the point. Apart from the fact that simply referring to a claim in pejorative terms is not a rebuttal, these claims were not what the debate was about anyway. Hence his comments were strictly irrelevant. The debate was not about whether Christianity is psychopathic.
Evidentialism
One final objection Harris alluded to was that there is no evidence for God’s existence. But again, this is irrelevant to 1b). The debate simply was not about whether there was evidence for God’s existence. Again, Craig’s first contention was only that: if God exists then we have a plausible account of the nature of moral obligation. Nothing in this claim requires one to believe there is evidence for God’s existence. At some point, the question can no longer be evaded – does Harris even understand conditional implication in a debate resolution?
It is worth noting that, in addition to being irrelevant, this objection has two other problems. First, it begs the question. If Craig is correct in holding that 1b) is true and 2) is false, then there is evidence for God’s existence. If moral obligation can be plausibly explained only on the assumption that God exists then the existence of moral obligations would be evidence for God’s existence. Consequently, to establish that there is no evidence for God’s existence, Harris would have to attack 1 and defend 2, something he spent almost the entire debate not doing.
A final point on this last issue. At several points in his opening statement, Harris appealed to intuitive moral judgements about the wrongness of causing suffering. He stated that he was justified in accepting them as “axioms” without any evidence. Now I think something like what Harris says here is correct. I accept that certain moral claims are properly basic and justified independently of any argument for their truth. The problem is, however, once you grant that substantive moral claims can be properly basic, it is hard to see how you can then reject the arguments of people like Alvin Plantinga that God is rational in the absence of evidence. What exactly is it about religious beliefs that disqualifies them from being properly basic that does not apply to moral beliefs?
Harris never answered (or even bothered to raise) this question; the only time he came close to doing so was when he argued that one cannot have properly basic beliefs about God because people disagree radically over the nature of God. However, as the existence of this debate shows, people also disagree widely over the nature of morality. So not only was the evidentialist objection irrelevant to the actual debate, Harris’s use of it was an obvious case of special pleading. Craig put his finger on this problem when he noted that Harris took morality on faith despite claiming to have proven it by science—an argument that Harris, true to form, consistently ignored.
Consequently, regarding contention 1, Craig clearly presented the better case. While Craig did not really offer any arguments for his contention untill late in the exchange, and even then the argument he gave was rather undeveloped, Harris never offered a response. He pretty much ignored 1a) and threw out one relevant point in argument against 1b) which Craig had already refuted in his opening statement and which has been rebutted in the philosophical literature ad nauseum. In every other argument Harris offered against a divine command theory, he ignored the theory altogether instead he offered objections to numerous other positions that were not divine command theory and which were not even pertinent to the debate.
Harris’s attitude appeared to be, “’in spite of the agreed-on subject of the debate, I’ll say whatever negative thing I like about Christianity and that will surely count as an awesome argument.” Unfortunately for the new atheists rational discussion does not function this way. Rational discussion involves listening to what your opponent actually contends, attempting to understand it, responding with reasoned arguments and sticking to the topic you agreed would be the focus of the discussion.
In Debate Review: Sam Harris and William Lane Craig on Divine Command Theory Part II, I will discuss Harris’s contention that morality can be grounded in the natural facts studied by science.
[1] Robert Adams Finite and Infinite Goods (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
[2] Philip Quinn “Divine Command Theory” in Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory ed Hugh La Follette (Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing House, 2000) 67.
[3] Adams Finite and Infinite Goods, 277-291.
Tags: Debates · Divine Command Theory · God and Morality · Is the Foundation of Morality Natural or Supernatural? · Notre Dame · Philip Quinn · Robert Adams · Sam Harris · William Lane Craig54 Comments
A common objection to belief in the God of the Bible is that a good, kind, and loving deity would never command the wholesale slaughter of nations. In the tradition of his popular Is God a Moral Monster?, Paul Copan teams up with Matthew Flannagan to tackle some of the most confusing and uncomfortable passages of Scripture. Together they help the Christian and nonbeliever alike understand the biblical, theological, philosophical, and ethical implications of Old Testament warfare passages.
This is a great review, Matt. Do you have any suggestions on what to read to get a general overview of the different types of DCT?
Hi Bossmanham
You could try this:
http://spot.colorado.edu/~morristo/DoesGodGround.pdf
Enjoy!
Paul, thats Wes Moristons critique of Craig’s specific case for a DCT. I don’t think Craig is the best defender of this position and I certainly don’t think that article is an introduction or representative account of the issues.
That said, I agree with him that Craig’s arguments are not always clear and as formulated they are subject to the problems he cites. I disagree on his interpretation of what Craig is getting at, I suspect Craig is driving at, admittedly obscurely some other arguments which are much more serious than the ones Moriston criticises ably in this article.
Bossmanham I would look at
William Alston, “Some Suggestions for Divine Command Theorists” in Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy ed. Michael Beaty (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990).
Robert Adams “Divine Command Meta-Ethics Modified Again” Journal of Religious Ethics 7:1 (1979); Finite and Infinite Goods (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
John Hare God’s Call: Moral Realism, God’s Commands and Human Autonomy (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2001); God and Morality: A Philosophical History (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007).
William Lane Craig “This most Gruesome of Guests” in Is Goodness Without God Good Enough? A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics eds Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanthan: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2009)
C Stephen Evans Kierkegaard’s Ethic of Love: Divine Commands and Moral Obligations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
Philip L Quinn Divine Commands and Moral Requirements (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978); “An Argument for Divine Command Theory” in Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy ed Michael Beaty (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990) 289-302; “The Recent Revival of Divine Command Ethics” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (Fall 1990) 345-365; “The Primacy of God’s Will in Christian Ethics” Philosophical Perspectives 6 (1992) 493-513; “Divine Command Theory” in Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory ed Hugh Lafollette (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 2000) 53-73; “Theological Voluntarism” The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) 63-90.
Edward Weirenga The Nature of God: An Inquiry into the Divine Attributes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989) 215-27. See also, “Utilitarianism and the Divine Command Theory” American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (1984) 311-318; and “A Defensible Divine Command Theory” Nous 17 (1983) 387-408.
William Wainwright Religion and Morality (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd, 2005).
William Mann “Theism and the Foundations of Ethics” in The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Religion ed William Mann (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005).
Thomas Carson Value and the Good Life (Notre Dame IN: Notre Dame University Press, 2000).
[…] Matt Flannagan has began a series of posts on the debate at MandM. […]
Matt,
I am curious, is Moriston’s critique of Bill Craig’s DCT superficial then?
How serious is craig’s argument?
Am I correct in assuming that you meant “…that belief in God is rational…”?
Good critique of both Craig and Harris. Craig for undeveloped argument, Harris for presenting no argument at all.
Alvin, I don’t think Moriston critiques Craig’s DCT in that article. He critiques some arguments Craig has made in public debates for his two contentions. 1. If God exists we have an sound foundation for objective moral values and duties and 2. If God does not exist we do not have a sound foundation for objective values and duties. Most of the article is directed at Craig’s arguments for 2. and there is also some arguments around Craig’s account of goodness. I actually am inclined to think Craig’s account of goodness is not the best theistic account though I think Robert Adams has developed it in considerable sophistication and Moriston does not address this at all focusing on Craig’s two or three sentence presentation in a debate..
As to Craig’s arguments for 2. I agree with Moriston that Craig often uses rhetorical flourishes and rhetorical questions and if you take some of the arguments as they are presented they don’t seem that cogent. Where I differ is I think these comments often point to arguments which are much more cogent.
Here is an example Craig in his debates often states
“After all, on the atheistic view, there’s nothing special about human beings.They’re just accidental by-products of nature that have evolved relatively recently on an infinitesimal speck of dust called the planet Earth, lost somewhere in a hostile and mindless universe and doomed to perish individually and collectively in a relatively short time.”
Moristion points out that the “there is nothing significant is about human flourishing” does not follow from the premises that (i)Humans are tiny compared to the universe. (ii)They haven’t been around very long (iii) They owe their existence to mindless natural processes. (iv)They die after a short time.(v) Eventually all of them will be permanently dead. On this Moriston is correct.
However, in the literature on DCT there are two separate lines of arguments which Craig’s comments here could be seen as alluding two. The description of a naturalistic universe spelt out in (i)-(iv) sounds a lot like the criticism of people like John Hare and Stephen Layman that atheism makes impossible a moral order, where ultimately virtue and happiness are conjoined, and that such an order is important for the rational authority of morality, these are serious arguments from Hare and Layman and Moriston’s comments do not address them.
Similarly, the claim “there is nothing significant is about human flourishing” and Craig’s references to speciesim while a rhetorical question does allude to the very serious point made by Nicholas Wolterstorff.
Wolterstorff issues a challenge to secularist who believes in human rights. Identify a non theological or non religious property or properties that is
(i) Is possessed by all members of the human family
(ii) Is not possessed by an terrestrial non human animal
(iii) Plausibly can be said to give humans worth sufficient to account for the standard schedules of human rights we grant that humans have
(iv) Not a property that is possessed by different humans to different degrees
(i) and (ii) are necessary if all rights are going to be granted to all human beings and not to animals like cows or dogs. (iii) is necessary if the property is to ground human rights (iv) is necessary if all people have “equal dignity” if the property that grounds dignity is comes in degrees and some people have it more than others then some people will have more and less dignity than others and they will not have equal rights.
The problem is no- non theological property we know of appears to be adequate to do this. (Singer interestingly has made the same point, he just concludes humans do not have dignity and all animals are equal)
Now consider what Moriston says after he points out Craig’s inference in the above quote does not follow. He states
“If one were to draw up a list of
things that make us special, it would probably include things like these. Humans
are (or can be) self-conscious, capable of rational reflection and deliberation, of
making plans and carrying them out. They fall in love, they have children, form
family bonds, and care for one another. Some of them write poems or compose
symphonies or discover proofs of deep mathematical theorems.”
The problem is these are precisely the kinds of answers which people like Singer and Wolterstorff have critiqued.
Re (i) not all humans have these properties, young children lack these properties, as do temporarily comatose, and dementia sufferers.
Re (ii) Some animals have these properties to a higher than some human beings.
David Boonin notes“by any plausible measure dogs, and cats, cows and pigs, chickens and ducks are more intellectually developed than a new born infant.”
Re (v) Different people posses these properties to in different degrees, some are more rational than others, some have more moral discernment than others and so on.
There are real difficulties in developing an account of why human beings are special from a secular perspective that are not taken seriously here. The same occurs with Armstrong’s critique of Craig. He appeals to “free will and moral agency” and moves on. Yet those like Singer or Wolterstorff who make this point in fact note these responses and then give detailed reasons why they don’t work.
Finally, Moriston turns to Craig’s repeated comments that on atheism there is no reason to think the morality evolved by homosapiens is objectively correct. Craig cites Ruse on this. Moriston then critiques some of Craig’s comments, critiques Ruse but then Moriston states
“That doesn’t necessarily mean that he couldn’t do so. More sophisticated and challenging versions of the evolutionary argument against moral realism can be found in the current literature. Some able philosophers argue that evolutionary explanations of morality lead to moral scepticism. That chance and natural selection have moved us even a small way in the direction of correct moral beliefs seems to them to be too great a coincidence to be credible.Some see this as a reason to reject moral realism (Street (2006) ), others as a reason to adopt the hypothesis that evolution is divinely guided and that God has written the moral law on the human heart (or at least on some human hearts!).There is a lot to think about here, and I don’t claim to have settled all the relevant issues.”
Exactly, the comments Craig makes in quick rhetorical form in fact allude to a very serious and I am inclined to think probably cogent line of argument. Moriston all but admits this. I think in fact some of the comments Craig makes suggests he does have this argument in mind as opposed to the more superficial version of the argument one Moriston and Armstrong attribute to Craig.
So, I am inclined to think that on divine command theory Craig is a populariser. On Philosophy of Time and the Cosmological argument, Craig is the top of his field he writes clearly and rigorously with careful precise developed argument. In ethics he has almost no scholarly publications, in his debates he appears to make a lot of rhetorical allusions in popular form of lines of arguments that others have made, and these arguments if developed rigorously have considerable punch. In debate format however they are often not developed and often put in rhetorical or slogan form, where he is speaking in a popular as opposed to academic setting. This is made all the worse by the fact that people like Harris simply refuse to take them seriously at all and try and change the subject.
I think that Craig’s contention that obligations arise in response to prescriptions by a competent authority is correct. Non-moral social “obligations” aren’t really obligatory, I think, because such “obligations” merely describe what it is to act conventional. We may think of them as prescriptive, but that’s just an internalization of these conventions.
It doesn’t seem plausible to me that one could have an obligation to do anything that isn’t commanded in some way.
Hi Matt S
I guess a couple of issues arise for me here. First, what’s a competent authority, if by this you mean a person who has a right to tell you what to do, or someone you are morally obligated to obey, then the claim that obligations arise in response to prescriptions by a competent authority runs into trouble. If you take the line that Mark Murphy does and contend an authority is not someone with rights or someone you have an obligation to obey, but an authority is simply a person who can generate moral obligations by commanding them, then the claim God is a competent authority seems to be an entailment of a divine command theory and hence can’t ground it. If Craig’s notion is simply that a moral obligation arises if a person with specific qualities commands it then his position is not really different from a social requirement theory.
Second, I disagree with you about non moral obligations, I think there are legal and social obligations. In fact Craig’s argument requires this because he draws an analogy with non moral legal obligations to establish his point, if these are not really obligations his argument fails. As to your specific example, you refer to social and legal obligations as “convention” which we have internalised. I agree, but note the claim was not here that these count as valid moral obligations. The claim is just that they are obligations, I think one can say in a sociological sense they are obligations imposed on us by society, of course that does not mean we are morally required or even rationally required to follow them. But that’s compatible with saying they are social or legal as opposed to moral obligations. The question then is what is an obligation and secondly what needs to be added to obligations to turn them from social obligations to legal ones.
I agree with you that its implausible for you to have an obligation if another person did not require or demand you to do it. That’s the key point in Robert Adam’s argument. He notes from J S Mill that
We do not call anything wrong, unless we mean to imply that a person ought to be punished in some way or other for doing it; if not by law, by the opinion of his fellow-creatures; if not by opinion, by the reproaches of his own conscience. This seems the real turning point of the distinction between morality and simple expediency. It is a part of the notion of Duty in every one of its forms, that a person may rightfully be compelled to fulfil it. Duty is a thing which may be exacted from a person, as one exacts a debt. Unless we think that it may be exacted from him, we do not call it his duty. Reasons of prudence, or the interest of other people, may militate against actually exacting it; but the person himself, it is clearly understood, would not be entitled to complain. There are other things, on the contrary, which we wish that people should do, which we like or admire them for doing, perhaps dislike or despise them for not doing, but yet admit that they are not bound to do; it is not a case of moral obligation; we do not blame them, that is, we do not think that they are proper objects of punishment. ,,but I think there is no doubt that this distinction lies at the bottom of the notions of right and wrong; that we call any conduct wrong, or employ, instead, some other term of dislike or disparagement,
Mill’s point is that having an obligation to do X differs from it being good to do X, or excellent to do X, or having a good reason to do X. In that with an obligation others demand you do it, and can force, or compel or censure, you in some way if you don’t. Moreover, societies internalise these obligations using social pressure. Particularly poignant is the fact that if you violate an obligation you are “guilty” of a breech and this can be expiated only if another forgives you. Which suggests that violation of an obligation is a breech of a social relationship. So, Adams argument, is that an obligation is a social demand or requirement. Adams notes that not all social demands are the same, one from an informed person, who loved you, would be one you had feel more reason to comply with than one from a person you hated and who despised you or was irrational or an idiot.
However a moral obligation differs in that its objective, so it also has certain other features such as being one that we have weighty reason to comply with, and comes from an impartial perspective, and so on. Adams suggestion then is that a moral obligation is best accounted for in terms of a the commands of a person who has certain attributes, which leads plausibly to a DCT. His account can make sense of the fact that obligations are social requirements yet moral obligations are objective and hold independently of what a person or society commands, and that human societies can’t generate moral requirements because they lack certain attributes such as being fully informed, rational, impartiality and so on.
Hi Matt,
Again, thanks for the great review. I was curious about your comments on the relatively undeveloped arguments presented by Craig, especially on DCT. I’m wondering if you could “fill in the missing information” for Dr Craig? That is, could you write a better version of Craig’s opening speech that more precisely defines DCT and the other things you mention that he lacked throughout the debate?
You have raised some good points here, but I’m curious what you would suggest to Dr Craig to make his argument a little more bullet proof?
Much appreciated.
– Andy Gray
“I guess a couple of issues arise for me here. First, what’s a competent authority, if by this you mean a person who has a right to tell you what to do, or someone you are morally obligated to obey, then the claim that obligations arise in response to prescriptions by a competent authority runs into trouble.
If you take the line that Mark Murphy does and contend an authority is not someone with rights or someone you have an obligation to obey, but an authority is simply a person who can generate moral obligations by commanding them, then the claim God is a competent authority seems to be an entailment of a divine command theory and hence can’t ground it. If Craig’s notion is simply that a moral obligation arises if a person with specific qualities commands it then his position is not really different from a social requirement theory.”
I think that competent authorities derive their authority from the fact that one ought to obey them, that is, their commands carry the quality of “oughtness”. However, I think I would distinguish between what it is to be a competent authority, and what authority itself is. A “competent authority” is what one is if one has “authority.” One might be a competent authority because he makes his commands carry oughtness by nature, or one might be a competent authority by borrowing the oughtness of some other being’s commands.
So what’s this “authority” I think one can have? It is one of two components, I think, that are instantiated in every genuine ought. I have difficulty thinking of the quality of “oughtness” as anything other than indicating prescriptiveness of a certain kind, which, where present, entails an obligation to obey. Prescriptiveness alone, of course, doesn’t mean the same thing as oughtness. The additional quality which turns prescription into “oughtness” is what I’d call “authority.” I don’t conceive of authority as being wholly constitutive of oughtness, because the addition of prescriptiveness is necessary for “oughtness” to be instantiated. If one “has” authority as I conceive it, one can by nature imbue at least some of one’s prescriptions with authority. (I’d think that, intuitively, moral oughts are metaphysically necessary, so they must be the authoritative commands of some necessary being) I’m not sure if this position is advocated by any philosopher, but that’s what I think.
“Second, I disagree with you about non moral obligations, I think there are legal and social obligations. In fact Craig’s argument requires this because he draws an analogy with non moral legal obligations to establish his point, if these are not really obligations his argument fails. As to your specific example, you refer to social and legal obligations as “convention” which we have internalised. I agree, but note the claim was not here that these count as valid moral obligations. The claim is just that they are obligations, I think one can say in a sociological sense they are obligations imposed on us by society, of course that does not mean we are morally required or even rationally required to follow them. But that’s compatible with saying they are social or legal as opposed to moral obligations. The question then is what is an obligation and secondly what needs to be added to obligations to turn them from social obligations to legal ones.”
I think that legal or social obligations are, if not grounded in a real moral law, something more like “virtual” obligations, a kind of imaginary obligation in response to the attribution of prescriptiveness to the social pressures of society, which are in fact not prescribing anything. I find it implausible that there is any such entity as “society” which can actually prescribe anything, as if it were some gestalt mind. Rather, it exerts a pressure on me that I rationalize into a kind of imaginary intent, the commands of which I refer to as the source of my obligations. In a sense, then, moral laws are “real” prescriptions, which generate “real” obligations, while nonmoral legal obligations are imaginary, but still imaginary obligations.
Why are the new breed of atheists so hopeless at rational argument and debate?…
An excellent summary and review of the debate between William Lane Craig and Sam Harris. In conclusion to part one of her analysis of the recent public debate between William Lane Craig and Sam Harris, supposedly on the topic of ‘Is Good from God? Are …
Compliments on an excellent part I. The hypocrisy of the “new atheists” never ceases to amaze me. They – people like Harris, Dawkins, Hitchens – castigate theists for being irrational, yet this is the kind of “rationality” with which they defend their own positions!
By elucidating the logical structure (or lack thereof) of this debate, you have given a clear example of this.
The one problem I see with debates like this is that not only are the participants defending rival accounts of what goodness and moral obligation are, but rival accounts of what a god actually is. Craig’s version of God is understandably the Christian God, omniscient omnipotent and, I would assume, unchanging. Harris, on the other hand is referring to a concept of God that is less formally described and like Allah or the Greek gods, can change their mind etc.
The debate was not (maybe unfortunately) on the validity of divine command theory as described by Craig but on the question “Is Good from God”. Therefore it would have saved a lot of time at the onset to agree on the definition of God. I’m sure that Craig would have agreed that no good could have come from a god as defined by Harris, and in turn, if God is described and agreed on by both as omniscient omnipotent and morally perfect then surely there really is no debate.
So as I listened to it, what I heard was Craig debating a very robust position with respect to his definition of God – ie, ‘Is good from the Christian God’. Harris on the other hand was really there to counter the assumptions about god by bringing up some of the more uncomfortable aspects of the Christian God. I think the issues raised with respect to abhorrent commands, barbarisms and Christian theology were an attempt to counter the assumptions Craig had made that god was omniscient omnipotent and morally perfect.
The debate reviews from the Craig side, (like yours) seem to assume that it should be beholden on the participants to answer each others claims… To me it mostly seems like a bit of sparing, and honestly, I don’t know why they bother.
Thanks Matt for the reply,
I learned a lot from your clarifications of points and counterpoints made by craig, ruse, moriston, hare and the rest.
I guess when looking upon two domains of moral epistemology God and no-god, you get separate sets of ambiguity when in so far as defining an absolute referential frame of ethics.
Sam Harris vs. William Lane Craig debate review (part 1)…
Below, I review the debate. Other reviews of the debate include: Nathan Schneider, Glenn Peoples, Russell Blackford, Wintery Knight, John Loftus, Randy Everist, J.W. Wartick, Chris Hallquist, Matt Flannagan, and more. The topic is secular morality (as …
Regarding the prolbem of God issuing possibly abhorrent commands, I find Craig’s objection completely inadequate. Craig does not show such a possibility is false, he merely asserts it.
If God is the standard for morals then it obviously follows he could command anything at all. No one could assess his commands as “bad” since the very concept of “bad” would be determined by God. Morever, if God’s nature is the standard for morality, if his nature determines what is good then if his nature were such that rape was good, then it would be good. That is what it means to be the standard. If the standard is constrained or limited by something external to it then it’s a big mystery as to how it can be viewed as the standard at all.
To object that this is impossible because we humans would find it to be abhorrent is to make us and our assessment of what is abhorrent to be the standard, invalidating the entire case for God being the standard for objective morality.
If we were to examine excerpts from the bible, such as the purported killing of the Amalekites in 1 Samuel 15, I don’t think there’s a Christian alive who would consider the killing of women, children and infants anything less than “abhorrent”, regardless of whatever justification they might try to come up with for such acts. It would still be abhorrent, even if somehow justified. I don’t think Craig would find it anything less than abhorrent either, which again, would invalidate his objection.
If he didn’t find running infants and toddlers through with swords abhorrent, well, that would tell us something about Craig.
Max you write ”Regarding the problem of God issuing possibly abhorrent commands, I find Craig’s objection completely inadequate. Craig does not show such a possibility is false, he merely asserts it.”
Craig’s position is that an action is wrong if and only if it is commanded by a just and loving God. Its possible for God to command something abhorrent only if its possible for a fully informed rational, loving and just person to endorse this act in the relevant circumstances.
Actually your own comments suggest you do not accept this possibility you write
If he didn’t find running infants and toddlers through with swords abhorrent, well, that would tell us something about Craig.
Here, you suggest that there are certain actions which are such that if someone endorses them it follows that they have a wicked character.
So which is it? If you claiming a fully informed just and loving person can never endorse the running through of infants and toddlers with the sword, then its not possible for God to command this and the abhorrent objection falls.
If it is possible for a person with these character traits to endorse this, then your suggestion that this “tells us something about Craig” does not follow Craig could do this and be loving, just rational and fully informed.
Morever, if God’s nature is the standard for morality, if his nature determines what is good then if his nature were such that rape was good, then it would be good. That is what it means to be the standard. If the standard is constrained or limited by something external to it then it’s a big mystery as to how it can be viewed as the standard at all.
This argument is unsound, On Craig’s view and on traditional theism God has certain traits essentially, God is loving, just, truthful and so on essentially, in all possible worlds. Hence, the situation you suggest, one where if his nature “determines” that rape is good. Would either be a situation where rape is something that a loving, just truthful fully informed person could engage in rape or it would be an impossibility.
”To object that this is impossible because we humans would find it to be abhorrent is to make us and our assessment of what is abhorrent to be the standard, invalidating the entire case for God being the standard for objective morality.”
This confuses epistemology and ontology, in the context your discussing to say that our assessment is the standard is simply to say that what we know about what is good and bad, right and wrong and so on, is a reliable guide to understanding what a perfectly good being would command.
A divine command theory however does not deny this, as Craig pointed out, the claim of a divine command theory is not that one cannot know what is right independently of belief in God. It’s the claim that right and wrong cannot exist independently of Gods commands, because the property of wrongness just is the property of being prohibited by God.
So using our moral standards to asses wether God would have commanded something is actually compatible with the claim that wrongness is identical with Gods prohibition.
Craig pointed this out in the debate, and the literature has pointed the distinction out over and over again. All objections like yours show is that sceptics either do not listen or do not read.
”If we were to examine excerpts from the bible, such as the purported killing of the Amalekites in 1 Samuel 15, I don’t think there’s a Christian alive who would consider the killing of women, children and infants anything less than “abhorrent”, regardless of whatever justification they might try to come up with for such acts. It would still be abhorrent, even if somehow justified. I don’t think Craig would find it anything less than abhorrent either, which again, would invalidate his objection.”
Actually it wouldn’t and Craig again pointed this out in the debate.
First, if this argument is sound it shows that God is portrayed in the bible as commanding abhorrent things. That however does not entail that God actually commanded abhorrent things, to get that conclusion you would have to accept that the bible is a reliable or infallible account of what God has commanded.
The problem is nothing about a divine command theory entails or commits a person to accepting this doctrine of biblical authority. There are many divine command theorists in fact who don’t accept this understanding of biblical authority.
So really this argument has nothing to do with a Divine command theory. Its an attack on a particular the notion of biblical authority. Had the question of biblical authority been the issue under discussion such an objection would be relevant, but its not the topic under discussion so its irrelevant.
Second, supposing this were an argument about biblical authority ( which its not) I note you are being selective with the text here. Because while you cite 1 Sam 15 and interpret it literally. You don’t cite 1 Sam 29-32 which if taken literally affirms that the Amalekites were not actually wiped out but still existed in large numbers in the very same region. So perhaps you can tell me why you choose to read Sam 15 literally and did not do this with Sam 29-32?
I wrote nothing of the sort! Oh wait… I am not the only Max?????
I’m not the only Jason either.
I wouldn’t want you to think you were special or something. 🙂
Max, I was well aware it was not you the comments did not seem to me to your style.
Sorry, yes I’m a different “Max” 🙂 I’ll use madmax going forward as that is my moniker on some chat boards.
You say, “Its possible for God to command something abhorrent only if its possible for a fully informed rational, loving and just person to endorse this act in the relevant circumstances.”.
I see the goalposts are moving. First God supposedly couldn’t commmand or endorse any act we think is abhorrent, invalidating his supposed role as the standard of what is good. Now he can supposedly do so, but only if a person with certain traits could endorse it and if the circumstances are a certain way.
This highlights the problem I’ve seen with many moral objectivists – they want God to be the standard, but when there’s a potential for it getting “ugly”, they back away from that stance, adding elements into the mix and effectively invalidating the idea they started with.
You say, “Here, you suggest that there are certain actions which are such that if someone endorses them it follows that they have a wicked character.” I didn’t actually say that. To me certainly it would be “wicked”. I understand that to others it might not be.
The question is, which camp would you and/or Craig be in? All you have to do is answer yes or no.
You say, “So which is it? If you claiming a fully informed just and loving person can never endorse the running through of infants and toddlers with the sword, then its not possible for God to command this and the abhorrent objection falls.”
I never said anything about “endorsing” anything. The issue was whether God could command something “abhorrent”. The claim was that he couldn’t. So the question is really to you and Craig, “Is such an act abhorrent or not?” If yes, that invalidates the objection. If no, then you just have to say as much.
You say, “This argument is unsound, On Craig’s view and on traditional theism God has certain traits essentially, God is loving, just, truthful and so on essentially, in all possible worlds. Hence, the situation you suggest, one where if his nature “determines” that rape is good. Would either be a situation where rape is something that a loving, just truthful fully informed person could engage in rape or it would be an impossibility.”
I find your objection to be in contradiction with the very argument Craig tries to make. If God exists and he is the standard, then HE decides what is “loving”, “just” and “truthful”, not your or I. That’s what is entailed by being the standard. God’s nature would not limited by anything and therefore it could potentially endorse any action, with no consideration of what you or I think or feel. If it is impossible, then God cannot logically be the standard, something else that could somehow limit the possibilities of what God’s nature could be would be the standard.
You say, “This confuses epistemology and ontology, in the context your discussing to say that our assessment is the standard is simply to say that what we know about what is good and bad, right and wrong and so on, is a reliable guide to understanding what a perfectly good being would command.”
Well, it’s yours and Craig’s objection, not mine. I’m just taking it to it’s logical conclusion and if we say we or something else can limit what God can or cannot declare to be moral or immoral, then we become the standard, not God.
You say, “First, if this argument is sound it shows that God is portrayed in the bible as commanding abhorrent things. That however does not entail that God actually commanded abhorrent things, to get that conclusion you would have to accept that the bible is a reliable or infallible account of what God has commanded.”
Not true at all. We can consider the account as a hypothetical and examine it as such. According to the bible, God did command this action. Would you and Craig consider such acts abhorrent or not? If yes, the objection is invalidated since you would agree that it’s possible for God to command something abhorrent. If you don’t think such acts would be abhorrent, all you have to do is say so.
You say, “The problem is nothing about a divine command theory entails or commits a person to accepting this doctrine of biblical authority. There are many divine command theorists in fact who don’t accept this understanding of biblical authority. ”
Taken as a hypothetical question, we can examine whether or not you and Criag would be consistent with the objection you give against God possibly commanding abhorrent actions. All you have to do is answer.
You say, “Second, supposing this were an argument about biblical authority ( which its not) I note you are being selective with the text here. Because while you cite 1 Sam 15 and interpret it literally. You don’t cite 1 Sam 29-32 which if taken literally affirms that the Amalekites were not actually wiped out but still existed in large numbers in the very same region. So perhaps you can tell me why you choose to read Sam 15 literally and did not do this with Sam 29-32? ”
Regardless of what Sam 29-32 says, we can make an assessment as to whether running through toddlers and infants with swords would abhorrent or not so it is completely irrelevant to my question.
The choices are clear, either you and Craig would consider it abhorrent or you wouldn’t. If you would, the objection disappears because you would be agreeing that God could command something abhorrent, which is consistent with God being the standard, not human beings. If you wouldn’t, then so be it. All you have to do is say so.
The answer is ….what we might see as abhorrent from our perspective might be quite different from the PoV of someone who can see a much broader picture and far more of the implications, and is in a position to determine the best possible course of action.
eg if you could go back and kill Hitler before he turned bad would you?. No one at the time could possibly know so they couldnt do so in any justifiable manner but you could have the knowledge and clarity of hindsight. What if you had totally clear foresite.
So many of these questions reveal the fundamental presupposition of the questioner, that God is not real or at best is concieved of as a slightly more powerful human being.
Children often think it really unfair that they cant eat lollies all the time and are obliged to eat their veges, even teenagers find many restrictions or obligations abhorrent, when the issue really is that a lack of knowledge, experience and maturity mean they are simply not capable of understanding. The adults are not wrong andmorally abhorrent nor is their authority invalid or questionable just because children dont necessarily understand.
Mad Max, you state
“Its possible for God to command something abhorrent only if its possible for a fully informed rational, loving and just person to endorse this act in the relevant circumstances.”.
I see the goalposts are moving. First God supposedly couldn’t commmand or endorse any act we think is abhorrent, invalidating his supposed role as the standard of what is good. Now he can supposedly do so, but only if a person with certain traits could endorse it and if the circumstances are a certain way.
Actually if you read that comment in context, you’ll see I am not saying that its possible for a fully informed rational and loving person to endorse the action in question. I was saying your argument only follows if you assume this. I then pointed out that your other comments suggest you think this is false. Quoting people out of context, is not really a terribly compelling critique. Especially when people can simply glance a few posts above and check.
My point stands, given the way Craig defines what he means by God, your claim that God could command something abhorrent is true only if its possible for a perfectly virtous being to knowingly command something abhorrent. I think that’s pretty obviously a contradiction. So your claim that he could is contradictory. Sorry, but no matter how many sceptics cite an argument or how compelling they think it is if a premise of the argument is a contradiction its unsound. Move on and try a new one. Instead of flogging a dead horse.
2.You write
“So which is it? If you claiming a fully informed just and loving person can never endorse the running through of infants and toddlers with the sword, then its not possible for God to command this and the abhorrent objection falls.”
I never said anything about “endorsing” anything. The issue was whether God could command something “abhorrent”.
Actually, the claim its possible for a loving and just God commands X is equivalent to the claim “ a loving and just perfectly informed person can endorse X” So by claiming that there was no justification for stating the former your stating there is no justification for stating the latter. So I’ll ask you again, do you believe its possible for a perfectly virtous person to knowingly command an abhorrent act?
If the answer is yes, then you cannot denounce people who command those things as evil. If the answer is no, then you have to grant that Craig’s claim God could not do this is true and drop the objection. I am sure that trying to engage in character assanation is more rhetorically effective. But I am actually more interested in hearing a coherent non contradictory criticism of a divine command theory.
3”The claim was that he couldn’t. So the question is really to you and Craig, “Is such an act abhorrent or not?” If yes, that invalidates the objection. If no, then you just have to say as much.
Sorry, but actually the question is to you, you’re the one that pushes the abhorrent commands objection, and this objection relies on the premise that God could not command an abhorrent act. I am not required to defend the premises of an objection I don’t accept, you are.
So again, do you claim that its possible for a perfectly virtuous being to command something abhorrent. Yes or no.
For the record I do think running a child through with the sword is wrong. I am open to the argument, made by many ethicists, that in rare circumstances where some greater good is at stake it might be justified or permissible, but in normal circumstances it’s wrong. Craig I am pretty sure holds the same view. So now are you willing to answer the question above, or are you just interested in defaming people, rather than justifying the premises you offer.
4. I find your objection to be in contradiction with the very argument Craig tries to make. If God exists and he is the standard, then HE decides what is “loving”, “just” and “truthful”, not your or I.
That simply shows you misrepresent Craig because Craig never said that God decides what is loving or truthful. That is not his position nor is it the position of any writer on divine command theory I know of. Craig’s position is that an action is wrong if its prohibited by a God who is essentially just, loving and truthful. Try responding to positions people actually have defended rather than ones sceptics make up.
5. Well, it’s yours and Craig’s objection, not mine. I’m just taking it to it’s logical conclusion and if we say we or something else can limit what God can or cannot declare to be moral or immoral, then we become the standard, not God.
Sorry but you have not, First, the claim that an action is wrong if and only if it is prohibited by a being that is essentially just loving and truthful. Does not logically entail God can declare anything at all to be moral. If he could do that he would not be essentially loving just and truthful. Like I said contradictions are not good premises of arguments.
Second, my claim was that our knowledge of what is right and wrong, means we can determine with a reasonable degree of accuracy what actions a essentially just and loving being could not command. Note this is not the same as the claim that I set standards which God is obliged to obey. Like I said to conclude this is to confuse epistemology with ontology. I pointed this out to you in my last post. Sorry but again misrepresenting others views, and repeating mistaken arguments after there mistakes have been pointed out is not a rebuttal.
It actually fairly simple, when someone says God is just, the word just means something, part of what it means is that God does not command certain types of actions, i.e those that are paradigmatically unjust. I really don’t know why this needs spelling out to you.
5. You keep asking wether I think God would command something abhorrent and I have answered, no I don’t. Like I pointed out the claim that a perfectly just and loving person would knowingly command something abhorrent is a contradiction. It follows that any objection to grounding morality in God on the assumption that God could is based on a contradiction.
I am really flattered that you are so interested in Craig’s and my opinions on other issues, whether they are consistent with his claims on a DCT, and wether they mean he is a good person. But that is not the issue nor was it the issue in the debate the issue in the debate was wether a divine command theory is plausible given theism. If you want to have a debate on the moot, is Craig a nice person, or on the moot, is biblical infallibility compatible with Craig’s meta ethical views, you are welcome to write to Craig and ask him for the opportunity. But, the claim that if a DCT is true it follows God could command anything at all even the abhorrent is a different claim and its flatly and clearly false.
Hello again,
You say, “Actually if you read that comment in context, you’ll see I am not saying that its possible for a fully informed rational and loving person to endorse the action in question. I was saying your argument only follows if you assume this.”
I honestly wasn’t trying to take anything out of context. My argument is that if God is the standard, then he is the standard and he would not be limited by our views of what is loving or rational else he would not be the standard. This cannot be logically avoided. It follows that a being who is the standard for what is moral or immoral could endorse acts we might not consider loving or rational because that being would not be constrained by what we thought was loving or rational.
All of your objections implicitly try to limit what the standard can be or can command, meaning it would no longer be the standard.
You say, “My point stands, given the way Craig defines what he means by God, your claim that God could command something abhorrent is true only if its possible for a perfectly virtous being to knowingly command something abhorrent.”
My claim is that a being who is the standard for what is moral or immoral cannot be limited by what you or I think is virtuous or abhorrrent, else that being is not the standard. The contradictions here exist between Craigs claim and the attempts to support that claim.
You say, “So your claim that he could is contradictory. Sorry, but no matter how many sceptics cite an argument or how compelling they think it is if a premise of the argument is a contradiction its unsound. Move on and try a new one. Instead of flogging a dead horse”
So the idea is that God, the very supposed standard for what is moral or immoral, is to be limited, measured and evaluated according to our ideas of “virtuous”, “loving”, “just”, etc.. It would be impossible for him to violate our concepts of these things. If this is the idea, it’s obviously a contradictory one, but I suppose, to employ a more fitting addage, I can lead a horse to water, but I can’t make him drink. 😉
You say, “So I’ll ask you again, do you believe its possible for a perfectly virtous person to knowingly command an abhorrent act?”
Under my subjectivist view, no. Under the moral objectivist view, God decides what is virtuous, not you or I and therefore he could command anything at all and deem it “pefectly virtuous”. With him as the standard, by definition, there is nothing that could contradict him or declare his assessment as incorrect or wrong.
I recognize that if such a being existed, and if it were the true standard for what is moral or immoral, it would not be limited by me in any fashion, while moral objectivists don’t seem to grasp what their own idea entails – or don’t want to.
You say, “If the answer is yes, then you cannot denounce people who command those things as evil. ”
False. I am a moral subjectivist. I am not constrained by the precepts of moral objectivism. You and Craig could not denounce commands you considered evil because both of you embrace the idea that God is the standard, making your own assessments and thoughts entirely irrelevant. But I could easily do so as I would not consider God to be the standard, even if I thought such a being existed.
You say, “For the record I do think running a child through with the sword is wrong. I am open to the argument, made by many ethicists, that in rare circumstances where some greater good is at stake it might be justified or permissible, but in normal circumstances it’s wrong.”
The question in context was whether you would find it “abhorrent”. Since I will assume the above is agreement that you would, either the objection that God could not command something abhorrent fails, or you don’t believe God commanded it per the biblical text.
You say, “So now are you willing to answer the question above, or are you just interested in defaming people, rather than justifying the premises you offer.”
This is entirely disengenuous. I wasn’t attempting to “defame” anyone, I was showing the obvious contradiction between Craig’s claim and his (and your) defense of it. I believe I have been successful, though I suspect you won’t agree.
You say, “That simply shows you misrepresent Craig because Craig never said that God decides what is loving or truthful. ”
Then who does? Craig? You? Who would you or Craig be to declare to God that some act X isn’t loving and thus good, especially if he is the standard for what is good? By what authority would limit what God can or cannot command because of what you considered not loving or not truthful? Once again this attempted defense puts Craig (or you) in the driver’s seat, making him (or you) the arbiter of what God can or cannot assess as moral or immoral. Based on this it would be clear to me that neither of you really believe your claim.
You say, “It actually fairly simple, when someone says God is just, the word just means something, part of what it means is that God does not command certain types of actions, i.e those that are paradigmatically unjust. I really don’t know why this needs spelling out to you.
When someone says God is the very standard and definition of what is or isn’t moral that means something too. It means God cannot possibly be limited by what you or I think is just or unjust. As the supposed foundation for morality, this would be the case and at every turn, to defend the claim, you effectively try to limit what God can or cannot do by human measures. This is a clear contradiction. You can’t have it both ways – either God is the standard for morality or he isn’t.
You say, “You keep asking wether I think God would command something abhorrent and I have answered, no I don’t. ”
Since it’s seems clear that you do think the killing of children is abhorrent, then your position must be that God didn’t really give this command as depicted in the bible. Fair enough.
It remains the case though the either God is the standard for morality or he isn’t. If he is, he would not be limited in any way by what we think is just, loving, or abhorrent. If he could be so limited, he would not be the standard.
I appreciate the exchange we’ve had but I detect that any further posts from me on this issue may be unwelcome and so I’ll leave the last word to you.
[…] arguments theologians get into in their attempts to offer a divine foundation for human morality. He wrote: “Goodness is best understood in terms of an exemplar, that good is identified with the […]
Problems with philosophers and theologians…
Circular theological arguments Local Christian apologists have tried to outdo each other with their partisan reviews of the recent debates between their hero, WL Craig, and Lawrence Krauss and Sam Harris. Interesting that they feel the need to debate s…
[…] arguments theologians get into in their attempts to offer a divine foundation for human morality. He wrote: “Goodness is best understood in terms of an exemplar, that good is identified with the […]
I don’t have much background knowledge in philosophical theology, so it would be great if anyone can clarify Craig’s concept of God.
Craig claims that the abhorrent command in the old testament does not pose a challenge agains this argument, because a theist can deny the old testament stories and still believe in a God that is morally perfect. The God that Craig defends is “omniscient, omnipotent and morally perfect”. But where did Craig get this concept of God from”? Isn’t this the God described in theistic scriptures?
How can anyone derive a concept of God that is “omniscient, omnipotent and morally perfect” by natural theology alone w/o looking at the scripture?
If Craig’s concept of God is also derived from the Bible, then Harris’ objection regarding old testament violence would actually challenge Craig’s contention 1(a), correct? it would sound a little like cherry-picking if craig’s concept of God is derived from the Bible and yet deny the old testament.
[…] arguments theologians get into in their attempts to offer a divine foundation for human morality. He wrote: “Goodness is best understood in terms of an exemplar, that good is identified with the […]
Mark ,Good question
Craig’s concept of God, comes from Christian Theology particularly Anselm of Canterbury (11 century). This of course is the result of sustained reflection on the scriptures, but it also contains elements of Greek philosophical thought.
You ask if one can get this concept of God without the scriptures. Here I’d say two things.
First, my understanding is that both Jews and Muslims have the same basic concept. Yet Muslims do not accept the Jewish scriptures. Moreover, some 17th century Deists have a concept of God like this ( Jefferson might be an example) and yet deist’s did not accept the scriptures as fully authoritative.
Second, most atheist philosophers accept this definition, partly because central to the concept of God is of a supreme being, a maximally excellent being, or a being worthy of worship. The idea is that when you unpack the idea of a supernatural person who is worthy of worship, and greater than any other that can exist something like the concept of God Anselm refers to exist. One would not consider a malicious evil deity worthy of worship or greater and more excellent than one who was loving and just and perfectly good.
Moreover, I think the kinds of arguments Craig offers is an attempt to support the existence of such a being by natural theology. Take for example the different arguments for Gods existence together.. One could argue that if God exists, then he explains jointly, such things as the origin of the universe, the continual existence of the universe, the existence contingent beings, the existence of laws of nature, fine tuning, and the existence and nature of moral obligations better than any alternative. Moreover, the divine command theory itself could be seen as a kind of natural theology. One shows that the nature moral obligation can be plausibly accounted for by God of the sort Craig defines that it can be in terms of any other alternative
You ask “If Craig’s concept of God is also derived from the Bible, then Harris’ objection regarding old testament violence would actually challenge Craig’s contention 1(a), correct? it would sound a little like cherry-picking if craig’s concept of God is derived from the Bible and yet deny the old testament”
The answer here is no, for several reasons.
First, Craig’s something like contention 1 (a) actually was advanced by neo-platonists who were not Christian’s. Neo-platonists believed that every good and beautiful thing resembled the form of the good or perfect goodness which transcended the empirical world. Neo-Platonists began identifying the form of the good with God independently of Christians and Jews, who themselves picked the idea up.
Second, Craig’s contention is only if God exists then we have a plausible account of goodness and obligation. Hence, his argument is only that if one accepts that the teaching of Christian theology that God exists, his conditional follows. It does not require one accept any other theological teaching.
,
Nor is this cherry picking, consider an example, in the 4th century B C some Greek philosophers came up with the idea of atoms as fundamental constituents of material reality. They developed elaborate atomic theories which were discredited in subsequent generations. Latter, in the 17th century AD, people took this ancient idea of atoms and used it to explain and account for the nature of various phenomena. Now these scientists did not accept the atomic theories of the 4th centrury BC which were problematic in various ways, they took the idea of atoms from this tradition and developed it in a different way. Does this mean that atomic theory is unjustified cherry picking?. One can imagine a Sam Harris trying to discredit the idea that water is H20 by attacking the ideas of 4th century Greek philosophers who in addition to believing in atoms believed a whole lot of other stuff which many contemporary atomists don’t accept.
Finally, if one does take the line you suggest one can turn the cherry picking charge against Harris. Harris after all contends the OT God commands Genocide. I have disputed this elsewhere, http://www.mandm.org.nz/2011/01/god-and-the-genocide-of-the-canaanites-i-wolterstorff%E2%80%99s-argument-for-the-hagiographic-hyperbolic-interpretation.html
http://www.mandm.org.nz/2011/01/god-and-the-genocide-of-the-canaanites-part-ii-ancient-near-eastern-conquest-accounts.html http://www.mandm.org.nz/2011/01/god-and-the-genocide-of-the-canaanites-part-iii-two-implications-of-the-hagiographic-hyperbolic-account.html
However, suppose I am mistaken, the problem with the cherry picking charge is that it can apply equally well here. Because, the bible also also teaches that God is perfectly just, loving has perfect knowledge and so on. So if one is to not cherry pick, has to conclude that the text teaches that genocide is permissible in situations where a just and loving person aware of all the relevant facts endorses it and under these circumstances its hard to see how genocide could be evil. Harris claim that a loving and just being commands genocide and this is unjust, really has little merit to it, as its an obvious contradiction. Either he claims a loving and just being could not command this in which case his objection to a DCT collapses. Or he contends these acts are while normally unjust, they just in the specific circumstances, in which case the objection collapses. But you can’t claim that a being which actually fits Craig definition could command certain acts and also contend those acts are unjust and unloving. That’s a contradiction.
Matt, the Qur’an actually does accept Jewish scripture, in a way that fits Divine Command theory rather well.
“He has revealed to you the Book with the truth, confirming the scriptures that preceded it: for He has already revealed the Torah and the Gospel for the guidance of men, and the distinction between right and wrong.” (Surah 3:2)
Peter, so the Quran accepts that Jesus was divine and that Isaac not Ismael is the child of the promise.
@Peter D
Islam has a doctrine of abrogation, basically any time Mohamed changed his mind, later revelation that contradicts earlier revelation takes precedence. This can be confusing because the Koran is not assembled in chronological order. Anyway early in the history of Islam Mohamed was trying to curry favour with the jews of Medina but they wouldnt accept him as a prophet so he changed his mind and later killed or drove most of them out. Later Suras in the Koran speak of killing the Jew or the Christian where-ever and when ever you can.
Matt and Jeremy, the Qur’an (Surah 3:2) says that humans receive guidance from God through Jewish, Christian and Muslim scriptures, as well as the knowledge of right and wrong through general revelation.
Of course there are serious divergences from the Bible on other details and doctrines. But on general ethical theism (the theism of the Divine Command debate) Qur’an and Bible are not far apart.
This seems to be consistent with Matt’s exposition of DC theory, and perhaps offers a glimmer of hope for working together towards a more peaceful world.
@Peter D unfortunately Islam goes on to say that the Jews and Christian have corrupted their scriptures and these people and scriptures are not to be trusted, so infact only the Koran is to be respected.
There is no common ground between the Bible and the Koran.
Peter D, I agree with you that a DCT is not a “Christian” theory and can be affirmed rationally by deist’s, Jews, Christian’s, and Muslim’s. I also am sympathetic to the idea that the significant overlap between these religions in moral teachings and also the similarities in overall world actually provides an platform for dialogue about ethics and morality. So I don’t think we are disagreeing on these particular points.
Matt, your response is both interesting and informative. Please allow me to ask some follow up questions.
“First, my understanding is that both Jews and Muslims have the same basic concept. Yet Muslims do not accept the Jewish scriptures. Moreover, some 17th century Deists have a concept of God like this ( Jefferson might be an example) and yet deist’s did not accept the scriptures as fully authoritative.
Jews and Muslims share parts of the same scripture, especially parts of the OT. Islamic teachings were also heavily influenced by Jewish and Christian scripture and thought. Perhaps this is sufficient to explain why both religions have the same basic concept of God?”
Did the 17th century Deists believe in a God that is “omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect?” Deist believed in a God that created the world, but is not interested in human affairs at all. Does this notion of God imply attributes such as omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection? And particularly, I doubt if the Deist could posit God as the moral order, because that implies God cares about human affairs. Such a God doesn’t sound like the Deist God.
“Second, most atheist philosophers accept this definition, partly because central to the concept of God is of a supreme being, a maximally excellent being, or a being worthy of worship. The idea is that when you unpack the idea of a supernatural person who is worthy of worship, and greater than any other that can exist something like the concept of God Anselm refers to exist. One would not consider a malicious evil deity worthy of worship or greater and more excellent than one who was loving and just and perfectly good.”
The question is whether the origin of this concept of God is derived from religious traditions. Just because atheist philosophers accept this concept of God, it doesn’t mean they can arrive at this concept without any contact with religious traditions. It’s clear that theists came up with the concept in the first place.
I agree with you that Craig is not cherry picking given his specific contentions in this debate, as illustrated by your example of the atomist. But it still confuses me. Craig is a Christian apologist who believes in biblical inerrancy. It’s hard for me to see how Craig can just dismiss Harris’ objection by saying that theists don’t have to accept biblical inerrancy. Isn’t this disingenuous?
I can see your objection Mark.
All Craig can claim to be defending is that a DCT which has as its Divine element the god of the philosophers (omnipresent, omnipotent, omnibenevolent, omniscient) is coherant.
As you rightly point out – this is not a defense of a DCT with the Christian God, or the Jewish God, or of a God who intervenes in history etc etc.
This makes WLC argument very narrow and weak and this is why he is very nervous about Harris asking any questions which are slightly off topic – they reveal how narrow Craig’s argument is, and how although it is a nice bit of “philosophy” it does not translate at all into the world of “faith”.
Max I find it odd that people suggest Craig was “nervous” about Harris asking off topic questions. Take the off topic issues raised, the issue of hell and the unevangelised and the problem of evil. Given Craig has actually written extensively on these topics and in other debates where they were relevant addressed them, the evidence is against this.
While I don’t attribute this view to you, the claim that Harris addressed objections Craig was unable to provide an answer to and that is why Craig said it was off topic is really atheist la la land, anyone familiar with Craig and his work knows this is false.
Hi Mark, thanks for your comments.
First, regarding the 17 century deist’s, I think the US declaration of independence here is interesting. It was drafted by Jefferson, yet it talks of rights being grounded in God, talks of a supreme judge of the world, talks of the law of natures God, and so on. So it I spell some of this out here http://www.mandm.org.nz/2010/07/the-theology-of-the-declaration-of-independence.html. I think you’ll find similar ideas in other forms of 17 century deism.
Second, my point about atheist’s is their observation is based on the core idea that fundamental to the notion of a God is a supreme being worthy of worship. But as you acknowledge the origin of an idea or concept is not really this issue, the issue is wether the concept if it has application in reality would explain various things better than alternatives do, that was the point about atoms.
Finally you state “I agree with you that Craig is not cherry picking given his specific contentions in this debate, as illustrated by your example of the atomist. But it still confuses me. Craig is a Christian apologist who believes in biblical inerrancy. It’s hard for me to see how Craig can just dismiss Harris’ objection by saying that theists don’t have to accept biblical inerrancy. Isn’t this disingenuous? “
I disagree, because the debate was not about Craig’s beliefs, it was about wether the foundations of morality are natural or supernatural. The fact that a Christian holds certain beliefs does not entail that these beliefs are relevant to the topic under discussion. The point that’s important here is that even if one granted Craig’s views on inerrancy were mistaken ( and I am not saying they are) and even if one grants that the old testament is not an accurate representation of God. Nothing follows about the truth or falsity of divine command theory. The issue is not, is everything Craig believes on every topic true. The question is whether the position he advanced on this topic is true.
For example I noted Robert Adams and Philip Quinn two leading defenders of a divine command theory who don’t accept inerrancy. Suppose, Craig offers the same arguments and counter arguments they do in defence of a DCT. Why would these arguments be unsound when uttered by Craig but defensible when utter by Quinn or Adams? They are after all the same arguments.
Harris was making the debate about Craig’s beliefs on other issues not about the case for or against a DCT and for his views on naturalism and morality to be sound, he needs to address a DCT not Craig’s position on the conquest account.
I think Craig can answer the questiosn. But when he is answering these questins he is in a different “mode”. There his god is the God of the bible, revealed through Jesus. In this debate his God is the philosophers God… defined by a few simple axioms. I don’t think that the two gel well together in general – or well in Craigs mind.
Interesting observations Max, my reading of Craig is that he wants to distinguish belief in inerrancy from Christianity. He believes in inerrancy, but he does not think that the truth of Christianity stands or falls on the existence of errors in the bible.
Many athiests seem to have a fundamentalist mentality, they think that belief in God, stands or falls on wether every passage in the bible is literally true and there is no errors of any sort. So when someone brings up the topic of theism they think an attack on inerrancy is the way to respond.
Matt, I did not mention inerrancy. That is not really the issue. My point is that it is a very different image or concept of God that Craig uses at different times… seeming using whichever image works best for his present argument.
Matt – is the Triune nature of God a topic that Craig gets into a lot?
Max, he does have podcast stuff on the trinity, where he goes through doctrine and then another one where he does questions on the trinity (see reasonablefaith,org)
But also in his Muslim debates he (obviously) speaks about the trinity. In particular, he uses the argument that without a Trinity God cannot truly be both loving and transcendent/unchanging. If we say that someone has the characteristic of love, then we mean that in a relational sense because love is a relational term. Hence, how can God be said to be loving if he is unitarian, which is to say who was he loving before he created human beings? To make sense of the doctrine of God’s characteristics of love etc something like the Trinity is needed so that God is in an eternally existing relationship within the godhead.
But apart from that no, he does not really talk about the Trinity.
I am also not sure how comfortable I am with the way he goes about debates in this way and Q&A sessions in particular. He becomes absolutely fixated with winning points in the debate (don’t get me wrong, I agree with most of what he says and find his God existence arguments very persuasive), and to me I don’t know how God honouring it is to be like that.
When an audience member asks a question that they are struggling with or wondering about, usually he answers in a dismissive, condescending way which ends up just saying “that’s not the topic of tonight’s debate”. I’m sorry but what? If someone’s got a question, as ambassadors for Christ we should be always ready for a reason for every aspect of our faith. We shouldn’t dismiss them to make sure we get all the points we can, surely?
In this way I find John Lennox and Ravi Zacharias’ Q&A periods far better examples of how to witness in an evangelistic/apologetic way.
Michael, I see your point, the problem is and I know this from experience, there is also the danger one can get a discussion taken radically off topic if you simply respond to whatever is said no matter how irrelevant. I have done a few debates myself and this can really be a serious problem.
For example a person raises an objection to your position by citing a particular controversial issue. The issue is actually irrelevant, here is the problem. If you respond to the issue, and someone disagrees with that then you end up having a debate about a peripheral issue and that detracts from this issue being discussed. If you state its irrelevant people claim you did not address there concern.
I myself try and do a bit of both, but its not easy and I suspect Craig is a lot better at it than I am.
Exactly.. I mean if an opponent says something like “Well your argument is all very well Craig, but if you insist that Jesus is God then it does not work… yada yada” and Craig replies… “but my argument only assumes that God is all powerful, and all Good – I never said that Jesus was God” then this is well true… but dissatisfying and makes me think he does not have an integrated world view. He seems to compartmentalize different theories and use different sets of beliefs to suit the occasion as it were.
Max, you could look at John Hare’s interesting work. His defence of a divine command theory incorporates concerns about atonement, sanctification and providence.
Craig has written several articles on the trinity http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/PageServer?pagename=scholarly_articles_Christian_Doctrines
Thanks again for your response, Matt, I have one more question.
If Craig identifies goodness as the nature of God, then isn’t contention 1A becomes trivial? It’s pretty much asking if goodness (God) exists, then we have a plausible account of moral goodness and the nature of moral obligation.
Hi Mark, I think I pointed out in a previous comment that I am not entirely satisfied with Craig (who is appropriating Adam’s and Alston) account of goodness in 1A.
However, I am not sure that Craig’s position in 1A trivialises the contention. This is because I think that two things can be identical without the claim they are identical or the question of their nature being a trivial one.
Take the paradigmatic case of water is H20. This is a true identity statement. Yet the question, is water H20? is not trivial, nor is the claim “water is H20” a trivial tautology on par with “water is water”.
Another example, Clark Kent is superman. This is a true identity statement. Yet if Lois Lane asks “is Clark Kent superman?” she is not asking a trivial question. Nor is the claim “Clark Kent is superman” a trivial tautology on par with the claim “superman is superman”
So I think the kind of argument you refer to conflates questions of meaning or semantics with substantive metaphysical claims of identity. If one were to claim that the word “goodness” meant or was defined in terms of “Gods nature” one might have a trival claim. But the claim that what we refer to when we use the word “good” is something that’s nature can be best explained by identifying it with God is not a trivial claim.
[…] I noted in my review of the debate, one response Harris offered to 1 (b) was to argue that the existence of evil in the world suggests […]
[…] Harris offered three direct lines of argument against a DCT. (I say direct lines because many of Harris’ rebuttals did not address DCT at all; rather he engaged popular objections to Christian doctrines about exclusivism and hell.) The first […]