A while ago I did a series of semi-popular posts on moral relativism beginning with Cultural Confusion and Ethical Relativism I. These posts grew out of a talk I gave in Tauranga in 2008. Later I presented essentially the same talk at Laidlaw College for Thinking Matters Auckland which was posted on You Tube and is available for viewing here. This video drew a response from Dean of The Dunedin School (TDS) blog (a full copy is pasted below as it has disappeared offline then reappeared more than once). In this post I will address Deane’s critique of my discussion of some arguments for moral relativism. In the next I will respond to his criticism of my arguments against relativism.
Deane’s critique appears to consist of three lines of argument. The first is a string of assertions about my alleged motives combined with pejorative terms to describe my conclusions. Deane insinuates that I am a “frustrated atavistic reactionists who want to take away rights from women, homosexuals, and other minorities and restore power to the patriarchy” and smugly contends that my arguments are “a mish-mash of illogical nonsense and rhetorical scaremongering.”
Unfortunately one does not refute a person’s arguments by simply asserting that their arguments are illogical. Even if Deane’s assertions about my motives were correct, and he offers no evidence to suggest that that they are, this would show only that I have terrible motives in making the arguments in question, not that the arguments themselves were problematic. Hence, this first line of argument can be dismissed as mere rhetoric.
The second line of argument is only marginally more substantial. Deane suggests that I spent more than half my talk “presenting obviously unsound arguments for relativism and then (marvelously!) disproving them to [my] captive evangelical audience”. Deane describes this as a “sleight of hand” on my part. Now exactly what this objection amounts to is unclear. Deane clearly dislikes the idea that my audience were evangelicals (which not all were) but the fact that my audience may hold to a particular religion does not show the arguments I presented to this audience were mistaken; in fact, Deane in conceding that the arguments I criticised were “obviously unsound” seems to agree with my conclusions about the merits of these arguments. Given this, it is hard to know what the problem is. Of course Deane describes my criticisms in a sarcastic tone but simply describing something sarcastically does not constitute an argument against it nor does deeming it “sleight of hand” show that it is mistaken.
What I think Deane is driving at is something more substantial. Some of what he says suggests he is accusing me of attacking a straw-man; he seems to be suggesting that I chose some really bad arguments, which anyone familiar with the discussions on relativism will know are not actually made by proponents of relativism and I criticised these arguments. I got away with it only because my audience are evangelicals, and hence, unaware that a straw-man has been presented.
Now apart from the suggestion that all evangelicals are ignorant, gullible people with no background in ethics and the assumption that the audience was made up of evangelicals (I suspect that the atheists present probably would not describe themselves as “evangelical”) the obvious problem with this claim is that it is false. The arguments I put forward come from the literature on relativism (as anyone familiar with the discussions on relativism can attest to).
In the talk I cite two arguments, an argument from tolerance and an argument from diversity. These arguments are often cited in secular ethics text books. Alan Bloom in The Closing of the American Mind, for example, notes that the appeal to tolerance is one of the most common reasons proposed for relativism. The arguments I mentioned are also cited by Harry Gensler in his book Ethics: A Contemporary Introduction, Louis Pojman notes these arguments in Ethics Discovering Right and Wrong and James Rachels raises them in The Elements of Moral Philosophy. Hence, far from being a straw-man that only an ignoramus would cite in the context of relativism, these are arguments for relativism cited in leading mainstream ethics textbooks.
The third of Deane’s arguments is more substantive. He suggests that one point I make in my talk is circular. Now the first thing to note is that this claim is, to some extent, fairly irrelevant. In the section in question I noted two arguments commonly put forward in favor of relativism and offered several lines of criticism against them, one of them Deane claims is circular. Now even if Deane were correct, pointing out that one line of criticism is fallacious does nothing to address the overall case I made. If one of several arguments are mistaken it does not follow that the rest are.
That said, Deane’s attribution of circularity to me is mistaken. In my talk I noted that one argument for relativism implicitly appeals to the following premise:
[2] All people have a duty to not be intolerant
At one point I made the following comment about this premise, “And notice too that the second premise is making a what? An objective moral statement. It is saying that all people have a duty to be tolerant. But according to relativism there are no objective moral statements”
It is here Deane thinks I have argued in a circle. He states,
Now, indulging Matt for a while, let’s ask this question: if a moral relativist did happen to hold to this premise, what would be the nature of the ‘duty’? Too obvious, you say? Well yes, the answer would seem to be too obvious. The ’duty’ would clearly be relative for a moral relativist… Matt falsely attributes moral objectivism to a moral relativist, because he just cannot grasp the concept of moral relativism. However, in moral relativism, a duty, even if applicable to everybody in a particular society, would by definition be morally relative. A prevalent problem with moral objectivists such as Matt is that they haven’t ever grasped what a purely subjective morality looks like, how it operates. They keep trying to sneak back in assumptions of moral objectivity – the very thing that moral relativists deny. And so their attempt to raise an argument against it – by assuming the objectivity of morality – is revealed as a piece of illogical and circular nonsense.
Several things can be said about this. First, even if I did (as Deane contends) assume the objectivity of morality in my criticism here, this would not make my argument circular. A circular argument is one where the conclusion is assumed in the premises. To be circular then I would have to be making an argument for the conclusion that moral relativism is correct. But I was not. At this point in the talk I was criticising one argument for moral relativism. But criticising one argument for moral relativism is not the same thing as offering an argument for objectivism. Hence, even if one grants Deane’s substantive point, my argument is not circular.
Second, and more importantly, Deane is wrong to claim that I was, at this point, assuming the objectivity of morality and sneaking this assumption into my interpretation of [2]. If Deane had bothered to listen to the passage he cited in its context he would see that I immediately went on to argue that [2] should be interpreted as affirming an objective principle. What I said was:
if relativism were true [2] would actually be wrong. You would only have a duty to be tolerant if you yourself believed in tolerance. If you were a bigot you’d be perfectly entitled to be intolerant. And if your society was a bigoted society it would be perfectly appropriate for you to be intolerant. So the person who makes this claim actually shows that they believe in objective morality, they believe there is an objective value of tolerance.
Hence it is simply not the case that I assumed moral objectivism and sneaked this assumption into my reading of [2]. What I did was offer an argument that [2] had to be interpreted this way because unless one interpreted [2] in an objectivist manner, [2] would be false.
Now if Deane thinks that [2] can be interpreted in a relativist manner then the burden is on him to show that my argument is mistaken. To ignore the argument and simply state that I assumed the position I argued for and then assert that the position is wrong establishes nothing at all (well, it establishes nothing about my argument).
Ironically, if we accept Deane’s contention that [2] should be interpreted as asserting a relative duty and not an objective duty then, in fact, it is the relativist that is engaging in circular reasoning. Remember, at this point in the talk I was criticising an argument for relativism, [2] was a premise of this particular argument for relativism. If [2], therefore, expresses or presupposes that moral claims are to be interpreted in a relativist fashion then the relativist is presupposing the truth of relativism in the premises of one argument for relativism, and this clearly would be circular.
For the relativist to offer a non-question begging argument for his position he must appeal to premises that non-relativists are likely to accept and hence the premises of his argument cannot be interpreted in a relativist fashion.
There is a final point to make here, Deane makes heavy weather out of the contention that I cannot conceive of what a relativist morality would look like. He states,
Matt’s criticism reveals that he has failed to appreciate what a thoroughgoing moral relativism would look like. He just doesn’t get it. He cannot conceive of moral duties that are not objective. I suspect that this is an all-too-frequent barrier for moral objectivists. Their commitment to moral objectivism is such that they fail to properly conceive of a world in which every moral duty is simply the result of cultural norms.
It is evident that an unjustified leap is being made here. Suppose, contrary to fact, I did err in one criticism I made of one argument for relativism. It hardly follows from this that I cannot conceive of what a thorough-going relativism would look like. All it would show is that on one point I made a mistake. But more importantly, even if it did establish what Deane claims, that I failed to appreciate what a thoroughgoing moral relativism would look like, it is not clear how this would constitute a criticism of my position. After all there are many things which I cannot conceive of that are perfectly rational for me to reject. I cannot conceive of what a square triangle would look like, it does not follow from this that I cannot defensibly claim that anyone who affirms that square triangles exist is mistaken and is uttering a nonsense. So once again Deane’s criticism amounts to nothing at all.
Of course Deane makes his points in a rhetorical, sarcastic, snarky manner and I am sure that for those who dislike evangelical Christianity, such writing is highly entertaining. Entertaining rhetoric, however, is never a substitute for substantive content; notwithstanding the entertaining rhetoric in this instance, the arguments Deane offers fail.
RELATED POSTS:
A Response to The Dunedin School’s “Thinking in Tatters: Moral Relativism and So-Called ‘Counter-Examples’”
Video of Matthew Flannagan Speaking on Moral Relativism
Cultural Confusion and Ethical Relativism I
Cultural Confusion and Ethical Relativism II
Cultural Confusion and Ethical Relativism III
The original blog post, “Thinking in Tatters: Moral Relativism and Hidden Objectivist Assumptions”, by Deane Galbraith of The Dunedin School is below Thinking in Tatters: Moral Relativism and Hidden Objectivist Assumptions
by Deane Galbraith
10 November 2009
Matt Flannagan, who blogs with his wife Madeleine at MandM, contributes to a New Zealand-based conservative think-tank called Thinking Matters. These ‘conservative think-tanks’ crop up from place to place and the term is usually a euphemism for frustrated and atavistic reactionists who want to take away rights from women, homosexuals, and other minorities and restore power to the patriarchy. Some of the members of Thinking Matters don’t appear to be noticeably different in this regard.
In a talk available on YouTube, Matt Flannagan attempts to argue against that phantom nemesis of all conservative think-tanks, what they term ’moral relativism’. (Everybody together now: ‘Oooooh, yucky!’) His arguments are a mish-mash of illogical nonsense and rhetorical scaremongering. There is much to take issue with in his presentation, so there is no need to dwell on his sleight of hand in presenting obviously unsound arguments for relativism and then (marvelously!) disproving them to his captive evangelical audience – which he does for more than half of his talk.
One thing which is worth thinking about is that, at one point in his talk (Part 4; 5:00ff), Matt’s criticism reveals that he has failed to appreciate what a thoroughgoing moral relativism would look like. He just doesn’t get it. He cannot conceive of moral duties that are not objective. I suspect that this is an all-too-frequent barrier for moral objectivists. Their commitment to moral objectivism is such that they fail to properly conceive of a world in which every moral duty is simply the result of cultural norms. They can’t do it. And as a result, their protests already – circularly – assume moral objectivism.
Matt makes his circular argument when he adduces the following as a premise which he claims is held by some moral relativists:
Now, indulging Matt for a while, let’s ask this question: if a moral relativist did happen to hold to this premise, what would be the nature of the ‘duty’? Too obvious, you say? Well yes, the answer would seem to be too obvious. The ’duty’ would clearly be relative for a moral relativist.
But Matt doesn’t get it:
“And notice too that the second premise is making a what? An objective moral statement. It’s saying that all people have a duty to be tolerant. But according to relativism there are no objective moral statements.”
Matt falsely attributes moral objectivism to a moral relativist, because he just cannot grasp the concept of moral relativism. However, in moral relativism, a duty, even if applicable to everybody in a particular society, would by definition be morally relative. A prevalent problem with moral objectivists such as Matt is that they haven’t ever grasped what a purely subjective morality looks like, how it operates. They keep trying to sneak back in assumptions of moral objectivity – the very thing that moral relativists deny. And so their attempt to raise an argument against it – by assuming the objectivity of morality – is revealed as a piece of illogical and circular nonsense.
Tags: Bad Reasoning · Deane Galbraith · Relativism · The Dunedin School7 Comments
A common objection to belief in the God of the Bible is that a good, kind, and loving deity would never command the wholesale slaughter of nations. In the tradition of his popular Is God a Moral Monster?, Paul Copan teams up with Matthew Flannagan to tackle some of the most confusing and uncomfortable passages of Scripture. Together they help the Christian and nonbeliever alike understand the biblical, theological, philosophical, and ethical implications of Old Testament warfare passages.
Well let’s see, they removed our responses and then later removed the blog entry altogether. It’s always possible that Deane has had a change of heart.
This is always going to be a bugbear for relativists who advocate tolerance though. The thing to ask them will always be: “So, are you saying that YOU are tolerant, or that I should be tolerant?” If he really holds that principle in a relativist fashion as Deane suggests, then she has nothing to say to me about whether or not I should be tolerant, unless she wants to get inside my head so to speak and convince me that I really do already feel that way, if only I reaslised it
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Deleted blog post recovered and re-posted? Priceless!
Isn’t the argument from tolerance no more than consequentialism? ie since tolerance is thought to be a good thing, and results from cultural relativism, we ought to favour relativism (or at least promote it to the masses) for its supposed good effects. In which case its truth becomes irrelevant.
I’m not certain exactly why cultural relativism should lead to greater tolerance though. If everyone else’s “truth” is considered equal to yours, presumably you still have a strong interest in your own truth prevailing if it conflicts with somebody else’s. And since there is nothing special about one person’s truth vs another, there is no longer any reason not to get in boots and all and ensure that yours comes out on top. If anything cultural relativism seems to imply less respect for what other people consider “true”, not more, since truth is no longer a master but a servant.
That’s a point worth making Peter. If a person really is a hardcore relativist, then others can’t actually teach us anything.
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Thank you for your reply, Matt.
However, there is nothing in your reply which alters my conclusion that you had simply assumed that when a relativist spoke of a “duty” that she must be meaning it in an objective sense. In fact, your reply only further demonstrates your hidden assumptions of moral objectivity, and your tendency to smuggle in objectivist assumptions into a discussion of the claims of moral relativism.
This was demonstrated in your original discussion of the relativist’s premise, “All people have a duty to not be intolerant.” It is telling that you went straight from describing what a relativist allegedly believes, to commenting, “And notice too that the second premise is making a what? An objective moral statement.” It is evident that in expressing such an opinion in this way, that you considered the relativist’s claim to be objective – before any argument was raised to support such a conclusion. For you only considered it necessary to introduce an argument for its alleged objectivity later. But at this earlier stage, you felt you could simply proclaim, as an off-hand remark, that a premise of an alleged relativist was objective! This shows that you were proceeding under the assumption that the relativist’s use of moral terminology really does has an objective sense. For you thought that all you needed to do was to introduce the moral relativist’s own words and say: ‘Look – this must be objective! Case closed!!’ The lens of your moral objective worldview prevented you from properly entertaining what the premise might mean within a consistent moral relativist worldview.
In your reply here, you further demonstrate your blindness to the (quite obvious) possibility that a moral relativist would use a moral term (such as “duty”) in a relative sense. This is very strange, but I will explore your argument so as to expose your hidden objectivist assumptions. Although you purport to represent the claims of a moral relativist, you are saying that the claims themselves are in fact objective. Now, there was a logical way to make such a claim. For it is one thing to raise an argument that the moral relativist has no grounds to support those claims. But it is another thing altogether to argue that the moral relativist must be making an objective claim – not an argument, mind you, but a claim!!
To make this clear, we are only dealing with a claim, that is, a premise to which the relativist holds. But your demand for the relativist to provide “a non-question begging argument for his position” shows that you mistake the function of a claim/premise. Such a demand fundamentally misunderstands the structure of a logical argument. You almost see this. For you rightly note that the relativist’s argument must “appeal to premises that non-relativists are likely to accept”. If you realized the meaning of your own words, you would realize, too, that “duty” cannot be confined to an “objective” sense, as you too hastily presumed. Rather, the claim of the moral relativist concerning a “duty” must be acceptable within the worldviews of both moral relativism and moral objectivism. That is, the “duty” at this stage can either be relative or objective. As you say, in a valid argument, “the premises of his argument cannot be interpreted [only] in a relativist fashion” (instead, this relativism must be a possibility, together with objectivism, in the premise). But if you are presenting a relativist’s claim concerning a “duty”, then to really be a relativist’s claim, that duty must be able to be interpreted as relative. It is no good to then come along, having set up your alleged relativist’s argument, that he himself cannot possibly have intended “duty” in a relativist sense. For you then break the logical rule that you yourself identified, that the relativist’s argument must “appeal to premises that non-relativists are likely to accept”. Sure, if you can provide an argument why moral “duty” must always be objective, you are free to do so. But when you are purporting to present the claim of a relativist (and whether you consider it to be a true or a false claim), that claim must of necessity be open to be interpreted as relative. When you fail to recognize this necessity, as you have done, you don’t even represent the claim of any relativists. Your alleged “relativist” must then hold to objective morals – which means she is not really a relativist at all. And, as I noted in my orginal post, and repeated above, this evidences your failure to appreciate the moral relativist’s claims (you smuggle in objective definitions, and make them necessary, as do other objectivists). Now, I reiterate that it is quite another matter as to whether the moral relativist’s aguent is valid. (I would never use the “argument from tolerance” you purport is used by moral relativists, so I won’t discuss the argument itself.) It is also quite another matter if you can raise an argument against the relativist’s claim of moral relativism. I haven’t seen you raise any valid argument against moral relativism, and I very much doubt you can. But even if you hypothetically could raise such an argument – what you cannot do is interpret the claim of a moral relativist as a necessarily objective claim. That is simply calling black “white”.
So again you have confirmed what I termed the “hidden objectivist assumptions” inherent in your unsound arguments against moral relativism. I think I appreciate your inability to do this, as someone who as a young child believed in moral objectivism. Once entertainted, the fantasy of moral objectivity is difficult to throw off. But there comes a time to give way childish things. I am yet to see evidence, in any of your alleged representations of moral relativism, that you can entertain moral relativism on its own terms, without smuggling in the assumptions of moral objectivity. You may dispense with these blinders in the future, I don’t know. But if you do open your eyes and assess the true position of moral relativism on its own terms, and as it is vigorously defended rather than popularly defended, you might find that the positive arguments you later raised against moral relativity in your talk (which I have not yet discussed) have become groundless.
Be good.
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Deane wrote: “It is telling that you went straight from describing what a relativist allegedly believes, to commenting, “And notice too that the second premise is making a what? An objective moral statement.” It is evident that in expressing such an opinion in this way, that you considered the relativist’s claim to be objective – before any argument was raised to support such a conclusion. For you only considered it necessary to introduce an argument for its alleged objectivity later. But at this earlier stage, you felt you could simply proclaim, as an off-hand remark, that a premise of an alleged relativist was objective! This shows that you were proceeding under the assumption that the relativist’s use of moral terminology really does has an objective sense. For you thought that all you needed to do was to introduce the moral relativist’s own words and say: ‘Look – this must be objective! Case closed!!’ The lens of your moral objective worldview prevented you from properly entertaining what the premise might mean within a consistent moral relativist worldview.”
Here you seem to suggest that if a person expresses a conclusion and then proceeds to argue for it that person has assumed it from the outset. This is clearly false. In any event you yourself did precisely what you accuse me of, in your first line you wrote: “…there is nothing in your reply which alters my conclusion that you had simply assumed that when a relativist spoke of a “duty” that she must be meaning it in an objective sense…” You began your comment by stating your conclusion and then you went on to offer arguments for it. Can I take it then that I can simply dismiss your comments as an assumption and ignore the arguments for them?
“In your reply here, you further demonstrate your blindness to the (quite obvious) possibility that a moral relativist would use a moral term (such as “duty”) in a relative sense.”
No, as argued in the talk and in the post above, it cannot be used in this sense. To have a premise for ethical relativism, that assumed ethical relativism, would be circular.
“To make this clear, we are only dealing with a claim, that is, a premise to which the relativist holds. But your demand for the relativist to provide “a non-question begging argument for his”
No, all I said is that the premise cannot assume the conclusion or the argument is rendered circular. In other words, in an argument for relativism, the relativist cannot appeal to moral duties that are taken as relative to prove that moral duties are relative. This is really quite basic.
“But your demand for the relativist to provide “a non-question begging argument for his position” shows that you mistake the function of a claim/premise. Such a demand fundamentally misunderstands the structure of a logical argument. You almost see this. For you rightly note that the relativist’s argument must “appeal to premises that non-relativists are likely to accept”. If you realized the meaning of your own words, you would realize, too, that “duty” cannot be confined to an “objective” sense, as you too hastily presumed. Rather, the claim of the moral relativist concerning a “duty” must be acceptable within the worldviews of both moral relativism and moral objectivism. That is, the “duty” at this stage can either be relative or objective. As you say, in a valid argument, “the premises of his argument cannot be interpreted [only] in a relativist fashion” (instead, this relativism must be a possibility, together with objectivism, in the premise).”
Sorry but it is you who does not understand the structure of a logical argument. To avoid being circular an argument for relativism needs only to avoid assuming relativism. He or she does not have to avoid assuming objectivism. In fact, if a relativist were to assume objectivism for the sake of argument and then show from objectivist premises that relativism was true that would be a valid argument, and a dialectically effective one. If she or he assumes relativist premises and argues from them to a relativist position her or his argument is not valid.
“But if you are presenting a relativist’s claim concerning a “duty”, then to really be a relativist’s claim, that duty must be able to be interpreted as relative. It is no good to then come along, having set up your alleged relativist’s argument, that he himself cannot possibly have intended “duty” in a relativist sense. For you then break the logical rule that you yourself identified, that the relativist’s argument must “appeal to premises that non-relativists are likely to accept”
Again you seem to misunderstand the situation here. If I was arguing for objectivism, it would indeed be circular to assume objectivism in my premises and hence I would have to appeal to premises a relativist would accept. I was not, however, doing this. I was showing why an argument proposed by relativists to persuade non-relativists to adopt their position is flawed. In that context there is no requirement to appeal only to premises a relativist accepts, all I need to show is that the relativist has failed to provide a valid argument from premises that her or his non-relativist audience is required to accept.
“Sure, if you can provide an argument why moral “duty” must always be objective, you are free to do so. But when you are purporting to present the claim of a relativist (and whether you consider it to be a true or a false claim), that claim must of necessity be open to be interpreted as relative. When you fail to recognize this necessity, as you have done, you don’t even represent the claim of any relativists.”
But I was not presenting the claim of a relativist. I was presenting an argument relativists give for why others are should adopt relativism. One requirement of an informally valid argument is that it not be circular, the relativist can believe whatever she or he wants but if his or her argument is to be valid she or he cannot assume these beliefs in his or her premises.
“Your alleged “relativist” must then hold to objective morals – which means she is not really a relativist at all.”
Actually this does not follow at all. It is quite possible (and I think likely) that a person can profess to be a relativist and also hold other moral opinions inconsistent with this and not realise it. This phenomenon occurs all the time.
“But even if you hypothetically could raise such an argument – what you cannot do is interpret the claim of a moral relativist as a necessarily objective claim. That is simply calling black “white”.”
Well I think this is mistaken for the reason stated above. First it could well be that a person is a relativist but also holds beliefs about tolerance that contradict her or his relativism. Pointing this out is not calling white black anymore than pointing out that a certain religious believer holds or accepts certain beliefs incompatible with his or her faith.
“So again you have confirmed what I termed the “hidden objectivist assumptions” inherent in your unsound arguments against moral relativism.”
Well, as noted, I argued that the premises need to be interpreted this way so there is no assumption here. Second, as noted, I was not, in the segment above, offering an argument against moral relativism, I was criticising two arguments for relativism. This is not the same thing. Third, in the context where a relativist is offering arguments to other people as to why they should be relativists, one has to assume that the premises do not presuppose relativism otherwise they are circular. Of course I could assume the relativist meant the premise to be interpreted in a relativist fashion, as you say I should, but then the argument is circular and easily refuted.
“But if you do open your eyes and assess the true position of moral relativism on its own terms, and as it is vigorously defended rather than popularly defended”
Well as I noted in my post, I got the arguments and definitions from ethics textbooks and not from popular presentations. I provided citations for there. So again, simply ignoring the argument I offered and asserting that I am “assuming” things is not a valid response.
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