MandM header image 4

Published: Theological Utilitarianism, Supervenience, and Intrinsic Value

April 14th, 2023 by Matt
Respond

My paper, “Theological Utilitarianism, Supervenience, and Intrinsic Value” has been published in a special issue of Religions, devoted to the topic God and Ethics. The abstract is as follows:

Erik Wielenberg has argued that robust realism can account for the “common-sense moral belief” that “some things distinct from God are intrinsically good”. By contrast, theological stateism cannot account for this belief. Hence, robust realism has a theoretical advantage over all forms of theological stateism. This article criticizes Wielenberg’s argument. Wielenberg distinguishes between R and D-supervenience. The coherence of Wielenberg’s robust realism depends upon this distinction. I argue that this distinction undermines his critique of theological stateism. I will make three points. First, once you utilize the distinction between R and D-supervenience, his argument for the incompatibility of theological stateism and intrinsic value fails. Second, theological stateism is compatible with intrinsic value. The historical example of theological utilitarianism, expounded by thinkers George Berkeley and William Paley, shows someone can accept that moral properties simultaneously R supervene upon God’s will and D supervene upon the natural properties of actions. Third, robust realism and theological stateism are in the same boat regarding intrinsic value once we distinguish between R and D-supervenience.

Tags:   · · · · · · · Comments Off on Published: Theological Utilitarianism, Supervenience, and Intrinsic Value

When bigots call out “bigots”

April 13th, 2023 by Matt
Respond

Albert Giubilini and I would not agree on a lot. Giubilini has defended not only abortion rights but what he calls “after-birth abortion”( which of course is a reference to infanticide). He also opposes religious conscientious objection in medicine. I disagree with him on both topics and disagree strongly. I find his conclusions repugnant. 

However,  it is the nature of moral philosophy that people will debate controversial moral opinions, opinions both sides feel strongly about. When the issue is a serious one, such as the ethics of war, abortion, or capital punishment, where you are literally discussing who can and cannot be killed people will find the views of their opponents repugnant and sincerely believe their views are harmful. This does not mean I attempt to harangue and shut down any lectures he does, or lobby for journals to not publish his work. It means I do the best I can to critique his views, as well as defend and sketch an alternative ethic which better accounts for our considered moral judgements. 

Studying moral philosophy has also taught me that often people you disagree with on one topic will say insightful and interesting things on another. In fact, they often say insightful things on the topic you disagree with them on. Those you disagree with are almost never always wrong and those in your camp are almost never always right. You can learn a lot reading people whose worldviews are very different to your own. 

To this end. I recently found an interesting piece Gulibani wrote on the. Practical Ethics blog at Oxford  University

One thing that stands out from the article is this, which reflects ideas I have myself expressed on occasion. 

The problem I am talking about is that on university campuses there is today a tendency towards bigotry. Being offended by certain topics to the point of wanting to shut down discussions can, in certain circumstances, turn political correctness into a kind of bigotry. Following the dictionary, we can define bigotry as “intolerance towards those who hold different opinions from oneself.” In this dictionary sense, bigotry does not describe the content of one’s moral beliefs, but rather the extent to which someone is prepared to expose her ideas to counter-arguments and evidence. Also, a more philosophical definition of “bigotry” – such as the one provided by John Corvino – does not tie bigotry to any particular political or moral view, whether “conservative” or “liberal.” According to Corvino, bigotry is “stubborn and unjustified contempt toward groups of people, typically in the context of a larger system of subordination.

Giubilini points out that bigotry, or “being a bigot” is not determined by the fact a person holds a particular opinion on race, gender, abortion, religion, political policy or economics to you. According to both the normal dictionary meanings of the word[1], and also more detailed philosophical analyses such as that of John Corvino. Bigotry is a function of *how* the opinion is held, and how one responds to those who disagree with that opinion.

Two aspects of what constitutes bigotry are noteworthy. Bigotry involves not just strongly held opinions, but *stubbornly* held opinions. If one holds an opinion strongly but is prepared to listen to counterarguments and revise your opinion in the face of new information and argument rather than just stubbornly affirm it no matter what, then you are not a bigot. You might be mistaken, but you aren’t a bigot. 

Similarly, bigotry involves intolerance towards those who hold rival ideas. Intolerance is not “disagreement”. If I said to you, “I tolerate my wife’s cooking” you would assume my wife was a bad cook and her cooking was something I had to endure dispute not liking it. You are not tolerant if you agree with certain views. Tolerance is determined by how one responds to views one disagrees with or finds distasteful, mistaken and so on.  

 So if you try and ban and shut down, or express hatred towards people who disagree with you, demeaning them banning them, trying to have them removed from the country, intimidating them insulting and shaming them and so forth then you are intolerant. It doesn’t matter what those views are and what views you hold. If you do those things you are not tolerating those who disagree with you. 

To his credit, Gulibani realizes this: 

“The aforementioned reactions of some pro-life (and, to a smaller extent, of some pro-choice) people to the after-birth abortion paper are a clear example of bigotry. But it would be a mistake to think that in academia bigotry is a prerogative of the pro-life or conservative camp. Actually, as the feminists’ disruption of the OSFL’s event demonstrates, pro-lifers and conservatives in academia are often victims of bigotry on the part of (some) feminists, pro-choice supporters, and liberals more generally. This is because bigotry is a function of the (un)ease with which someone is offended by other people’s opinions or even by scientific hypotheses, and there is no reason to think that feminists, so-called liberals or pro-choice advocates are less susceptible to being easily offended than conservatives. One can hold the most progressive or liberal ethical and political views and still be a bigot in the sense of I have defined. As Teresa Bejan recently wrote in an article in The Atlantic, today, “[w]hile conservative students defend the importance of inviting controversial speakers to campus and giving offense, many self-identified liberals are engaged in increasingly disruptive, even violent, efforts to shut them down.” As a self-identified liberal, I have to say that, sadly, this claim finds confirmation in my experience.” 

The irony is that today, many people who confidently pride themselves on “calling out bigotry” are actually bigots. 

If you turn up to angry protests demanding that people who express certain views be silenced, shut down. You are doing two things, first, you are showing, that will not consider rival views, listen to them or consider them, instead, you will just angrily shut those views down, refuse to listen and make sure no one else can. You will not examine any counterarguments, in fact you are demanding such arguments not be made. If you do this have not just strong views, but stubborn views, views immune to counter-evidence. Second, you are also exercising intolerance towards those with whom you disagree. So, you are a bigot. 

Saying “ I am calling out bigotry” doesn’t make you, not a bigot just as the claim by the characters in Orwell’s 1984 claiming they worked for the Ministry of Truth, didn’t change the fact they were publishing lies. Stating a claim over and over doesn’t make it true. Nor does chanting slogans about how much you hate bigotry make you, not a bigot. Words have meanings and we know what a bigot is. If you hold your opinion stubbornly and use it to act intolerantly against others you meet the core criteria of a bigot.

So, when I am confronted with a young first-year university student, straight out of high school, who tells me some view I hold “makes me a bigot” and concludes am to be shunned or insulted, or silenced, because of this. My reaction is to roll my eyes. 

I have spent years studying questions in moral philosophy and in theology, reading and exposing myself to people on all sides of the issue. I have engaged in public debates and panel discussions with people I disagree. I read the works of the best opponents of the views I hold and I have published responses to some of them in the literature. On some occasions, I have discussed and debated issues with them. I have learnt a lot from this, on several occasions my views have shifted, or I have revised what I thought. It is, of course, possible that I am holding my views stubbornly and if you have some reasons or arguments, you want me to consider I am happy to listen. 

However, if you are just going to assert without argument, I am a bigot, refuse to listen and then demand I be shunned, hated, fired, muzzled etc. etc. I am afraid that your claim to be calling out bigotry is self-deceived bull shit. It is true I might be a bigot. However, your behaviour makes it abundantly clear that you are.  

Your claim to be calling out bigotry is on par with someone standing in a room shouting, in English, “I don’t speak a word of English”. That’s funny, it is something one might see an epic Monty Python skit on. But don’t expect me to take your conclusions remotely seriously. When you grow up and can have a rational discussion rather than throw a tantrum let me know. In the meantime, stop the bullshit you’re a bigot. If you want to call out bigotry, try the mirror.

 

[1] Some examples:

 Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary defines a bigot as: someone who is ‘obstinately or intolerantly devoted to his own opinions and prejudices’,

The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language says a bigot is:‘one who is strongly partial to one’s own group, religion, race, or politics and is intolerant of those who differ’.

Miriam Webster defines a bigot as “a person who is obstinately or intolerantly devoted to his or her own opinions and prejudices especially : one who regards or treats the members of a group (such as a racial or ethnic group) with hatred and intolerance

The Oxford Dictionary of English defines bigotry as: ‘obstinate and unenlightened attachment to a particular creed, opinion system or party’.

Oxford Languages defines a bigot as “a person who is obstinately or unreasonably attached to a belief, opinion, or faction, especially one who is prejudiced against or antagonistic towards a person or people on the basis of their membership of a particular group.

Tags:   · Comments Off on When bigots call out “bigots”

“Is Jesus the only Way?” talk at Newhope Community Church

November 8th, 2022 by Matt
Respond

Recently, I gave a talk at New Hope Community Church in East Auckland. This talk was on the topic “Is Jesus the only way?  I attach it here. 

Tags:   · · Comments Off on “Is Jesus the only Way?” talk at Newhope Community Church

Is Theism Incompatible with the Pauline Principle? Comments on James Sterba’s Argument from Evil

November 3rd, 2022 by Matt
Respond

My paper, “Is Theism Incompatible with the Pauline Principle?” has been published in a special issue of Religions, devoted to the topic Do We Now Have A Logical Argument From Evil? The abstract is as follows:

 

This paper criticises James Sterba’s use of the Pauline principle to formulate a logical version of the problem of evil. Sterba’s argument contains a crucial premise: If human agents are always prohibited from doing some action, God is also prohibited from doing that action. This implies that the Pauline principle applies to both Divine and human agents. I argue that any Theist who affirms a divine command theory of ethics can consistently and coherently deny this premise and its implication. If a divine command theory is coherent, a theist can affirm that the Pauline principle governs human agents’ actions but not God’s actions. I will also criticise Sterba’s criticisms of a divine command theory and argue that they fail.

 

Enjoy.

Tags:   · · · · · · · · · Comments Off on Is Theism Incompatible with the Pauline Principle? Comments on James Sterba’s Argument from Evil

Thinking Matters Talk: Does Morality Need God? Part Three:

September 8th, 2022 by Matt
Respond


This year the New Zealand apologetics organization Thinking Matters ran a “Confident Christianity Conference” in Auckland. I was asked to speak at this conference on the topic. Does Morality Need God? Below is a slightly streamlined version of the talk I gave.

This brings me to my second contention: If God exists, a divine command theory would provide a coherent account of our fundamental assumptions about moral requirements.

I outlined four assumptions about the kind of requirements morality imposes upon us. These were

  1. Inescapability: moral requirements apply to us irrespective of whether following them contributes to any ends or aims we currently desire.
  2. Impartiality: moral requirements are justified from an impartial perspective.
  3. Authority: agents always have conclusive reasons to do what is morally required and never have sufficiently good reasons for doing what is morally wrong.
  4. Accountability: if something is morally required, we are guilty and liable to blame if we fail to do it and lack an adequate excuse.  

I will make three points.

First, If God exists, the assumption that wrongness is identical to the property of being contrary to God’s command would coherently account for all these assumptions. Consider the fact that moral requirements are “inescapable.” If God commands someone to do something, this command is addressed to them, regardless of whether it contributes to any ends or aims they currently desire. So, the imperative in question is inescapable.  Similarly, consider the impartiality of moral requirements. God is an all-powerful, all-knowing, essentially benevolent, and impartial agent. So what God commands is co-extensive with prescriptions that a benevolent, impartial person who was fully informed and reasoning correctly would endorse.  A command is also a paradigmatic example of a prescription that involves a demand for which we hold people accountable through standard practices such as blaming. That is how a command differs from other prescriptions, such as a piece of advice or a suggestion. So, if the property of being morally required is identical to the property of being commanded by God,  we would expect it to be true that we are accountable to moral requirements.

Second, if God exists, the thesis that wrongness is identical to the property of being contrary to God’s command would vindicate the assumption that it is always in our long-term self-interest to follow impartial demands. A divine command theory entails that moral requirements are what we are accountable to God for doing. Unlike human beings, God’s commands are co-extensive with what is demanded from an impartial point of view, and people can never violate these norms secretly without being detected.  

Third,  all attempts to refute a divine command theory have failed. It’s widely claimed that divine command theories were refuted by an argument called “The Euthyphro Objection.” This objection is named after a dialogue written by the ancient Greek philosopher Plato in the 4th century BC. Plato’s original argument is somewhat obscure and applied only to polytheistic religions (those religions that believe in many gods). However, the version used by philosophers today is an adaptation of Plato’s argument for use against monotheistic faiths. Critics of divine command theories appeal to three arguments loosely associated with Plato’s dialogue. These are (1) the anything goes objection, (2) the arbitrariness objection, and (3) the vacuity objection. I will address each of these briefly in turn.

The Anything Goes Objection

One objection is that a divine command theory makes morality arbitrary because anything at all could be right or wrong. King and Garcia explain the alleged problem in this way:

[Divine command theory] implies that it is possible for any kind of action, such as rape, not to be wrong. But it seems intuitively impossible for rape not to be wrong. So [Divine command theory] is at odds with our common-sense intuitions about rape.[1]

This objection assumes it is possible for God to command rape. Divine command theorists contest this assumption. They do not contend that moral requirements depend on the commands of just anyone. They base moral obligations on the commands of God conceived in a particular way. God is an all-powerful, all-knowing, essentially loving, just, immaterial person who created the universe on their conception. Given this, the claim that God could command people to perform a horrendous act like rape holds only if it’s possible for an all-knowing, loving, and impartial person to command rape. This is unlikely. The reason critics use examples like rape is that they view them as actions that no virtuous person could ever knowingly entertain. However, suppose, for the sake of argument, it is possible for a just and loving, omniscient person to command rape. Rape would only be commanded in situations where a just and loving person, aware of all the relevant facts, could endorse it– and under these circumstances, it’s hard to see how one could take for granted it was morally wrong.

 Arbitrariness

A pervasive objection is that divine command theories make morality arbitrary because that nothing is right or wrong prior to God’s command; God can have no reasons for issuing one set of commands instead of another. Oppy explains the objection.

Could it have been, for example, that murder, rape, lying, stealing, and cheating were good because God proclaimed them so? Surely not! But what could explain God’s inability to bring it about that murder, rape, lying, stealing and cheating are good by proclaiming them so, other than its being the case that murder, rape, lying, stealing, and cheating are wrong quite apart from any proclamations that God might make?[2]

However, this is implausible. Suppose God has character traits such as being essentially loving and impartial. In that case, God can and would have reasons for prohibiting actions like rape, murder, or cheating, quite apart from whether these actions are antecedently wrong. Antecedent to any command on God’s part, these actions won’t have the property of being morally prohibited. But they could still have other properties such as being cruel or harmful or unjust or detrimental to human happiness— or being expressions of hatred, for example. And a loving and impartial God could prohibit these actions because these actions have these non-moral properties.

Divine command theories do not entail that morality is arbitrary. If anything, the opposite is the case. A divine command theory entails that actions will be wrong in virtue of certain non-moral properties those actions have. Non-moral properties would provide an informed, loving, and impartial person with reasons to prohibit those actions.

 Vacuity Objection

A third objection is that divine command theories entail that the doctrine of the goodness of God is rendered vacuous. Someone can only be morally perfect if he has duties and acts in accordance with them. But, seeing God does not issue commands to himself, a divine command theory entails that God has no obligations. Consequently, God cannot be God.

This objection assumes that God’s goodness should be explicated in terms of God faithfully discharging his duties. But there is no reason why we must understand God’s goodness in this way. In Christian creeds like the Westminster Confession, God’s goodness is understood as possessing certain character traits, such as being loving, impartial gracious, merciful, long-suffering, truthful, forgiving, etc. If God’s commanding an action makes it required, God cannot have an obligation to do these things; that does not mean God does not do them. God does not have to have a duty to do something in order to do it.

To recap: unless we assume that prudential and impartial commands never conflict, we cannot account for our fundamental intuitions about morality. Second, secular accounts of the kind of accountability we have to morality undermine this assumption. Fourth, a divine command theory would, if true, both vindicate this assumption and coherently account for our fundamental assumptions about morality.  Finally, standard objections against a divine command theory fail. The conclusion is this. If we assume God exists, a divine command theory can coherently and defensibly account for these fundamental assumptions in a way a secular theory cannot.


[1] Nathan L King, “Introduction”, in Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics, eds. Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 2008), 11.

[2]  Graham. Oppy, Best Argument against God (Hampshire: Palgrave Pivot, 2014), 44.

Tags:   · · · · · · · 3 Comments

Thinking Matters Talk: Does Morality Need God? Part Two:

August 29th, 2022 by Matt
Respond

This year the New Zealand apologetics organization Thinking Matters ran a “Confident Christianity Conference” in Auckland. I was asked to speak at this conference on the topic. Does Morality Need God? Below is a slightly streamlined version of the talk I gave.

I outlined four assumptions about the kind of requirements morality imposes upon us. These were

  1. Inescapability: moral requirements apply to us irrespective of whether following them contributes to any ends or aims we currently desire.
  2. Impartiality: moral requirements are justified from an impartial perspective.
  3. Authority: agents always have conclusive reasons to do what is morally required and never have sufficiently good reasons for doing what is morally wrong.
  4. Accountability: if something is morally required, we are guilty and liable to blame if we fail to do it and lack an adequate excuse.  

We can now turn to my first contention: secular accounts of morality cannot coherently account for these assumptions. I will make two points in support of this.

The first is that unless prudential and impartial requirements never conflict, we won’t be able to account for these assumptions coherently.[1] Why think this? Suppose it is not always in one’s long-term self-interest to comply with impartial demands. Sometimes a particular type of practical dilemma will occur. Impartial demands will conflict with prudential requirements. When they do, we face the question: What reason is there to act impartially rather than in one’s self-interest? What reason do we have for always giving precedence to impartial demands in such cases? [2]

One cannot answer this question by pointing out that we have impartial reasons to follow such rules based on the fact that other people will benefit or be harmed by our actions. The question, after all, is why I should give impartial reasons precedence in such cases. Nor can it be answered by appealing to my interests or because the case is one where morality and such things conflict. Many philosophers have argued that no answer is forthcoming. Three examples will illustrate the problem:

Example #1. Ms. Poore has lived many years in grinding poverty. She is not starving but has only the bare necessities. She has tried very hard to get ahead by hard work, but nothing has come of her efforts. An opportunity to steal a large sum of money arises. If Ms. Poore steals the money and invests it wisely, she can obtain many desirable things her poverty has denied her: a well-balanced diet, decent housing, adequate heat in the winter, health insurance, new career opportunities through education, and so on. Moreover, if she steals the money, her chances of being caught are very low, and she knows this. She is also aware that the person who owns the money is well off and will not be greatly harmed by the theft. Let us add that Ms. Poore rationally believes that if she fails to steal the money, she will likely live in poverty for the remainder of her life. In short, Ms. Poore faces the choice of stealing the money or living in grinding poverty the rest of her life.[3]

Example 2: A young woman has her heart set on getting into medical school. If she gets in, through hard work and dedication she will graduate and become a good physician. However, even after much study she has been unable to score high enough on the MCATs to be admitted to any medical school. She finds herself with an opportunity to cheat that will ensure her an MCAT score that is high enough to gain admittance to some medical school and so to eventually fulfill her lifelong dream. Her patients will not be harmed by being treated by an incompetent physician because she will not be an incompetent physician once she receives the necessary training. At most the only person who will be harmed is the person denied admittance to medical school because this young woman will take one of the available places and so leave one less slot to be filled. Assume that this person will only be slightly harmed and that somehow the young woman knows all this. It would be wrong for this young woman to cheat to get into medical school, but why isn’t it true that if she does not care about cheating, then what she has most reason to do is to cheat if she knows she can get away with it?[4]

Example: 3 Suppose your son has robbed a rich man of his jewels, the police are after him, and he asks you to help him escape to Brazil. You know you can arrange things so that neither of you will get caught. You also know that if he is caught he will be sent to prison and his life will be ruined, but if he escapes, he will have a good life in Brazil. It would be wrong of you to help him escape, but why isn’t it true that what you have most reason to do is to help your son escape justice?[5]

Cases like this suggest that, if impartial and prudential requirements conflict, agents don’t always have reasons to give precedence to the former. However, this means the total reasons in favor of doing what is impartially demanded will not always be stronger than the reasons against acting. Consequently, agents will not have conclusive reasons to do what they are morally required to do.

We can summarize the conclusion here as an inference from three intuitively plausible premises:

[1] Moral requirements are inescapable demands justified from an impartial perspective

[2] agents always have conclusive reasons to do what is morally required

[3] If there are cases where impartial and prudential requirements clash, then either (a) agents have reasons to always give precedence to impartial demands in such cases or (b) agents do not always have conclusive reasons to follow impartial demands.

[4] agents do not always have reasons to give precedence to impartial demands in such cases.

If these premises are all correct, we must either embrace the assumption that impartial and prudential demands never conflict or embrace a contradiction. We cannot claim both those moral requirements are inescapable and impartial and claim that agents have conclusive reasons to follow them. 

Second, secular accounts of the kind of accountability we have to morality would, if true, undermine this assumption. They entail that impartial and prudential requirements do sometimes conflict. I noted earlier that if something is morally required, we are accountable for doing it. Historically, many understood this in terms of accountability to God. However, God cannot play that role in a secular theory. What does? Atheist philosopher Walter Sinnott Armstrong answers: “human beings” do. “We each have the authority to hold people responsible for violating moral duties. If my neighbor steals jewelry from his grandmother, then surely, I have the authority to criticize him and his action…You do, too.” [6] “Morality is enforced verbally by public condemnation or socially by ostracizing violators.” [7]. In addition, “we all have the authority to vote for representatives who enforce moral norms through formal institutions, such as by legal punishments…. We collectively have the authority to impose such sanctions.” [8]

These kinds of sanctions might account for our being accountable to moral requirements. However, they are insufficient to ensure that it is always in everyone’s self-interest to comply with impartial requirements. The” norms enforced through legal punishments,” “public condemnation,” or “social ostracization” are often not justified from an impartial point of view. Laws often endorse or permit unjust practices that fail to take the interests of a segment of society into account. The accepted mores of the groups people belong to, such as nations, and gangs, often are designed to advance the interests of the group over and above those of others. The mores we legally and socially enforce are often unjustified by facts and sound reasoning. The laws of a society can and often do persecute people who act impartially. There are familiar cases where a person becomes a member of a social group where acting immoral enhances their social status, whereas doing what is right results in social ostracization.

Even if these norms were co-extensive, agents would not be held to account in cases where a person can violate these norms secretly without being detected. There also will be cases where whatever sanctions are incurred will be more than offset by the benefits gained by non-compliance. There will be many cases where a person knows that it is extremely unlikely they will be caught, and the risk of punishment or sanction is more than outweighed by the benefits one receives from disobeying.[9]

In summary, unless we assume that prudential and impartial commands never conflict, we cannot account for our fundamental intuitions about morality. Second, secular accounts of the kind of accountability we have to morality undermine this assumption. This means that secular accounts of morality cannot coherently account for our fundamental assumptions about morality.


[1] The argument from this section is influenced by the argument proposed by Henry Sidgwick (1900) The Methods of Ethics Book IV, chapter VI available at https://www.gutenberg.org/files/46743/46743-h/46743-h.htm#Page_496 and also John Gay (1731) The Dissertation Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality available at https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/wollaston-british-moralists-vol-2#lf1368-02_head_022  I adapt their ideas in my own way. David Brink develops a similar line of argument; see David Brink, “A Puzzle about the Rational Authority of Morality” and also “Kantian Rationalism: Inescapability, Authority, and Supremacy” in In Garrett Cullity & Berys Nigel Gaut (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason. (Oxford University Press, 1997). 255–291 

[2] See, for example, David Brink, “Self-Love and Altruism” Social Philosophy & Policy 14 (1997) 123.

[3] This example comes from C. Stephen Layman’s “God and the Moral Order” Faith and Philosophy, 23 (2006): 307

[4]  This example comes from Bruce Russell’s “Two Forms of Ethical Skepticism,” in Louis Pojman, Ethical Theory: Classical and Contemporary Readings (New York: Wadsworth, 1998), p. 595.

[5] Ibid 595,

[6] Walter Sinnott Armstrong, Morality Without God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 98.

[7] Ibid, 98.

[8] Ibid,

[9] These last two paragraphs summarize the argument of Henry Sidgwick in “The Method of Ethics” see Book II, chapter V.  available at https://www.gutenberg.org/files/46743/46743-h/46743-h.htm#Page_162 accessed 25/8/22

Tags:   · · · · Comments Off on Thinking Matters Talk: Does Morality Need God? Part Two:

Thinking Matters Talk: Does Morality Need God? Part One

August 24th, 2022 by Matt
Respond

This year the New Zealand apologetics organization Thinking Matters, ran a “Confident Christianity Conference” in Auckland. I was asked to speak at this conference on the topic. Does Morality Need God? Below is a slightly streamlined version of the talk I gave.

“If God does not exist, then everything is permissible.” These words from Ivan Karamazov in Dostoevsky’s The Brothers of Karamazov express a widely held intuition that moral requirements depend upon God’s existence. Most contemporary ethicists today would dismiss this intuition. In this talk, I will argue their dismissal is premature. I will defend what philosophers call a divine command theory of ethics. The thesis that moral wrongness is (identical to) the property of being contrary to God’s commands.[1] Where God is understood, in orthodox fashion, as a necessarily existent, all-powerful, all-knowing, essentially loving and just, immaterial person who created and providentially ordered the universe. 

Note three things about this thesis:

First, it is a thesis about the nature of moral requirements. It is not a thesis about the nature of goodness. The concept of “good, is ambiguous, as is seen by the following statements “I had a really good dip in the spa pool last night,” Or “going on a low carb diet is good for you.” Or “Carlos the Jakal was a good hitman.” The concept of the morally obligatory, or morally required, is not identical to the concept of what it is good to do. It might be good, even saintly, for me to give a kidney to benefit a stranger, but it is not an act I am obliged to do.[2] 

Second, my thesis is that the property of being morally required is “identical” to the property of being commanded by God.  I am not saying that people cannot know what is right and wrong unless they believe in God. Nor am I claiming that the word “wrong” means “contrary to God’s command.” These are distinct claims. Consider light; Light is identical to a certain visible range of the electromagnetic spectrum. But obviously, that isn’t the meaning of the word “light.” People knew how to use the word “light” long before discovering its physical nature. And they knew the difference between light and darkness long before they understood the physics of light. Analogously, we can know the meaning of moral terms like “right” and “wrong” and know the difference between right and wrong without being aware that the moral requirements are God’s commands.[3]

Third, this is a thesis about the relationship between God and morality. It is not a claim about the relationship between the bible and morality. The thesis I laid out does not mention any sacred text such as the Bible, Quran, Hadith, Torah, or Talmud. While many divine command theorists accept that God has revealed his commands in an infallible sacred text, some do not. The claim that God’s commands are contained in some sacred text is not part of or entailed by a divine command theory itself. It is the result of other theological commitments they have. One could consistently be a divine command theorist without holding this. Divine command theories are ecumenical; they have had advocates within the Christian, Islamic, Jewish, and even deist traditions.

Having clarified my thesis, I will defend three contentions.

  • Secular accounts of morality cannot coherently account for our fundamental intuitions about moral requirements.
  • If God exists, then a divine command theory can coherently account for our fundamental intuitions about moral requirements.
  • Standard objections to divine command theories fail.

I. Four Assumptions about Moral Requirements

But first, what do I mean by fundamental assumptions? Moral theories are tested, in part, by how well they account for various assumptions about morality implicit in our moral thought and practice. [4] I will begin by listing four plausible assumptions about the type of requirements morality imposes upon us.

One is that moral requirements are inescapable: they apply to us irrespective of whether following them contributes to any ends or aims we currently desire.  Consider a criminal who stands in the dock convicted of a crime; he openly admits the crime, is unrepentant and informs us that he wanted to kill and torture. Doing so did not frustrate any of his desires. Does our moral condemnation of him depend on us assuming he does not have statistically abnormal desires so that we withdraw this judgment when we discover he really does desire to kill and maim?  Moral requirements can’t be escaped or begged off by noting they don’t fulfill one’s goals or ends. [5]

Second moral requirements are requirements that are justified from an impartial point of view. Peter Singer explains:

The ‘Golden Rule’ attributed to Moses, to be found in the book of Leviticus and subsequently repeated by Jesus, tells us to go beyond our own personal interests and ‘love thy neighbour as thyself’ – in other words, give the same weight to the interests of others as one gives to one’s own interests. The same idea of putting oneself in the position of another is involved in the other Christian formulation of the commandment, that we do to others as we would have them do to us. The Stoics held that ethics derives from a universal natural law. Kant developed this idea into his famous formula: ‘Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.’ Kant’s theory has itself been modified and developed by R. M. Hare, who sees universalisability as a logical feature of moral judgments. The eighteenth -century British philosophers Hutcheson, Hume, and Adam Smith appealed to an imaginary ‘impartial spectator’ as the test of a moral judgment, and this theory has its modem version in the Ideal Observer theory. Utilitarians, from Jeremy Bentham to J. J. C. Smart, take it as axiomatic that in deciding moral issues ‘each counts for one and none for more than one’; while John Rawls, a leading contemporary critic of utilitarianism, incorporates essentially the same axiom into his own theory by deriving basic ethical principles from an imaginary choice in which those choosing do not know whether they will be the ones who gain or lose by the principles they select…. One could argue endlessly about the merits of each of these characterisations of the ethical; but what they have in common is more important than their differences. They agree that an ethical principle cannot be justified in relation to any partial or sectional group. Ethics takes a universal point of view[6]

Third moral requirements have practical authority: agents always have conclusive reasons to do what is morally required and never have sufficiently good reasons for doing what is morally wrong. Someone has conclusive reasons to act in a certain way when the reasons in favor of acting, taken together, are stronger than any set of reasons we may have to act in some other way.  If we don’t always have conclusive reasons to do what is right, having total allegiance to morality will be arbitrary and, at worst irrational.   We will have no more reason to do what is right than wrong. Or doing the right thing will be doing what we have a most reason not to do.[7]

Moral requirements are supposed to answer questions about what we are to do. They are considerations that guide our actions.  When we learn something is wrong, that tells us what we are not to do. They cannot do this if we lack conclusive reasons to do what they say.  Suppose you and I are discussing whether it is my duty to donate to the red cross. You convinced me it is my duty to do so. The red cross knocks on my door. I refuse to donate. I suspect this would puzzle you; didn’t I concede that I had a duty to do it? If I responded with “yes, I am persuaded it is my duty to do it, but that doesn’t mean I have reasons to do it,” I suspect you would think I was missing something. I would deny moral requirements have any authority or claim on my behavior and don’t address the question, “what ought I do?”.[8]

Or suppose you heard that I had resigned from my high-paying job. You think I am nuts. How am I going to provide for my family? Why would I give up the career I always dreamt of? I tell you, I discovered the firm was engaging in unethical business practices, and I had to resign to avoid being complicit. On hearing this, wouldn’t it now make sense that I did this? I was justified in doing so. If you do, you are assuming that the fact an action is wrong justifies my refraining from doing it.[9]

Fourth, a final assumption is that if something is morally required, we are accountable for doing it in an important sense.  John Stuart Mill famously stated,

“We do not call anything wrong unless we mean to imply that a person ought to be punished in some way or other for doing it—if not by law, by the opinion of his fellow creatures, if not by opinion, by the reproaches of his own conscience. This seems the real turning point of the distinction between morality and simple expediency.”[10]

There is a conceptual link between something being morally obligatory and something being blameworthy. If we do what is morally wrong without excuse, others can legitimately blame us, and guilt is warranted. Moral requirements conceptually are demands people make upon one each, which we can hold each other accountable through demanding an excuse, practices of blaming, criticizing, and guilt.

Robert Adams asks us to imagine a situation in which there are compelling reasons to support you not walking on the lawn. However, these reasons give you no grounds for feeling guilty if you do, and they provide no reasons for other people to make you feel like you must stay off the lawn or to blame and reproach you for doing so. Adams concludes that while there would be a sense in which you ought not to walk on the lawn, you have no obligation not to do so.[11]

So, whatever property moral wrongness is, it is the property of being prohibited by certain standards: standards that are inescapable and justified from an impartial point of view. The fact these standards prohibit an action means agents have conclusive reasons not to do the action in question. Agents are also accountable for actions doing actions prohibited by these standards. Others can blame and sanction me if I act contrary to them without an adequate excuse. A plausible thesis about the nature of moral wrongness should account for these facts.

In my next post, I will defend my first contention: that secular accounts of morality struggle to coherently account for these four assumptions.


[1] Robert M. Adams, “Divine Command Meta-Ethics Modified Again,” Journal of Religious Ethics 7:1 (1979): 76.

[2] Example from C. Stephen Evans, Kierkegaard’s Ethic of Love: Divine Commands and Moral Obligations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 16.

[3] This illustration comes from William Lane Craig see “Is Is the Foundation of Morality Natural or Supernatural? The Craig-Harris Debate” available at  https://www.reasonablefaith.org/media/debates/is-the-foundation-of-morality-natural-or-supernatural-the-craig-harris-deba/) accessed 19 August  2022.

[4] The implicit method here is described in Richard Joyce’s “Theistic Ethics and the Euthyphro Dilemma,” Journal of Religious Ethics 30 (2002): 68-69;”

[5] Richard Joyce, “Mackie’s Arguments for an Error Theory,” Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (available at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-anti-realism/moral-error-theory.html, accessed 20/4/17).

[6] Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 11

[7] This argument is adapted from C. Stephen Layman’s “God and the Moral Order” Faith and Philosophy, 23 (2006): 306- 307

[8] This example comes from Michael Smith’s The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing 1994) 6

[9] This example comes from C Stephen Layman’s “A Moral Argument for The Existence of God” Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics eds Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008) 53-54

[10] John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, chapter 5 available at https://www.utilitarianism.com/mill5.htm accessed 23 August 2022

[11] Robert M. Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 238.

Tags:   · · · · Comments Off on Thinking Matters Talk: Does Morality Need God? Part One